WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXX, Number 1 October 1977

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ISSN 0043-8871

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WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. October 1977. Vol. xxx, No. 1. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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ABSTRACTS

Minority Nationalities in China's Yunnan Province: Assimilation, Power, and Policy in a Socialist State

By D. J. SOLINGER

The varying experiences of different minority groups in China's Yunnan province are analyzed in light of the power resources that each possesses. The size, location, and impregnability of the group account for whether or not it can exert leverage on the regime in attempting to obtain cultural, political, and economic benefits. The author found that a group's assimilability, or its propensity to change its cultural traits, is negatively correlated with its numbers, with living in an isolated territory, and with its impregnability. The treatment the group has received under the People's Republic is dependent upon the same three power resources, as affected by the regime's policy and goals. For example, efforts have been made toward the political integration of groups whose main power resource is numbers, while the regime's main goal, when faced with groups whose principal resource is impregnability, has been to maintain civic peace.

On Peasant Revolution and National Resistance: Toward a Theory of Peasant Mobilization and Revolutionary War with Special Reference to Modern China

By R. THAXTON

A longstanding thesis on the Chinese revolution is that the peasants embraced the Communist movement because the brutalization by the invading Japanese Army aroused the village people, making it possible for the Communist Party to organize them and to appeal to their nationalist aspirations. A theoretical exploration of peasant mobilization and revolutionary war in the T'aihang Mountain-North China Plain revolutionary base suggests different reasons. The peasants there embraced the Communist movement mainly because the Communist Party 8th Route Army helped them regain their basic rights to subsistence in their struggles with landlords and local governments before the Japanese invasion. The armies of the Japanese and the Kuomintang exerted tremendous pressures on the peasant movements in the base area, and there was a negative correlation between the presence of these intruding forces and the emergence of a viable Communist political order. The revolutionary army won the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation largely by averting and ameliorating the burdens the peasants were encountering. In all of the revolutionary processes, the peasants placed greater value on the performance of the party in enhancing their livelihood than on the nationalist propaganda of the revolutionary movement.

A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocation

By R. D. McKINLAY and R. LITTLE

Two views, founded on divergent rationales, have been used to explain the allocation of official bilateral aid. One view explains the allocation of aid in terms of the humanitarian needs of the recipient, the other in terms of the foreign policy interests of the donor. Although the foreign policy view is now clearly dominant, it has not been developed systematically. This paper initially develops an analytic foreign policy model of aid allocation. The model suggests that the provision of aid leads to the establishment of commitment and dependency, enabling the donor to realize certain foreign policy utilities. These utilities in turn allow the donor to pursue its interests. These interests may be ordered into five substantive foreign policy models. The main research objective of the paper is to test these models in the context of U.S. aid by making a cross-national, longitudinal study of the distribution of U.S. aid over the years 1960-1970. We find that the foreign policy model which best explains the allocation of U.S. aid is one that is consonant with the political interpretation of imperialism.

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

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Negotiation as a Management Process

By G. R. WINHAM

Modern international negotiation is evolving toward a managerial process and away from a classical dispute-settlement procedure. Negotiation between governments is becoming the functional equivalent of bureaucracy within governments, and it is designed to increase orderly decision making and reduce uncertainty in the international society. Theories of bargaining and diplomatic representation are less useful in understanding modern large-scale negotiation than are theories about the management of information, or theories about how individuals develop common perceptions in complex situations. Concepts that help to explain modern negotiation are: problem-solving search, which emphasizes the development of relationships or hierarchies in complex data; programmed operations, which emphasize the tedious trial-and-error process of building agreement; and final agreement, which emphasizes the reformulation of problems.

Cognitive Maps of Three Latin American Policy Makers

By J. A. HART

Cognitive maps are representations of the causal beliefs or assertions of a specific individual. Maps of three Latin American policy makers (Carlos Andrés Pérez, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, and Aurelio de Lyra Tavares) suggest new hypotheses and ways of comparing maps across individuals: (1) individuals with broader political responsibility may have more complicated maps with respect to numbers of goals and policies, but less complicated maps with respect to *linkages* between policies and goals, than individuals with narrower responsibility; (2) maps of different individuals can and should be compared with respect to the degree to which they make (or fail to make) distinctions among related concepts; and (3) maps can be used to predict the future policies of individuals, and should be used in this way to test the theoretical potential of the approach.

From Revolution to Post-Revolution: How Much Do We Really Know about Yugoslav Politics?

By S. L. WOODWARD

This review of eight recently published works on Yugoslavia suggests that although information about the country is constantly increasing, the conceptual approach of social scientists continues to limit our understanding of its politics. Focusing on a variety of problems of interpretation that arise out of the concept of ideology in each work, the author offers alternative interpretations of Yugoslav politics and assesses the current state of our knowledge.

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MINORITY NATIONALITIES IN CHINA'S YUNNAN PROVINCE: Assimilation, Power, and Policy in a Socialist State

By DOROTHY J. SOLINGER*

A RECENT study of racial and ethnic group relations points to the importance of including "a consideration of power relationships" in studying the interactions of ethnic groups.[1] In this essay I will analyze the varying experiences of different minority groups in China's Yunnan province in light of the power resources that they possess. Specifically, I will show that three key structural variables—the size of the group, its location, and its impregnability—define the power of each group; they amount to its power resources. These three variables explain both the assimilability of each group and the treatment the group has received from the Chinese government.

Studies of ethnic groups (minority nationalities) that reside in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have generally dealt with the Chinese situation descriptively, as a special case.[2] Three aspects of governmental policy toward these groups have received attention: first, the particular traits and cultural configurations of individual minority groups and how policy has been geared to fit them; second, shifts in

* Many thanks for helping me to clarify an earlier draft of this paper go to Ray Corrado, June Dreyer, Gardel Feurtado, and Alberta Sbragia.

[1] Milton M. Gordon, "Toward a General Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1975), 89.

[2] Examples of excellent studies of minorities in the PRC are: David M. Deal, "National Minority Policy in Southwest China 1911-1965," Ph.D. diss. (University of Washington 1971); June Teufel Dreyer, "Chinese Communist Policy Toward Indigenous Minority Nationalities: A Study in National Integration," Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University 1972); Dreyer, "China's Quest for a Socialist Solution," *Problems of Communism,* XXIV (September-October 1975), 49-62; Dreyer, "Traditional Minorities Elites and the CPR Elite Engaged in Minority Nationalities Work," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1972), 416-50; George V. H. Moseley, "China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question," *China Quarterly,* XXIV (September-December 1965), 15-27; Moseley, *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Moseley, *The Party and the National Question in China* (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1966); Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966); and Alan Winnington, *The Slaves of the Cool Mountains* (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1959).

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overall, central-level policy toward minorities in general over the past 28 years; and, third, the distinctive features of the Chinese Communist approach—specifically, its attempt to recognize and retain as much of each minority's culture as is compatible with the state's own goals; its generous bestowal of material benefits to the different groups; and its efforts, more energetic at some times than at others, to include these groups in the political framework of the Chinese state. What is missing, however, is an attempt to generalize from these case studies of separate groups and changing policies, and to employ concepts that can be used by theoreticians of ethnicity in a broader context.

Yunnan province provides an excellent laboratory for the study of minority affairs, as it is inhabited by more ethnic groups than any other of China's provinces. Most sources claim that over twenty different peoples live here, nine of which have at least 200,000 members.[3] Minorities constitute up to one-third of the population of the province, reliably reported as 19,100,000 in 1957.[4] One writer has noted that "the intricate ethnic composition of Yunnan is unequalled in any other part of the world."[5]

In the discussion, I will first present my analytical framework, followed by some material on Yunnan province. Subsequent sections will illustrate the framework with examples of the assimilatory experiences of some of Yunnan's ethnic groups and of the types of treatment they have received under the PRC.

Framework and Hypotheses

The PRC, like some Chinese regimes of the past, has tended to be receptive to groups that live among the Han (the dominant ethnic group in China) and are not resistant to Han rule. The more assimilated groups have received a different type of treatment from those that are less assimilated. However, the reasons have not been systematically investigated. I will argue that this relationship can be explained by the fact that three key factors—size, location,[6] and impregnability—account for the assimilability of a given group and for the treatment it receives.

[3] *China News Analysis* [hereafter *CNA*], No. 232 (1958), 3.

[4] See United States, *Joint Publications Research Service* [hereafter *JPRS*], No. 26863, *Communist China Digest*, No. 130 (1964), 102.

[5] Inez de Beauclair, *Tribal Cultures of Southwest China* (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service 1970), 18.

[6] For the purposes of this paper, location is considered in terms of its impact on a group's seclusion. Proximity to international borders, another significant aspect of location, is not dealt with here.

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I will consider these three factors as power resources since, in Dahl's terms, their possession acts as a "means by which . . . to influence the behavior of others."[7] These resources might be used by a given minority group to achieve such presumed goals as: culturally, withstanding assimilation and retaining cultural identity; economically, holding on to or obtaining material resources; and politically, maintaining political autonomy or achieving political power.

In investigating the nature of the relationship between these power resources and the first dependent variable, a group's assimilability, assimilability will be defined as a group's propensity to change its cultural traits. Relevant cultural traits in the Chinese case include language, patterns of land use, social structure and class system, form of political organization, customs and beliefs, and the technological level and standard of living of the groups.

The following hypotheses relate the power resources to assimilability:

1. The larger a group within a given locale, the less assimilable it is likely to be;
2. The more inaccessible a group's territorial location, and thus the more isolated the group, the less its propensity to assimilate;
3. The more impregnable the group (according to the dictionary definition, "not capable of being captured by force . . . unyielding"), the less assimilable it tends to be. In Yunnan province, impregnability, or the ability to resist encroachments effectively, has historically been based on a particular military aptitude, and sometimes on a cohesive political organization.

FIRST RELATIONSHIP

Independent Variables	*Dependent Variable*
Size Location (inaccessibility) Impregnability	Assimilability (propensity to change cultural traits)

Thus, the differing cultural features of the various ethnic groups in China have been subject to modification (likely to undergo assimilation) depending upon a group's size, location, and impregnability. Contrary to what some have implied, the original cultural features of the group are not necessarily obstacles to its becoming assimilated into the prevailing Chinese cultural patterns.[8] Thus, minority groups in

[7] Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1963), 15.

[8] See especially Deal (fn. 2), 8; Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 22, 98-99; and Dreyer, "Chinese Communist Policy . . ." (fn. 2), 191-99, 355-57.

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Yunnan have not remained unassimilated, for example, because their society practices slash-and-burn agriculture, lacks classes, or has a low technological level. Rather, groups have continued to slash and burn because they are large in size, isolated geographically, and resistant politically or militarily.

A second set of relationships explains the connection between the same three power resources, again as independent variables, and the treatment the group has received under the PRC, as a second dependent variable. In order to formulate this connection, two intervening variables must be introduced: governmental policy and goals. "Treatment" will refer to governmental fulfilment or nonfulfilment of the three presumed minority goals noted above: withstanding assimilation and retaining cultural identity, holding on to or obtaining material resources, and maintaining political autonomy or achieving political power.

The PRC's policy toward minorities, as expressed in the three State constitutions adopted since 1949,[9] has affected the approach it has taken toward minority groups, as distinguished from Han Chinese. This policy, more or less unchanged in the three documents, sets out an undifferentiated strategy in dealing with these groups: it speaks of the equality of all groups, the right of each to regional autonomy in the area where it resides, the freedom of each to develop and use its own language, and the importance of building unity among all peoples of China.[10] These formal principles are modified when put into practice and are implemented differently for different groups. However, the general commitment to this set of guarantees still informs the treatment ethnic groups receive in China.

The goals of the PRC regime are probably more important than stated policy in understanding the treatment of different groups.[11] Those goals that have particular bearing on the implementation of policy include enlisting minority support for the Peking government and achieving the political integration of the minorities; obtaining economic control over minority territories and their resources; and militarily, ensuring civil peace within China and the security of the frontiers where most of China's minorities reside.[12] Thus, political, eco-

[9] These are the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (1949), the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954), and the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1975).

[10] See Dreyer, "China's Quest . . ." (fn. 2), for a summary of the shifts and variations in national policy toward minorities since 1949.

[11] Cf. Dreyer, "Chinese Communist Policy . . ." (fn. 2), 4-5.

[12] Of Yunnan's minority population of approximately 6 million, 2.2 million have been said to live along its more than 2,000 kilometers of international borders.

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nomic, and military factors all influence the treatment that different minorities receive.

The following variables describe the treatment of particular ethnic groups in China:

	SECOND RELATIONSHIP	
Independent Variables	*Intervening Variables*	*Dependent Variable*
Numbers	State Goals	Treatment
Location	(Political integration	(Cultural integrity
(inaccessibility)	Economic control	Economic benefits
Impregnability	Military security)	Political position)
	State Policy	
	(Equality	
	Autonomy	
	Linguistic freedom	
	Unity)	

The interrelationships among these variables will be specified in the final section of this paper in illustrating the treatment that particular groups have been accorded in the PRC. It should be stressed here, however, that both the assimilability of a given group (the first dependent variable) and the treatment it receives (the second dependent variable) depend on the power resources of that group. Before going on to examine the connections between this framework and the varied experiences of minority groups in Yunnan province, we must take a brief look at the province itself.

Yunnan Province

Yunnan province, with a large and mixed minority population, is marked by geographical remoteness. It has historically been, at best, a peripheral outpost along China's southwest border. A natural barrier of steep mountains—the Kao-li-kung, the Nu-shan, and the Yun-ling-shan—and turbulent rivers—the Lan-tsang (Mekong), Nu (Salween), Chin-sha (the upper reaches of the Yangtze), and Yüan (Red)—has blocked communications between interior China and Yunnan province as a whole. The province borders on Burma to the west and southwest, Vietnam to the south and southeast, and Laos to the central south. Even today, despite improved communications, Yunnan is relatively inaccessible and distant from the center of national power in Peking.[13]

Yunnan has been invaded many times, and various peoples have

[13] C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People* (New York: Praeger 1972), 77.

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migrated in from Tibet and Burma as well as from Szechwan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi provinces. As a result of these various migrations and the rugged terrain, the province became fragmented into separate homelands of different racial groups. One theory holds that the stronger peoples took over the valleys, pushing the weaker into the mountains, so that the most primitive groups landed on the levels where only those who lived by hunting and gathering could survive.[14] According to another theory, migrations proceeded in line with the economic characteristics of respective peoples: those accustomed to living in river valleys stopped there, while others preferred to settle on the mountain ranges.[15]

The area was not formally brought under direct Chinese control until the Mongol conquest of China in the thirteenth century. Up to that time, interaction between the few Chinese there and the aborigine population had been infrequent. Even thereafter, there was very little conscious and planned effort to bring the most isolated groups under Chinese influence. In fact, from ancient times, minorities were categorized as "raw" (unassimilable), or "ripe" (amenable to adopting Chinese civilization). Only those considered ripe were fully accepted and were offered official employment once they acquired a Chinese education and practiced Chinese social customs.

As far back as two thousand years ago, Chinese dynastic policy toward the non-Chinese people in the Yunnan area had taken on the character it was to retain, more or less, up to 1949: indirect rule through recognizing local chiefs as governors.[16] This practice reached its height through the *t'u-ssu* or "native chief" system that was formalized by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Under this system, tribal rulers were left in place so long as they paid tribute and kept the peace.

The *t'u-ssu* system accentuated and perpetuated the remoteness of the native groups in Yunnan and reinforced their impregnability. While resident Chinese officers with military staff were appointed in other tribal areas of China, in southwest China native chiefs were only loosely supervised. Despite repeated efforts by successive dynasties to abolish the system, it continued to exist throughout changes of political regime over a period of six centuries.[17]

The Nationalist government decreed the formal abolition of the

[14] *Ibid.*, 40.

[15] De Beauclair (fn. 5), 10.

[16] The following account draws on Fitzgerald (fn. 13), 46-74, unless otherwise noted.

[17] De Beauclair (fn. 5), 12; also see Deal (fn. 2), 72-73, and George Moseley, "The Frontier Regions in China's Recent International Politics," in Jack Gray, ed., *Modern China's Search for a Political Form* (London: Oxford University Press 1969), 302, 310, 321.

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t'u-ssu system in 1931. Some chiefs, however, retained *de facto* control over their territories into the 1940's.[18] By this time, Chinese attempts to penetrate the area had resulted in a dual system of control, under which the tribespeople tended to follow their traditional leaders, who were often well-armed. In fact, Chinese officials frequently needed *t'u-ssu* concurrence to get things done. The Yunnan provincial government attempted to eradicate the system, but in some cases ended up by restoring the chiefs to their positions in the belief that these rulers might be useful in protecting the frontier.[19] When the Communists entered Yunnan in 1949, they had to deal with an ethnically complex and in some cases recalcitrant population.

As we examine the first set of theoretical relationships—between assimilation and the size, location, and impregnability of several minority groups—we will get a sense of the nature of the various groups that confronted the new regime.

The Assimilatory Experiences of Some Yunnanese Ethnic Groups

Of Yunnan's more than twenty ethnic groups (following the Chinese linguistic method of classification), I have chosen nine for more intensive analysis; they were used in constructing the model presented above. The discussion in the two following sections uses some of these groups as examples. The nine studied are the Tai (including the Chinese Shan and the Lü), the Chingpo (or Kachin), the Hani (or Akha or Aini), the Yi (or Lolo), the Pai (or Minchia), the Lisu, the Lahu, the Kawa (or Wa), and the Nakhi (or Nahsi or Mosu). (See accompanying map.)

At least until recently, all but two of the tribes studied were hill people, practicing slash-and-burn shifting cultivation. Of the nine groups selected, only the Tai and Pai are lowlanders like the Han Chinese. The Tai peoples sought the river valleys; like the Han Chinese, they practice settled, wet-rice agriculture. The Pai are rice farmers of the plains and valleys. There has thus been a close link between settlement habitat and land-use patterns among these peoples, or between geographical location and assimilation into the economic ways of the Han Chinese.

Five of the groups (the Tai, the Yi, the Lisu, the Kawa, and the Nakhi) may be subdivided into two distinct types. In each case, one

[18] Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 28.

[19] Herold J. Wiens, *China's March Toward the Tropics* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press 1954), 247-54.

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

MAP OF YUNNAN PROVINCE

ROUGHLY SHOWING AREAS WHERE THE BULK OF EACH MINORITY GROUP DISCUSSED IN THIS PAPER IS CONCENTRATED

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of the types was still unassimilated into Chinese cultural patterns by the 1940's, while the other had become assimilated to varying degrees. Among the assimilated types, one can find instances of all kinds of cultural traits—language, land-use patterns, social structure, political system, customs and beliefs, and technological level—having undergone change upon contact with the Han.

The theoretical import of this aspect of Yunnanese ethnicity is that in each case where a group has become subdivided and where cultural differences have been modified, migration has occurred. Where a group has remained culturally unchanged, numbers, geographical isolation, impregnability, or some combination of the foregoing provide an explanation.

The two major Tai-speaking groups in Yunnan, the Lü and the Shan, have evolved quite differently from each other. Both are river valley, wet-rice cultivators.[20] As of the 1940's, the Chinese Shan, especially those living along the Yunnan-Burma highway, had lost much of their distinctive national character, and had become more or less like the Chinese. The Lü, on the other hand (located in southwest Yunnan in the Sip Song Panna, now called the Hsi-shuang Pan-na, according to the Chinese pronunciation), were still a nation at that time, with their own economic and political systems and culture. Their political and geographical isolation made them one of the least sinified of the groups of Yunnan. Moreover, the malarial conditions in the Sip Song Panna had stymied Chinese colonization. Chen describes the intricate feudal political and land systems of the Lü, which were based on a hereditary officialdom and centered around a royal court.[21]

It is significant that, according to Chen's 1940 figures, the Tai of the Shan states represented only 30 to 40 percent of the local population in their area, while the Tai in the Sip Song Panna accounted for somewhere between 50 and 85 percent of the residents there.[22] Probably related to the fact that the Tai in the Shan states did not constitute an overwhelming majority is Leach's finding that "it is legitimate to speak of Kachins [Chingpo] becoming Shans or of Shans becoming Kachins." Leach also notes that Shan traditions and theories of government have been borrowed from Chinese sources.[23] The Lü, on the other hand, despite nearly two centuries of Chinese attempts at conquest (1726–1909), responded with frequent revolts and were never com-

[20] E. R. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (Boston: Beacon Press 1954), 42.
[21] Chen Han-seng, *Frontier Land Systems in Southernmost China* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, 1949), 2, 6, 8; 15; chap. 5.
[22] *Ibid.*, 2.
[23] Leach (fn. 20), 61; 249.

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ASSIMILATION AND POWER RESOURCES OF SOME MINORITY GROUPS IN YUNNAN PROVINCE

People	*Size or Location in Relation to Local Population*	*Geographical Features*	*Impregnability (Political and Military)*	*Assimilatory Experiences*
TAI				
Lü	50-85%	River valleys; Isolation; Malarial conditions	Cohesive feudal system; Frequent revolts	As of the 1940's, largely separate, economically and politically; Unsinified
Shan	30-40%	River valleys; Along Yunnan-Burma highway	Chinese government system adopted	Much of their distinctive national character lost
YI				
Norsu (Black Bone)	Aristocracy of a region where Yi constitute the majority of the population	Mountain dwellers in a remote region	Warlike, raiders, fierce resistance, hostility Powerful *t'u-ssu*	Traditionally totally unaffected by Han civilization
White	A minority in Han regions	Scattered on plains and mountains throughout province	Forced to migrate	Acculturated
KAWA				
Wild	Homogeneous Kawa area	Isolated, mountainous homeland	Headhunters, warlike	Never under Han influence
Tame	A minority in Tai regions	Among the Tai in the lowlands	Headhunting abandoned	Assimilated into Tai culture
LISU				
Black	Homogeneous Lisu area	Hills	Autonomous; Raiders and murderers	Distinctive settlement and land-use patterns
White and Flowery	Among Han	Lowlands	Soldiers in Chinese armies	Assimilated, identify with Chinese
PAI	In blocs	Plains—accessible	Not hostile	Most assimilated group

pletely subdued.[24] Thus, in comparing these two Tai-speaking regions, one finds that, because of their larger numbers relative to other groups in the area, their greater geographical isolation, and their higher degree of impregnability (a cohesive political system and military resistance), the Lü of the Sip Song Panna were relatively less sinicized by the turn of the century.

When the Chinese did begin to penetrate the Lü area administratively in the twentieth century, their influence worked subtle changes on the feudal system. Traditional tribute payments gradually changed into rent, and land that had once been communal began to be shifted to the status of private family property.[25] Apparently neither Tai group is immune to assimilation once its isolation is successfully broken.

The Yi (or Lolo) of Yunnan may also be divided into two main types. The Norsu (or Nosu) of northern Yunnan are the aristocracy, also known as the Black Bone Yi. Like the Yi who inhabit the Taliang Shan (Cool Mountains) in southwestern Szechwan, they were the land-owning elite who traditionally engaged in animal husbandry, kept slaves, and raided Han Chinese areas for captives and booty. Known for their warlike behavior, fierce resistance to Han interference, and hostility to the Han generally, they had up to the 1950's been totally unaffected by Han civilization.[26] Like the Tai, they were under powerful *t'u-ssu* until the Communist takeover.[27]

The other Yi, who are scattered in the mountains and sometimes on the plains throughout the province, have become more acculturated to Chinese ways.[28] These are the White Yi, previously the serfs of the Black Bone Yi. Either they or their ancestors left the traditional Yi homeland and became adapted to Chinese ways, practicing both wet and dry agriculture, and adopting Chinese dress, religious festivals, surnames, and language. The further south a group of Yi was found, the less the traditional social stratification among them had survived by 1949.

There is one theory that the Yi now found in most of Yunnan were originally Han captured by the Black Bone Yi. In captivity, they be-

[24] Chen (fn. 21), chap. 4.

[25] *Ibid.*, chaps. 9-11, esp. pp. 34-35, 52, 62.

[26] Frank M. Lebar, Gerald C. Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, *Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: HRAF Press 1964), 20-25; also see Lin Yueh-hua, *The Lolo of Liang Shan* (New Haven: HRAF Press 1961), chap. 1, 6, 7, 8; Winnington (fn. 2).

[27] De Beauclair (fn. 5), 13.

[28] *Ibid.*; see also Lebar, Hickey, and Musgrave (fn. 26), 25-26; Wiens (fn. 19), 94; and Samuel R. Clarke, *Among the Tribes in Southwest China* (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Company 1970), 126-28.

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came assimilated to Yi culture patterns. However, as land became scarcer, they were forced to migrate while the Black Bone nobility stayed behind.[29] These White Yi have by now become so sinicized that they identify themselves with the Han.[30] It is interesting to note that these Yi, who were possibly originally abducted Han, were able for a time to forget their Han ancestry and consider themselves Lolo,[31] despite the fact that Black Bone (or Norsu) Yi civilization is technologically greatly inferior to that of the Han.[32]

These data on the Yi lead to conclusions similar to those drawn from the Tai case. First, the Norsu, who remained in an area where Yi constituted the bulk of the population, who were geographically isolated in montane regions, and who were effectively resistant to the Han, retained their cultural heritage at least until the late 1950's. The Yi who for one reason or another left this area to live among other peoples underwent cultural change. The point here is that there is nothing intrinsically unmalleable about Yi culture; its persistence has been tied up with the power it derives from being physically separate and militarily threatening.

The Kawa present a third case of a people with two branches, known as the savage and the civilized, or the wild and the tame Kawa, respectively.[33] The wild Kawa, living between the Salween and Mekong Rivers, were headhunters. Their fondness for warfare, and their superstitious belief that Chinese heads were most efficacious for their sacrifices, had historically kept the Han out of their hills quite effectively. They lived on dry-field agriculture, hunting, fishing, and gathering. These Kawa hated the Han and never came under their influence. Only a few scattered Shan settlements dotted the otherwise homogeneous, isolated, and mountainous wild Kawa homeland on the Burma border.

The tame Kawa have mainly resided in the south of the province, in the Sip Song Panna area and in an area farther north, bounded by the territory of the savage Kawa and interior Yunnan. They long ago abandoned headhunting and the religious beliefs accompanying it. These tame tribespeople are wet-rice farmers in lowland areas where a Tai-speaking population is dominant. On the eve of the Communist takeover, they were in the process of becoming Tai economically, religiously, and linguistically. In wild Kawa areas, any intruding peoples

[29] Wiens (fn. 19), 95. No definitive explanation has been given for the cause of this group's migration, or for that of any of the other minority groups' migrations.
[30] Lin (fn. 26), 2.
[31] *Ibid.*, 86.
[32] Winnington (fn. 2), 57.
[33] The following is drawn from Lebar, Hickey, and Musgrave (fn. 26), 129-30; Wiens (fn. 19), 309-11; and Winnington (fn. 2), 125-29.

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were subordinated to the Kawa; but once Kawa people ventured into alien country, they became susceptible to the foreign influences that worked to erode their culture and to undercut their power to resist assimilation.

The Lisu are yet another people who were split into acculturated and nonacculturated groups.[34] The assimilated (White and Flowery) Lisu practiced rice farming; the untouched (Black) Lisu made their homes in the hills and lived on swidden agriculture and hunting. Until the First World War, the Chinese exercised scant if any control over the upper Salween region, where the Black Lisu were concentrated. The latter kept their autonomy, venturing out only to raid Chinese caravans, and killing any Chinese who dared to enter their territory.

The Flowery and White Lisu to the south identified with the Chinese and adopted their customs; even before 1949, they fought in Chinese armies and intermarried with the Chinese. Once again, the presence or absence of military strength and an isolated, concentrated habitat split one ethnic people into groups with different cultures.

The rice farmers known alternatively as Pai or Minchia are centered around the Tali plain in western Yunnan, at the crossroads of trade routes.[35] Dwelling together as a bloc, the more than one-half million Pai have derived what power they have from their numbers;[36] their territory is not particularly inaccessible and their behavior has not been hostile. Though historically the Pai did not let incoming Chinese displace them from their plains, Chinese culture has seeped into the area over a period of seven centuries.

The Pai are now probably the most assimilated ethnic group in Yunnan province. By the time the People's Republic was established, their language was being supplemented or replaced by Chinese; their land system was quite similar to the pre-PRC Han system of private ownership; they were politically and militarily integrated into the Chinese state; and their educational system was heavily influenced by that of the Chinese. Only their social organization and kinship system had retained a separate form. Here, then, is a people whose habitat was not unapproachable and whose habits did not contribute to impregnability. As a result, Pai culture has been largely sinicized; only the White Yi, of all the peoples investigated here, are as assimilated into Chinese culture.

This discussion has recounted the experiences of a number of minor-

[34] See Lebar, Hickey, and Musgrave (fn. 26), 27-30.
[35] *Ibid.*, 9-12; Wiens (fn. 19), 293, 320-21.
[36] *CNA* (fn. 3), 3.

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ity groups in Yunnan before 1949 in order to simplify and generalize the dynamics of the assimilation process. In brief, several minorities in the province have been split into an acculturated and a nonacculturated subgroup. The main difference between the histories of the two has been that one subgroup remained in an isolated and inaccessible area where its numbers were concentrated and where its hostile, warlike behavior left it impregnable and resistant to Han Chinese encroachments. The other subgroup, living as a minority among other peoples, had to relinquish the power afforded by concentrated numbers, an isolated geographical setting, and impregnability. This information permits the following generalizations about the Yunnan experience before 1949:

1. Numbers, isolation, and impregnability are power resources that have diminished a group's assimilability;
2. Given the receptivity of the Han Chinese, the dominant ethnic group, there is nothing intrinsically unmalleable in the cultural makeup of these ethnic groups; once their power resources were removed, by whatever means, they became available for assimilation.

Thus, if one examines the cultural differences between the Han Chinese and these groups in their unassimilated forms, it becomes apparent that there are instances here of every type of trait undergoing assimilation. By the 1940's, most Pai spoke the Chinese language as well as their own.[37] Land-use patterns among the White Lisu and the tame Kawa had changed before 1949 from slash-and-burn agriculture to wet-rice cultivation. Social structure among the Lü was undergoing change as a prefeudal land system with some communal features was evolving into one based on private landownership when the Chinese entered and taxed the Lü domains.

Among the White Yi, a social structure based on a slave system with three classes disappeared as the White Yi migrated southward and settled among other peoples. The Shan political system was influenced by Han traditions and theories of government. Kawa beliefs were altered as the people became "tame" and ceased to hunt Han heads. And technologically, the Yi—a primitive people with a low productivity level and simple tools—[38] could both assimilate the culturally superior Han and be assimilated by them.

[37] C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Tower of Five Glories* (London: Cresset Press 1941), 13, 15-20.
[38] Winnington (fn. 2), 57.

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Thus, none of the cultural traits that have been offered as reasons why a group has not become assimilated—language, land use, social structure, political system, customs and beliefs, and technological level—are necessarily unchangeable, especially where the dominant group is receptive to acculturating outsiders. Given small numbers, intermixing, and lack of resistance, each trait has been shown to be capable of change, at least for some peoples. Consequently, in Yunnan at least, the basic and most important data one needs to know about a group to predict its success in retaining its cultural identity concern its power resources: its size, its location, and its capability to resist. These same power resources, mediated by governmental policies and goals, have determined the treatment that different groups are accorded in Yunnan.

The PRC's Treatment of Some Yunnanese Ethnic Groups

As noted above, the principles of equality, autonomy, linguistic freedom, and unity mark the formal ethnic policy of the PRC. These principles, though by no means entirely ignored, are honored differentially; the result is that the different groups receive different types of treatment. The present rulers have not explicitly stated that they are pursuing different strategies toward different groups (except to insist, at various points in time, that the "special characteristics" and "concrete conditions" of the groups should be taken into account).[39] However, the government's interest in building a strong national state that enlists active support from all its people, and that is economically strong and militarily secure, has caused the regime to bend policy, at least in Yunnan province, apparently based upon what we have termed the power resources of the various groups.

The following discussion illustrates the relationship between power resources, state goals and policy, and treatment. The latter is discussed principally in terms of two of the presumed minority goals—retaining cultural integrity and maintaining or achieving political position. Bestowal of material and welfare benefits—preferential commercial policies, educational assistance, public health services, transport and communications infrastructure, assistance in agricultural and industrial development, and outright subsidies—is a hallmark of general Chinese policy toward all minorities; these benefits have not been meted out differentially.

For the purposes of this discussion, minority groups have been categorized as:

[39] See Dreyer, "China's Quest . . ." (fn. 2).

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A: Most assimilated or assimilable ("ripe" in traditional terms, geographically accessible and nonresistant in our terms); especially those whose main power resource is size;

B: Those whose resources are mixed (e.g., less numerous than A-groups and somewhat isolated, but not strongly hostile in the past);

C: Least assimilated or assimilable ("raw" in traditional terms, geographically isolated and impregnable in our terms).

Two caveats: first, it should be noted that Yunnan itself has the special characteristics of remoteness and large numbers of ethnic groups. Thus, for even the most assimilated of the Yunnan minorities, treatment might differ from that of groups in more accessible areas; and groups in more accessible areas may actually be more assimilated than the most assimilated Yunnan group. Second, because of temporal shifts in the PRC's policy toward minorities, these illustrations are relevant only at a crude level of generalization.[40]

The hallmarks of the treatment of A-group minorities are grants of political participation (a higher number of party members relative to total numbers, leadership positions within their larger-than-average administrative areas), and bestowal of cultural visibility. Furthermore, A-groups, being more assimilated and thus more like the Chinese, are less likely than other groups to be exempted from social reform movements. The chief aim of the regime in dealing with these peoples has been to ensure their political integration into the state.

Although the Tai, especially in the Sip Song Panna, were geographically isolated to a certain extent before 1949, their behavior was not overtly hostile and warlike; by the time of Communist takeover, their region had already been economically penetrated by the Han. The Shan, particularly those along the Yunnan-Burma highway where contacts with Chinese were frequent, were said to have lost much of their distinctiveness. Moreover, the Tai are quite numerous in Yunnan: the most reliable figure is considered to be 480,000 for 1953.[41] For these reasons, the Tai are here considered as an A-group.

[40] The shifting means that the central government has used over time in leading the Chinese minorities toward an eventual regime goal of integration are well documented and summarized in Dreyer, "China's Quest . . ." (fn. 2), and Moseley, "China's Fresh Approach . . ." (fn. 2). For a more detailed study of these changes, see June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976).

[41] Population figures for the various groups have been taken from *CNA* (fn. 3); *JPRS*, No. 21463, Translations of Political and Sociological Information on Communist China, No. 106 (1963); de Beauclair (fn. 5), 20-25; and Union Research Institute, *Communist China 1960* (Hong Kong 1962), 201.

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The Tai have been granted two large autonomous areas[42] in which, despite the presence of other groups, they are clearly the favored nationality. They monopolize the leading positions, and symbolic ways have been found to emphasize that leadership. For example, in both areas, princely seals of office were presented to the traditional Tai chieftains. In one area, the tribal administrative unit was retained;[43] in the other, the first political congress was held in the form of traditional Tai new year's rites.[44]

As of the mid-1950's in the Lü area (now the Hsi-shuang Pan-na), 60 percent of the total number of cadres were members of minorities; in the Shan area (now Tehung Tai Chingpo), only 16 percent of the cadres came from minorities.[45] According to our model, this can be explained by the fact that the Tai people in the Lü area had greater power—both because of their larger numbers and because of their greater isolation.

Culturally, the Tai have in several ways been given visibility where other groups have not. Tai was made the official language in the autonomous government in the Hsi-shuang Pan-na, despite the presence there of many other groups.[46] Since most Tai people are Buddhists, a Buddhist association was set up there in 1956.[47] As recently as 1975, the Tai all over Yunnan were permitted to celebrate their traditional water festival, albeit by substituting study of Mao and farming work for much of the traditional content of the festival.[48]

Other A-groups in Yunnan include the sinicized White Yi (total Yi in Yunnan number over a million, but some of these are the unsinicized Black Bone Yi; Communist figures do not make this distinction) and the Pai (about 560,000 people). Along with the Tai, these groups were better represented among the deputies chosen at the first Yunnan

[42] Autonomous areas were provided for in Article 50 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 1949, which served as the temporary constitution of China until 1954. These areas were, in theory at any rate, to guarantee regional autonomy where national minorities are concentrated. In such places, special organs were set up according to the size of the populations involved; special attention was to be paid to respecting minority languages and customs; minority cadres were to be trained and put into office; and special economic benefits were to be granted. The Common Program is translated in Albert P. Blaustein, ed., *Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China* (South Hackensack, N.J.: Fred B. Rothman 1962), 51-52.

[43] Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 66, 115; 113; 66.

[44] *Survey of China Mainland Press* [hereafter *SCMP*], No. 614 (1953), 17.

[45] Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 111.

[46] *SCMP*, No. 669 (1953), 29-30.

[47] *SCMP*, No. 1419 (1956), 10.

[48] Kunming Radio, April 25, 1975.

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Provincial People's Congress in 1954 than were the other groups.[49] The White Yi and the Pai were given large autonomous areas within the interior of the province (the Ta-li Pai and Ch'u-hsiung Yi autonomous districts, respectively).

Although little has been said about preserving Yi culture, a special investigation of Pai and Tai cultural treasures was undertaken in 1957.[50] A few years before that, it had been reported that medical students at Yunnan University included Tai, Pai, and Yi, but none of the other groups were enrolled here.[51] The lack of exemptions accorded the Pai and sinicized Yi during social reform movements is illustrated by their experience during land reform: both groups carried out this movement at the same time and in the same manner as the Han Chinese.[52]

The political inclusion and bestowal of cultural visibility that characterized the treatment of the Pai, White Yi, and Tai, and the lack of exemptions that marked work with the Pai and Yi, may be related to the power resources of these peoples and to the goals of the regime. Since the regime's principal goal with respect to these peoples has been to integrate them politically, it is likely that their main power resource —numbers—has mandated a policy of rough representation on a quota basis. These groups were not overtly hostile and did not pose a military threat; there was probably no fear that they would clamor for separatism once they were courted culturally. In any case, the salient aspects of their cultures were not dangerous.

Group B minorities are best illustrated by the Hani, and in some cases by the Tai. The government's efforts toward groups with a combination of power resources (for example, relatively large numbers and some isolation, but no fierce resistance historically) were directed, as in the case of group A, chiefly at political integration.

Since their population is not as large as that of group A, however, and since their isolation is not combined with threatening behavior like that of group C, the situation of group B lies between that of the other two. B-group minorities tend to be given some, though fewer, of the special benefits of cultural visibility and political recognition, and to receive fewer exemptions. The regime's principal aim has simply been to bring these groups into the system—for example, to settle them in autonomous areas where several peoples live and where they do not necessarily predominate. The larger a minority of this type, the more it is treated

[49] *SCMP*, No. 875 (1954), 42-45. Of 45 deputies chosen, 23 were picked from 14 minority groups. Of these, 5 were Yi, 4 were Tai, and 2 were Pai. There were also 2 Kawa, but the remaining 11 groups had only one representative each.

[50] *SCMP*, No. 1504 (1957), 24.

[51] *SCMP*, No. 496 (1953), 18.

[52] Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 95, 99.

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like group A (allowed to play the dominant role in an autonomous area, for example); the more it resembles group C in terms of hostility, the more it will be treated as a C-group (receiving exemptions, for instance).[53]

Originally, sub-county-level autonomous areas were created for the less numerous peoples. By 1952, such units were disbanded or amalgamated into larger units, thereby diminishing the significance of "autonomy" for the smaller groups.[54] In an attempt to compensate for this loss, the larger peoples, such as the Tai, were encouraged to help the people of other nationalities, such as the Hani, achieve "area autonomy" within the framework of the larger areas. In this way, smaller B-groups were brought into the system. Press reports on this type of activity stressed that these efforts were geared at "strengthening unity" among the various nationalities involved.[55]

The less numerous peoples also did less well in the promotion of cadres. Problems existed even in the Hani's own relatively large autonomous area. In 1956, for example, minority cadres were said to number more than 50 percent of total cadres in the area, but that figure included Miao and Yi cadres transferred there from other places.[56]

Around the same time, cadres dealing with minorities in Yunnan undertook a self-criticism of their work, in which they revealed that, though Yunnan had more than 5,000 minority cadres, the distribution among the different groups was quite unbalanced. In particular, cadres stationed at the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy were being ignored.[57] And it was at these lower levels that the cadres of the smaller minorities were working.

Many stories in the press of the early 1950's tell of yet another way of including these isolated small minorities and increasing the regime's control over them: such groups were encouraged to move out of their mountain habitats and onto the plains and valleys. Among the groups urged to make this descent were the Chingpo, Lisu and Hani.[58] In social reform, these peoples received a middle-range kind of treatment. They did not undergo full-scale land reform along with the Han Chi-

[53] Large numbers and hostility do not tend to go together, probably because unassimilated groups isolated in the mountains were not numerous by 1949. However, the Kawa are a sort of counterexample with a population of 300,000 (some of whom, though, are of the "tame" branch). In their case, a divide-and-rule strategy has been followed, as noted below.

[54] Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 49.

[55] See, for example, *SCMP*, No. 505 (1953), 22-24, and No. 589 (1953), 28.

[56] *Yun-nan jih-pao* [hereafter *YNJP*], January 7, 1956.

[57] *SCMP*, No. 1351 (1956), 25-27.

[58] See, for example, *SCMP*, No. 321 (1952), 23-24, and No. 1169 (1955), 30; *JPRS*, No. 13153 (1962), 28, and No. 26863 (1964), 102.

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nese, but they had to take part in the "peaceful, consultative" variety described below.[59] The Hani and the Tai as well as the Chingpo carried out land reform in this manner.[60]

Thus, these peoples neither received special recognition politically, nor the degree of exemptions accorded to the C-group. Their cultures have not been singled out for particular attention. They are placated to a certain extent, but the PRC government probably assumes that minorities of this type—without the power resources of either large numbers or historical impregnability—are least likely to be major sources of friction.

Group C minorities include the Norsu (unassimilated Yi), the Kawa, and, in some senses, the Chingpo. All of them traditionally had reputations for fierce behavior which, along with the geographical isolation that also characterized them, constituted their main power resource. In a sense, these resources have won a kind of bonus for groups trying to preserve their autonomy: it has given them more exemptions from social reform movements than other groups, and kept them on the fringes of society where they had been historically. The regime's main goal in handling these peoples has been to ensure civil peace.

At the same time, there has been a lack of opportunity for these groups to participate in the PRC polity. For both the Norsu and the Kawa, autonomous areas were established relatively late. The Norsu region in northern Yunnan was said to have been liberated by the Communists in 1950, but the first work team did not enter there until 1953. The Kawa were the only frontier-dwelling people for whom an autonomous area had not yet been established by 1956. The indication is that the Communists tended to delay working with the most hostile and dangerous groups until the regime had first accumulated power through integrating other groups. Moreover, while the process of establishing civil organs of rule proceeded relatively quickly in other areas, military rule tended to persist in Kawa areas. Among other tasks, the army had the job of reforming the local custom of headhunting.[61] Rather than giving the 300,000 Kawa people one administrative region to inhabit once area autonomy had been established for them, three contiguous areas were set up, dividing the Kawa in order to control them better. Similarly, the Chingpo, a warlike mountain people, were junior partners in the autonomous area where the Shan group of the Tai were dominant (the Tehung Tai Chingpo Autonomous Chou).

[59] Winnington (fn. 2), 208, describes these three modes of transition to socialism.
[60] *YNJP*, April 5, 1956; Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 95.
[61] *Ibid.*, 92; 89; 106, 118.

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As for selection of cadres from the C-groups, there is some indirect evidence that they have not fared well. One source notes a "failure to foster minority cadres," especially among those whose cultural and economic levels are "backward."[62] Similarly, in speaking of Chinese Moslems in a northern province, Dreyer notes a tendency to exclude warlike minorities from participation in party and government affairs.[63]

Along with this exclusion however, C-groups have been given exemptions from certain social reform movements and have been permitted to delay the implementation of others. The Lisu, Kawa, and Chingpo, for example, skipped over land reform altogether, because, it was said, land ownership in their areas was not very concentrated, production was backward, and earning a livelihood was hard.[64] They were said to be making a "direct transition to socialism."[65]

For the Norsu, the system known as "peaceful, consultative land reform" was undertaken. No force was used, and upper-class personages were permitted to retain political rights. And although their land was taken over and divided up, and debts owed them were cancelled, these individuals were granted subsidies, a practice unheard of in Han Chinese areas or among the more assimilated minorities.[66] In these areas, land reform was carried out as much as five years later than it had been among the Han and other groups.

The cooperative movement that followed land reform was also late and proceeded slowly among these peoples. By 1957, for example, only 12.2 percent of the Chingpo population had entered agricultural producer cooperatives,[67] although the co-op movement had been completed a year earlier in other areas of China. In the Kawa areas and in other places where hill peoples lived, the cooperative movement also lagged behind.[68] A final example of exemptions comes from one of the Kawa areas in south Yunnan. Here, in the early 1960's, serfdom was found to have been re-established after having been abolished earlier.[69]

The central aspects of the cultural heritage of these C-groups seem to

[62] *SCMP*, No. 1381 (1956), 25-27.
[63] Dreyer, "Chinese Communist Policy . . ." (fn. 2), 156.
[64] *YNJP*, April 5, 1956.
[65] Winnington (fn. 2), 209, notes that this policy was used for primitive groups where class divisions were unclear or minor and not recognized by the people themselves. Although the lack of perceived classes does justify omission of a reform aimed at deepening class antagonisms, it is also true that this policy need only be used for unassimilated groups, and is thus an exemption that their power wins for them.
[66] *Ibid.*, 78.
[67] David M. Deal, "Policy Towards Ethnic Minorities in Southwest China, 1927–1965" (Northwest Regional Seminar on China, University of Washington 1972), 22.
[68] Moseley, "The Consolidation . . ." (fn. 2), 126.
[69] *CNA*, No. 720 (1968), 6.

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have received less attention than those of the others; in some cases they have been deliberately eradicated. An example of the latter case is the army's assignment to abolish the Kawa practice of headhunting. The press is silent on explicit efforts to honor the culture of the more hostile peoples, beyond the customary bows to language, costume, and dance which all minorities receive. Probably, given the regime's goal of achieving peaceful relations between these peoples and the Chinese, it was considered safest to leave them outside the system as much as possible and to avoid alienating them by rapid attempts to modify their social systems, once their most heinous habits had been abolished.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have generalized the experiences of minority groups in Yunnan province in analytic terms. I explained assimilability, i.e., the propensity to undergo cultural change, in terms of the power resources of various groups—defined, in the case of Yunnan, as numbers, location, and impregnability. Assimilation was seen as possible for non-hostile groups with small numbers, living among the Han Chinese, once these groups accepted Chinese social forms and practices, which many tended to do.

I have related the PRC's goals, particularly political integration and civil peace, to the power resources of the various nationalities. The regime has been interested in bestowing political recognition on groups whose main resource is numbers, and in ensuring their participation in the system. For non-hostile groups with smaller populations and without significant resources, there have been no outstanding efforts to do more than appease them. The policy for groups who, though their numbers may not be large, have the potent resource of long-term hostility and resistance has been to permit them to live almost on the fringes of the system, and to exempt them from social movements that might stir up their hostility.[70]

There is no clear way to evaluate the extent to which the minorities' own assumed goals have been fulfilled. It does seem that groups whose only resource is numbers have had to accept a definition of their cultural identity formulated by the Chinese and, at best, a chance to participate in a Chinese-designed and -dominated system. It may be that the groups

[70] According to the *New York Times* (April 22 and May 31, 1976), 20 Lahu and Pulang families were at the time still living outside the system in Yunnan. The Lahu, according to Lebar, Hickey and Musgrave (fn. 26), 30-32, are a proud, quarrelsome people, who, until recently, retained their autonomy in the mountains. They boasted a reputation for being able fighters against Chinese encroachments.

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with the power—if latent—to resist, have fared best because of the exemptions accorded them.

The aims of this paper were limited: to reach an understanding of ethnicity, assimilability, and the treatment of minority groups in one specific locale over time. However, the use of analytic concepts may enable other analysts to see more readily the distinctions and similarities between the experiences of ethnic groups in Yunnan and those of other groups elsewhere.

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ON PEASANT REVOLUTION AND NATIONAL RESISTANCE: Toward a Theory of Peasant Mobilization and Revolutionary War with Special Reference to Modern China

By RALPH THAXTON*

THROUGHOUT the 20th century, Western social scientists have by and large explained contemporary peasant revolutions in categories and concepts born of the European Enlightenment and of the cold war. Many outstanding theorists have located the reasons for revolutionary victory in organizational weapons, foreign-induced nationalism, imported Bolshevism, and Communist-induced people's war. These grandiose theoretical explanations have provided some insightful interpretations of the origins and growth of the Chinese revolution—the world's first great peasant revolution.

Yet a quarter-century after the Chinese revolutionary victory, we still know very little about the social origins and conditions of peasant participation in the Chinese revolutionary processes in any given region, much less how that participation compares across regions. A comparative theoretical understanding of the Chinese revolution will require ultimately a grasp of specific regional experiences. In this essay, therefore, I will focus on the changing pattern of peasant mobilization and revolutionary war in the T'aihang-Pingyuan region before and during the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation. The T'aihang-Pingyuan region, with a population of approximately forty million rural people, was the nerve center of the Chinese Communist Party's 8th Route Army between 1937 and 1949. This Shantang Plateau–North China Plain region, stretching from the T'aihang Mountains in Shansi to the Po Hai Gulf Coast in Shantung, became an inferno of counter-revolutionary war under the scorched-earth practices of the Japanese and Kuomintang armies. By examining this area, we may evaluate the

* I wish to thank Edward Friedman, Mark Selden, John Starr, Ben Kerkvliet, and Michel Adas for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A Foreign Area Fellowship and a post-doctoral Fellowship from the University of California Center for Chinese Studies made possible much of the research for this essay.

World Politics, October 1977, Vol. XXX, No. 1 © 1977 by Princeton University Press

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intervening independent impact of Japanese and Kuomintang counter-insurgency warfare on the Communist peasant movements in North China with an eye toward explicating the relationship between social revolution and national resistance.

In this essay, I seek to establish the starting points for a theory of peasant mobilization and revolutionary war with special reference to modern China. With this in mind, I examine, first, the changing terms of rental relations between peasants and landlords prior to the overthrow of the Ching dynasty, after the collapse of dynastic guarantees, during the initial phases of Communist-led peasant protest, and during the Japanese invasion. I then explore peasant interpretations of the nationalist message which the Communist Party introduced in enforcing exchanges between peasants and elites during the Anti-Japanese War. Next, I analyze the changing pattern of peasant involvement in the struggles of the Communist Party's 8th Route Army with Japanese and Kuomintang armies, both during the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation. Finally, I trace the origins of the Communist Party's legitimacy to the ways in which revolutionaries borrowed from and built on the ongoing traditional resistance activities among the peasants. The Chinese-language sources for this essay are partly preliberation documents of the Communist Party on the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation which Kuomintang armies captured during raids on the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Region in 1946–1947, and partly postliberation pro-Communist documents and pro-peasant literary works on peasant rebellion and revolutionary war from the fall of the Ching dynasty to the rise of the People's Republic.[1] Since the values of the peasants may have been different from those of the Communist powerholders, I have tried to separate the peasant from the Communist meaning in these sources, while keeping in mind that in regions where the peasants took power, their values may have become the moral pillars of the revolutionary political order.

[1] Some of the basic sources on the T'aihang-Pingyuan base area are Ch'i Wu (ed.), *I-ko ko-ming ken-chu-ti ti ch'eng-chang: K'ang-jih chan-cheng ho chieh-fang chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien-ch'u kai k'uang* [The Growth of a Revolutionary Base: The General Conditions of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region During the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance and the War of Liberation] (Peking: The People's Press 1958), 1-196; *Kuan-yu Chi-nan kung tso ti yi chien* [Opinions Concerning Work in Southern Hopei] (The Propaganda Department of the Shantung Party Branch 1942), 1-156; Liu Po-ch'eng, "Women tsai T'aihang shan shang," [When we were in the T'aihang Mountains] (*Jen-min jih-pao*, June 21, 1962); also see *T'aihang jen-chia* [The People of T'aihang] (Peking: China Youth Publishing House 1964). The translation of this source is in *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, IV (Spring-Summer 1972) and V (Fall-Winter 1972–73). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the present author.

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I. The Revolutionary Rectification of Exploitation in Subsistence Rental Relations

In the T'aihang-Pingyuan region, the Communist Party's 8th Route Army initially gained a foothold by supporting the traditional demands for subsistence by peasants who were rebelling in order to restore values they were losing.[2] With the collapse of the Ching dynasty after the mid-19th century, the peasants lost an essential political safeguard against naked exploitation and repression by landlords and local governments; these elites began to transgress the peasants' rights to harvest and home without fear of reprimand by the central government. Under the basic conditions of rural insecurity, poor crop yields and grain shortages, droughts and flooding leading to widespread erosion and displacement of the soil, famine and epidemics, and unpredictable swings in prices of subsistence commodities, the peasants began to protest long before the Japanese invasion because they were afraid that their families would go hungry. In many parts of T'aihang-Pingyuan, then, the peasants were acting on their own initiative. A decade before the 8th Route Army clashed with the Japanese Army on the North China Plain, the peasants were pleading with landlords to abolish outrageous interest rates on loans for grain, and they were petitioning the government to hold down the prices of salt and the taxes on grain, in order to stop the landlords and warlord-oriented Kuomintang magistrates from reducing them to wretchedness.

Although the Communist Party's 8th Route Army momentarily enabled many peasants to regain their sustenance, the Japanese occupation gave the rackrenting landlords a new lease on political life and permitted them once again to violate the subsistence rights of the rural poor. In the T'aihang Sub-Region, the Communist Party helped the peasants to regain the subsistence provisions they expected in exchange for rent payments and labor, and the 8th Route Army enabled peasant self-defense teams and militias to join in overthrowing the old ruling groups who violated these provisions. Only here was the revolutionary government able to persuade the peasants to support the Anti-Japanese War. The behavior of tenants, a particularly destitute sector of the peasantry, illustrates this pattern of peasant mobilization and revolutionary war in the war-torn districts of the T'aihang-North China Plain.

[2] Cf. Ch'i Wu (fn. 1), 99-130; *T'aihang jen-chia* (fn. 1); and just about any Chinese source on the rent and interest reduction and wage increase movements among the peasantry during the War of Resistance.

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A. TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE EXCHANGE (PRE-1911)

Although landlord-tenant relations had seriously deteriorated throughout the last years of the 19th century, tenants were trying to hold on to their traditional subsistence rights.[3] Almost all tenants paid crop rents and performed services for landlords in exchange for a set of subsistence provisions. Tenants had the right to secure employment, as evidenced in traditional five-year and permanent tenancy contracts, and they took a subsistence share of the harvest, such as half of the crop, under the customary fifty-fifty sharecropping agreements. On the North China Plain, tenants customarily petitioned landlords to reduce the crop rent by 25 percent in the aftermath of a poor harvest, to cancel the crop rent in the face of successive crop failures, and to make interest-free loans of grain to get through the spring hunger. Landlords were expected to provide head towels and straw hats to protect tenants from sunstroke, and puttees to guard them against leeches and snakebite in the damp fields. When tenants became ill, the landlord was obligated to fetch a doctor and pay medical fees. Landlords were also expected to hire, pay, and lodge extra field hands to help with weeding and earth-banking during the spring. Although landlords sought to minimize their contributions whenever possible, such provisions were the main social rights tenants sought in these reciprocal relations.

B. EXPLOITATION BY RENTIERS; TENANT PROTEST (1911–1937)

With the collapse of the Ching dynasty, tenants lost a crucial check on exploitation by the central government. The landlord-*rentiers*, backed by the warlords' guns and Kuomintang magistrates, overthrew the traditional terms of subsistence rental agreements with tenants.[4] Rather than honor five-year and lifelong tenancy rights, landlords leased the land only on an insecure short-term basis and demanded rent deposits—which tenants could neither afford nor recover—as a precondition of tenancy. In many instances, they violated the customary arrangements, replacing the old fifty-fifty sharecropping agreements

[3] The Chinese sources that evidence these traditional subsistence rights are *T'aihang jen-chia* (fn. 1); Chi Teng-K'uei, *Hua Hsien cha chien yun-tung chien pao* [A Report on the Investigation of the Rent Reduction Movement in Hua County] (Materials for the Mass Movement, Civil Movement Department Hopei-Shantung-Honan District Party Committee: 1945?), 21-45; *Fa ling hui pien Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien chu cheng fu pien* [A Compilation of Laws and Directives Edited by the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government], Vol. I, Part 1 (The Tao Fen Bookstore: July 1945).

[4] Ch'i Wu (fn. 1), 100-115; *T'aihang jen-chia* (fn. 1), 57-70.

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with fixed amounts or different percentages. In the villages on the Yellow River Plain, landlords substituted the devalued inflationary banknotes of the Kuomintang for the customary grain wages and cut back on meals for tenants and hired hands. In the T'aihang Mountains and on the Plains of Hopei and Honan, landlords collected rents regardless of changes in the quantity or the quality of the harvest.[5] They also discontinued spring hunger loans, and made grain loans only for comparatively short periods at interest rates generally above 50 percent and even as high as 100-200 percent.[6] In Hua *hsien* and Pu *hsien*, two grain-rich counties in the Yellow River Plain, landlords withdrew the head towels, straw hats, puttees, and work pants they customarily supplied to tenants and field hands before the temple-market festivities.[7] They also defaulted on their traditional obligations to fetch a doctor and pay medical fees when sickness struck the tenants who tilled their fields.[8] In several instances, landlords reneged on hiring extra field hands for spring planting, or restated leases to take the wages for extra field hands from the tenants' customary share of the harvest.[9] They even made tenants assume responsibility for the harvest-time carting services for which they had paid in the past. These violations of customary agreements brought hunger to tenant families, and made them voice their grievances long before the arrival of the Communist Party or the Japanese.

Tenants carried out protests as individuals, small groups, and whole villages to recover the subsistence provisions in their rental agreements with landlords. They appealed to landlords to continue the traditional leases and to uphold their customary claims to half the harvest. Where these appeals failed, many tenants pooled their families' funds to take notorious landlords into the Kuomintang courts. They pleaded for a 25 percent crop reduction in the aftermath of a poor harvest by prodding the landlords to visit the fields to inspect the losses. Tenants also

[5] *T'aihang jen-chia* (fn. 1); Cf. Ramon Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890–1949* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1970), chaps. 4-7.

[6] *Kuan-yu pu-bien chien-cha chien-tsu chien-hsi kai-shan kung-jen tai-yu cheng-tse tsu-chih kuang-ta kung-nung chi pen ch'un-chung te chih-shih* [Concerning the Ordinary Investigation of Rent and Interest Reduction, the Policy of Improving Workers Treatment and Wages, and the Instructions for Organizing the Broad Masses of Workers and Peasants] (The Po Hai District Party Committee: June 1944), 1-15, 80-90.

[7] Chi Teng-k'uei (fn. 3), 21-45.

[8] *Kung tso t'ung hsun ti shih i chi* (Work Correspondence Number 11, The Civil Movement Department of the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Branch Office of the Central Communist Party: August 10, 1945), 1-10.

[9] *Tsu-tien kuan-hsi tiao ch'a tsan kao tsai-liao* (Reference Materials on an Investigation of Rental Tenant Relations, November 1945-January 1946), 1-14.

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protested the intolerable interest rates on spring loans, threatening to take grain from the bins of landlords who would not reinstate loans without interest in times of dearth. And they organized strikes to regain their rights to tools and plow animals, medical aid and sick leave with pay, and cash tips for delivering a calf or a lamb under sharecropping agreements.[10]

The tenants who led these protests were not demanding that landlords permanently discontinue crop rents or give up all of the profits from increases in the harvest. In most cases they were asking only for the traditional provisions of livelihood. And it was the landlords' denial of such modest requests, coupled with the failure of the Kuomintang to mediate these disputes, that made the tenants escalate their protests in the decade before the revolution of 1949.

C. THE RETURN TO TRADITIONAL SUBSISTENCE EXCHANGE UNDER THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1936–1945)

In 1936 Liu Po-ch'eng brought the 129th Division of the 8th Route Army into the T'aihang-Pingyuan region to support the peasants' initiatives to regain their rights to a tolerable livelihood. The Communist Party and its revolutionary army enabled tenants to recapture the basic elements of social justice in their rental relations with landlords.[11] On the Yellow River Plain, party cadres supported tenants in their strikes and sit-ins, endeavoring to make landlords honor old leases and abolish rent deposits. Along the Shantung Po Hai Coast, the party activists got behind the campaigns by tenants and hired hands to make landlords pay the customary grain wages in accordance with the standard market measures and prices. All across the Plains of Hopei and Honan, the party's district governments supported unions of tenants and hired hands in their demands that landlords reduce and cancel crop rents after harvest failures and once again provide spring hunger loans at tolerable interest rates. In Hua and Pu *hsien*, tenants made landlords reassume the cost of medical services and reinstate the salaries of tillers whose illness prevented them from working. They made the landlords restore the head towels, puttees, and work pants due to the peasants who cultivated their fields. And they demanded that landowners reassume responsibility for providing wages and shelter for extra field hands and for carting services during the harvest. With the backing of

[10] Chi Teng-k'uei (fn. 3), 21-45.

[11] I have analyzed some details of the Communist Party's role in the return to subsistence in "Tenants in Revolution: The Tenacity of Traditional Morality," *Modern China: An International Quarterly*, 1 (July 1975).

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the revolutionary army, the peasants regained many of the basic subsistence provisions they had lost prior to the Japanese invasion.

D. THE JAPANESE INVASION AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF EXPLOITATION (1937–1944)

The Japanese invasion was a disaster for the peasant movements in much of the T'aihang-Pingyuan region. The old landowning elite, rather than flee the countryside, actively welcomed the Japanese Imperial Army's help in putting down the peasants' protests in their domains.[12] With the backing of the Japanese Army, the landlords once again turned the tables on the rural poor and tore up the subsistence agreements the tenants had renegotiated under the shield of the Communist Party's 8th Route Army.

During the Japanese occupation, landlords again subjected tenants to insecure short-term seasonal contracts. In much of Shantung, which was under direct Japanese rule, the paper currencies of the pro-Japanese Kuomintang banks were substituted for grain wages, and tenants found that these inflationary notes did not keep pace with the price of grain in the marketplace.[13] In Shansi and Shantung, landlords in villages under the pro-Japanese regimes forcibly collected crop rents in spite of poor harvests; they revoked gleaning rights, as they had done before the Communist Party helped the tenants resecure these inalienable harvest claims.[14] Where the Japanese occupied a district, many landlords cut their contributions to sharecropping arrangements, such as plow animals and funds for repairing implements. In several Shansi villages, landlords also withdrew cart services, forcing tenants to carry their crops to the marketplace. They even refused to make loans to tenants for hiring extra field hands, and required tenants to pay these wages in advance as a precondition for renewing a lease.[15]

With the onset of the Japanese occupation, tenants were again facing the intolerable terms of the landlords' rental arrangements. These peasants apparently would not and could not support the Communist Party's revolutionary village governments against the Japanese without first recovering their subsistence provisions from landlords. In this sense, the

[12] Almost all of the Communist Party's documents and literary works suggest that many landlords in this part of China stayed in the villages (or else returned to them from the market towns) during the Japanese occupation to resume their exploitative practices. Cf. Feng Te-ying, *Ku Tsai Hua* [The Bitter Herb] (Peking: The People's Press 1959).

[13] *Kuan-yu pu bien* . . . (fn. 6), 2-3.

[14] *Tsu-tien kuan-hsi* (fn. 9), 1-14; cf. Hsu Kuang-yao, *Little Soldier Chang Ka-tse* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1974), 1-40.

[15] *Tsu-tien kuan-hsi* (fn. 9), 1-14.

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presence of the Japanese correlated negatively with the emergence of the Communist-led revolution in the T'aihang-Pingyuan. On the plains of Hopei, Shantung, and Honan—where the Japanese continually threatened the villages and allowed landlords to overturn recent gains of rent reduction and wage increases—the Communist Party was able to win only very tenuous support from the peasants for the Anti-Japanese War. In the T'aihang Sub-Region, the Communist Party led the tenants in restoring the traditional *status quo ante* in subsistence rentals; the 8th Route Army coordinated peasant militias to hold off the Japanese and to break the backs of the landlords who violated the agreements on rent reduction and wage increases of 1942–1944, thereby paving the way for peasants to seize power in the villages. These backwoods highland villages, where the 8th Route Army stood superior to the old ruling groups, became the secure rear service areas supporting the Communist Anti-Japanese War.

II. National Salvation as a Pretext for Solving Peasants' Grievances

During the War of Resistance, the Communist Party combined solutions to the problems of livelihood with appeals to the peasants to save the ancestral land. In the T'aihang-Pingyuan region, these nationalistic appeals to the peasants were an attempt to check the exploitation by the rich, rather than to mobilize the peasants. National salvation was a pretext for supporting the ongoing struggles of the peasants to regain their subsistence. What won the peasants to the Communist Party was the power of the revolutionary army to compel landlords to curtail ongoing exploitation and alleviate hunger.[16]

The 8th Route Army won the peasants' support for its district governments by helping to plant, irrigate, and harvest, and by organizing peasant committees to arbitrate land ownership and crop rent disputes with landlords.[17] The party members also encouraged peasants to carry on public national salvation elections to choose the spokesmen of their village Peasant Associations, allowing them to organize these electoral campaigns around issues such as rent reduction and grain-tax sharing.

In the T'aihang Sub-Region, where the peasants elected activists from their own ranks to village posts by overwhelming majorities, these

[16] *Ts'ung hsi meng hui kan Shansi min-chung yun-tung* [The Shansi Civil Movement from the Viewpoint of the Sacrifice League] (Yellow River Press July 1939), 1-70.

[17] For many colorful examples of cooperative endeavors by the 8th Route Army and the peasants in subsistence-related practices, see *Jen-min-ti chun tui* [The People's Troops] (February-April 1946).

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elections symbolized the shift in political power in the villages. Under the Peasant Associations, the villages decided who would contribute how much grain to provision the revolutionary army. The Communist Party devised a 3/7 tax-share formula (wherein landlords paid 7/10 and the peasants paid 3/10) to allow landlords to demonstrate their loyalty to the country and their willingness to help hungry villagers; the peasants nonetheless often pressured the leaders of their Peasant Associations to make landlords pay all of the tax in kind for the Anti-Japanese War. Since the peasants were existing on hunger margins, they decided the rich should save the country so the poor could secure their rights to harvest and home.[18]

Only when landlords disrupted these electoral clashes did the Communist Party district governments put nationalist politics in effect. But when the party arrested, tried, and sentenced the landlord provocateurs as traitors, the peasants were upset with these rulings. They feared that these temporary court sentences would eventually cause landlords to return to the villages and take vengeance. Not knowing when the 8th Route Army would move out of their villages toward the front lines, the villagers would have preferred to eliminate their rich enemies rather than to abide by the Communist Party's policy of interclass accommodation during the United Front. Without assurances of future protection, the peasants did not dare go along with the national United Front because of fear of counterrevolutionary vengeance.

The Communist Party was hard-pressed to win the peasants over by nationalist appeals alone. In Southern Hopei, the peasants thought the Communist Party's national-salvation propaganda put forth by natives of their own villages was irrelevant to their problems of subsistence, and they turned away from nationalist appeals that were not tied to issues of rent reduction.[19] Similarly, the rural people in several of the marketplaces thought that the Communist Party members in the patriotic Sacrifice League, who established national-salvation headquarters near the grain markets, were a new clique of grain-tax predators, similar to those of the Kuomintang; the peasants initially turned away from the patriotic messages of the Sacrifice League.[20] In this traditional backwater of rural North China, the peasants did not have any conceptions of modern Western nationalism. The success of the revolutionary political movement, therefore, was based largely on its service to the deeply felt needs of people whose world views were shaped primarily by their

[18] Cf. Liu Chang, *T'aihang fengyun* [The T'aihang Storm] (Peking: The Writers' Press 1962).
[19] Cf. Li Hsiao Ming, *Pingyuan Ch'iangsheng* [The Sound of Rifle Fire on the Plains] (Peking: The Writers' Press 1959).
[20] Cf. Liu Chang (fn. 18).

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concern for subsistence and by local loyalties; and only secondarily, if at all, was it based on loyalty to a nation-state.

III. The Impact of War on Peasant Mobilization and Communist Power

The Japanese aggression and the assaults of the Kuomintang field army were hardly a boon to revolutionary development. In the T'aihang-Pingyuan, the war-making activities of the Japanese and Kuomintang armies actually slowed the growth of the Communist-led peasant movements in several ways.

A. Peasant Solidarity Inside the Villages: The Counter-revolutionary Destruction of the Prerequisites for Peasant Involvement in the Revolutionary War

Counterrevolution and Subsistence Prerequisites. One serious obstacle to popular support for the War of Resistance was the physical weakness of the peasantry. The Japanese presence intensified this situation. The landlord *rentiers* inside the Japanese-occupied districts reduced the regular provisions, demanded new extracontractual labor, and taxed the villages to the bone. For the peasants, this dual squeeze meant continuing starvation. With their basic means of subsistence constantly in peril, the peasants were physically unable, and also probably unwilling, to participate in the Anti-Japanese War. Cheng Wei-san, a veteran of the Kiangsi peasant movement, explicitly recognized subsistence as a chief prerequisite for the peasants' participation in the Anti-Japanese War:

> Peasants must possess the physical strength to resist Japan. The peasantry is suffering from cold and hunger. Starving peasants are not able to resist Japan. The peasants, at a minimum, demand a resolution to the problem of hunger and emaciation and an improvement of their position. They need food and adequate clothing to resist Japan. Therefore, if we want the peasants to resist Japan, we first must liberate them from feudal exploitation. In the past some of our comrades did not understand the peasants. When they offered liberation and the peasants refused it, they thought it was because the peasants were backward and ignorant. They did not know the peasants still experienced this constraint. That is, if the peasants are to resist Japan, it is only reasonable to improve their livelihood.[21]

[21] Cheng Wei-san, *K'ang-jih chan-chung yu nung-min yun-tung: tsai er shih ti i tzu min-yun kung-tso hui-i shang ti pao-k'ao* [The War of Resistance and the Peasant Movement] (Political Department, Second Division, the New Fourth Army, April 14, 1941), 2-3.

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Counterrevolution and Psychological Prerequisites. Another obstacle that prevented peasants from aligning themselves with the Communist Party was their fear of dearth. The Japanese Army disrupted production routines and reduced the already scarce goods in the villages, thereby spreading the fear of starvation among the rural people. The outlook among peasant families who could no longer predict even a marginal subsistence from one day to the next hardly made it easy for the Communist Party to organize the villages.

The peasants told party district officials that they preferred to consume their grain and to spend their savings immediately over saving and planning for future production, because the predatory extractions of the warlords, the Kuomintang, and the Japanese armies were making life uncertain from one moment to the next. The peasants' psychology of immediate consumption was a rational response to deprivation by pillaging armies. Not only did the Japanese invasion reinforce the peasants' tendency to provide only their short-term subsistence needs; the Japanese military missions also made it more difficult for the party to inspire them to plan, save, and produce for the long-run needs of the revolutionary army. The peasants were extremely reluctant to assume the risks of expanded grain production while the Japanese were ruining the dykes to disrupt spring planting and raiding the crops to stop the autumn harvest. Indeed, in the T'aihang-Pingyuan region, these Japanese search-and-destroy operations, which were designed to deny the harvest to the revolutionary army, actually deprived the 129th Division of its desperately needed grain provisions in 1941–1942.[22]

Counterrevolution and Social Prerequisites. The invading Japanese Army tore apart the social fabric of Chinese village life. Surely, however, the warlord armies of Wu Pei-fu, Yen Hsi-shan, and Chiang Kai-shek had been ripping apart the peasant communities for a number of decades, so that the Japanese practices were different only because they were conducted by foreigners. Like their warlord predecessors, the Japanese occupying forces shattered the social bases for peasant solidarity and revolutionary power in the villages.[23]

In the T'aihang-Pingyuan region, the Japanese counterinsurgency operations endangered the traditional cooperative exchanges that the Communist Party had been cultivating among the peasants.[24] Joint

[22] Cf. Ch'i Wu (fn. 1); also see T'ing Ling, *I-erh-chiu shih yu Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu ch'u* [The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region] Peking; Hsin-hua: New China Press 1950), 39-45.

[23] Cf. Ch'i Wu (fn. 1), 99-196.

[24] *Ibid.*

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family mutual-aid groups, for instance, were the social sinews of peasant solidarity and peasant activism. They provided a host of valuable village services through horizontal peasant-to-peasant exchanges: self-reliance and self-sufficiency sprang from the joint endeavors of little groups of families, friends, and field companions. The mutual-aid activists behind these collective endeavors enabled the poor to avoid turning to landlords for aid, thereby depriving the latter of their capacity to dominate community affairs. The peasant exchanges also strengthened the social basis for militia units that could challenge the forceful landlords directly.

The Japanese war-making activities hardly helped the Communist Party develop these customary horizontal exchanges among the peasants. The invading Japanese Army undermined these peasant-to-peasant exchanges, and, in some instances, surrendered the villages to landlords who interfered with the mutual-aid activities that contributed to the growth of the peasants' power. In the war-contested areas of the T'aihang Sub-Region, these developments led to the decline of revolutionary fortunes.

Even in the war-torn districts where the 8th Route Army was dominant, the Japanese threat interfered with the mutual aid that was traditional among the peasants. Communist Party officials had to request the mutual-aid group captains to attend war committee meetings, require that vanguard mutual-aid groups allocate people and plow animals for war duties such as long-distance transporting of grain, and ask these groups to arrange for substitute tillers for members who had gone to war. The peasants generally stretched their mutual-aid activities to accommodate these war-induced demands. Chinese sources suggest that the continuing absence of the group leaders, the loss of human labor, and the additional work most likely did strain the customary mutual-aid obligations of the peasantry.[25] One would expect the logical consequence to be the dissolution of the cohesive social bonds making for self-reliant and self-sufficient initiatives among the peasants.

In the districts where the Japanese had the upper hand, the landlords prohibited the peasants from collecting grain taxes on the basis of traditional principles of "subsistence first"; they pressured the villagers to requisition fixed amounts of grain for soldiers under Japanese command and made the peasants carry out noncompensatory war duties. They also restricted the mutual-aid activities of the peasants, prohibiting

[25] Almost all of the documents on the war suggest the Communists were able to cultivate mutual-aid arrangements among the peasants into larger collective-oriented production movements, principally in the areas which were free from the devastation of war. Cf. Ch'i Wu (fn. 1), 116-92.

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tenants from lending their plow animals to their companions in self-defense teams, threatening those who were tilling the fields of 8th Route Army soldiers, and forbidding the teams to collect grain for Communist Party headquarters. These fixed requisitions and restrictions cut deeply into the peasants' crop yields, leaving them in a precarious position during the bad harvests that beset drought-stricken T'aihang from 1938 to 1944, and severing the mutual-aid arrangements that were fundamental to the peasants' class cooperation. Thus the Communist Party found itself with an insecure and incohesive peasantry that was unable, even if it had been willing, to participate collectively in the Anti-Japanese War.[26]

Counterrevolution and Political Prerequisites. The Japanese invasion put destabilizing pressures on the revolutionary governments of the Communist Party. Originally, the gangs of the landlords, the Anti-Communist posses of the Kuomintang, and the bands of the warlords were scattered units acting largely on their own. When the Japanese Army arrived in the T'aihang-Pingyuan base area, however, these scattered local forces, along with the Kuomintang field forces, went over to the Wang Ching-wei North China Political Council, thereby putting themselves under the central command of the Japanese Army. These armies of the old ruling groups and the defecting armies of the Central Government were organized into units called "Emperor Assisting Army" (*huang hsieh chun*). As John S. Service pointed out, "Their service undoubtedly assists the Japanese by reducing somewhat the number of Japanese troops necessary to garrison and hold the occupied areas."[27]

It is important to consider that from the outset, the United Front was a sham without a class basis, and that the Japanese occupation allowed for political alignments that intensified the class conflict which irreparably tore it apart. For the T'aihang-Pingyuan region, specifically, the defection of the Kuomintang armies to the Japanese signified that the peasants' war against the agrarian political elite and the Communist Party's War of Resistance against the Japanese were becoming the same war in 1941–1944. During the War of Resistance, the old ruling groups generally not only did not fight the Japanese—they aligned themselves

[26] I have yet to encounter a single Communist document that maintains that the notorious land-owning elements did not attempt to deprive the peasants of their means of effective cooperative action during the Japanese occupation.

[27] Service, "Willingness of Chinese Military Leaders to Become 'Puppets,'" State Security Copy, November 3, 1943. Quoted in Joseph W. Esherick, ed., *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service* (New York: Random House 1974), 49.

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with them for the purpose of putting down the peasant rebellions in this area. With the Japanese Army organizing these Chinese elements into a centralized and coordinated network for counterinsurgency, the landlords and local government clients of the "Emperor Assisting Army" were able to slow down the peasant uprisings in the T'aihang-Pingyuan Communist base area.[28]

One politically destabilizing consequence of the Japanese occupation, then, was a more efficient means of counterrevolutionary terror. When the Japanese took over Communist districts, the Kuomintang magistrates and police chiefs gave the go-ahead for the landlords to organize the ruffians in their domains into anti-Communist militias and to imprison the peasant rebels working with the Communist Party. These local anti-Communist forces colluded with the Japanese Army to pinpoint and punish the peasant families whose sons and daughters were in the People's Militias and the 8th Route Army. When the peasants refused to reveal the whereabouts of the suspected rebels in their native communities, as reportedly happened around Chao Chia town on the Plains of Southern Hopei,[29] the Japanese Army brutalized the women and children and destroyed the land and property of suspected rebel leaders. These terror tactics may have made the peasants hate foreign soldiers, but they hardly created political conditions conducive to the growth of stable Communist governments in the villages. Instead, the wake of the Japanese war brought chaos to Communist village governments, leaving the party activists to battle blazing huts or to round up stampeding livestock while at the same time trying to hit back at the invaders.

The Japanese thrusts into Communist districts also compelled the party to carry out emergency militia mobilizations and army inductions which depleted the party's peasant leadership in the villages. The 1942–1944 inductions, for instance, indirectly undercut the rebel movement in the villages because the semi-uprooted peasants who joined the 8th Route Army were, by and large, the key activists in the movement for rent reduction and the leaders of the villages' self-defense teams. When they left the villages for the front lines, Communist officials had to rely on a second set of peasant leaders who were less attuned to the specific grievances of the villagers and to the strategies of countermobilization devised by the landlords. This war-induced shortage of leaders occa-

[28] The T'aihang-Pingyuan case seems to support the brilliant analysis of Service on the consequences of the power realignments in North China for the growth of rural populist movements under the Communists. These consequences were negative.

[29] See Li Hsiao Ming (fn. 19).

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sionally allowed landlords to sidestep the movements for rent reduction and to sabotage the unions of tenants and hired hands and the Peasant Salvation Associations of the villages.

The Japanese military campaigns also made it more difficult for peasants to assist the revolutionary army.[30] Helpless peasants who suffered from hunger, fatigue, and diarrhea watched the Japanese loot grain, slaughter livestock, and smash utensils. In response to these Japanese ravages, the 8th Route Army carried out emergency mobilizations for moving grain, hiding livestock, evacuating villages, and repairing river dykes. It was almost impossible for the rural poor simultaneously to secure their own subsistence and to assist the revolutionary army under such conditions. Their efforts at moving the grain to keep it away from enemy troops, fighting the floods to save the crops, and finding herbs for wounded soldiers apparently had to give way to allaying hunger, saving the family, and salvaging a few pieces of property. These responses to counterinsurgency warfare were part of General Okamura's design to drain the peasants' support for the 8th Route Army. The Communist Party therefore found it virtually impossible to build strong peasant organizations for fighting the Anti-Japanese War in villages where these war-induced problems took a severe toll in peasant time, labor, and funds.

The Japanese invasion also produced crises of grain supplies for the revolutionary governments by uprooting hundreds of thousands of peasants, and increasing the number of refugees on the North China Plain. During the War of Resistance, these refugees from the war-devastated districts of the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Sub-Region sought security in the highlands of the T'aihang Sub-Region. When the Japanese broke the party's hold on these areas, the revolutionary government lost the harvest in the key grain counties on the Plains. At the same time, the refugees from these war-torn counties fled into the rear areas of T'aihang, and the Communist governments in the T'aihang Sub-Region encountered sudden supply crises of a staggering magnitude. The problems attendant to arranging food, shelter, and employment for the hungry and homeless strained the supplies of these Communist-led district governments right up to the end of the War of Resistance.[31]

[30] The slippage in peasant support is evidenced in short stories and novels on peasant participation in the war. For a vivid example, see Chen Ying-shih, "A Visit to My Native Village," *Chinese Literature*, No. 1 (1975), 86-93.

[31] Cf. Ch'i Wu (fn. 1), 132-96; also, documents on the measures for grain provision by the T'aihang Communist Party Trade Bureau, Bureau of Industry and Commerce, and bank cadres.

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B. THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON MARKET CHOICE

During the War of Resistance, the Communist Party promoted free trade in the traditional markets. The peasants were thus able to avoid the monopolist monetary arrangements that landlords and local governments had moulded from the commercial networks in the countryside, and to keep their families financially solvent. Through independent trading, the peasants in the T'aihang-Pingyuan base area participated in village and temple markets which the Communist Party, in turn, knitted into a self-reliant, free-trade political economy. The Japanese Army disrupted the free-trade markets in the revolutionary base area, and initially allowed the old agrarian elite to reimpose its own terms on the peasants. Under the occupation, the peasants were not able to recover their traditional way of trading, and the party could not get the rural people to support the War of Resistance.[32]

Traditional Markets (Pre-1911). From the beginning of the Ching dynasty, Chinese peasants had the right to rent, purchase, sell, mortgage, and bequeath their land, property, and produce. Most peasants exchanged their crops and crafts in village and temple markets at relatively equitable free-trade prices. Under ideal conditions, the dynasty indirectly enabled peasants to carry on these commercial exchanges by discouraging landlords from impoverishing the peasants through usurious grain dealings and preventing local lords from using the *gabelles* as a conduit for squeezing the peasants.

Peasant families engaged in marketing to enhance their livelihood, using the profits to buy food, replenish rent funds, and re-establish dowries for marrying off their children and giving them a start at work. The profits made by the outstanding producers also brought benefits and better times to the village. These villagers could afford to expand their crop lands, to employ marginal workers as field hands, purchase a buffalo, share their implements with other peasant families, make

[32] The Communist Party's struggle for markets with the Japanese has never been researched by a Western scholar. A good place to begin reading on this topic is *Pa-lu chun chun-cheng tsa-chih* [Military Affairs Magazine of the 8th Route Army]. This periodical repeatedly stresses the crucial importance of the 8th Route Army in protecting and promoting the political economy of free trade in the Communist Party base areas from Japanese attacks. For this section on marketing, I rely mainly on *T'aihang ch'u mao yi kung tso li nien lai chung yao chueh ting chih shih min ling pi mi wen chien i chiao pin* [The Secretly Filed Materials on the Past Ten Years: Important Decisions, Directives, and Orders on T'aihang District Trade Work], *tsan kao tsu liao ti san pien shan yeh mao yi lei ti i chi* [The First Book on Categories of Business and Trade in the Third Edition of Reference Materials] (T'aihang District South Hopei Bank Headquarters, Bureau of Industry and Commerce: December 1945), 1-100.

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interest-free loans of grain to friends and co-workers, and contribute a larger share of the village grain tax.

Commercial exchanges among the peasants also created the economic sinews of self-reliant communities within the domains of landlord patriarchs. Although clan, patron-client, and market relations modified their choices, the peasants in their dual role as dominant producers and direct sellers posed a challenge to the monopolistic intentions of landlords. These currents of peasant commerce were especially strong in the T'aihang-Pingyuan region, where villages made up largely of small freeholders were only tenuously subject to the grain tributes of the central dynasty and the harvest tithe claims of the landlords.

The Contraction of Markets under the Kuomintang (1911–1937). We cannot comprehend the plight of the peasants in the T'aihang-Pingyuan region without describing how landlords and local governments captured commerce and shrank the peasants' trading opportunities after the downfall of the Ching dynasty.[33] On both the Yellow River Plain and the Shantang Plateau, the old agrarian elite recast the market networks through which the peasants earned a livelihood to favor its own exclusive interests. These socially harmful activities continued with Kuomintang acquiescence and assistance from 1927 to 1937.

Landlords, with the approval of the Kuomintang courts, usurped the lands of prosperous peasants through false proof-of-ownership papers; they appropriated the property of small freeholders through grain loans that required interest payable in mortgages; and they transgressed the tenants' prerogatives of land-tenure by selling lands that tenants had bequeathed to their families, or by leasing tenancy plots to the highest bidder from one season to the next without permission from the tenant who originally developed the plot. When the peasants challenged these violations in the courts, the judges ruled against them.

The Kuomintang also allowed landlords to align themselves with warring armies and colonial market agents to force peasants to produce for the world market. During the Kuomintang decade, many landlords in the North China Plain began supplying foreign cotton and tobacco companies by urging the peasants to cultivate cash crops (partly as a precondition for seeds and loans), and by forcing them to sell these crops through cotton and tobacco stations at prices insufficient to sustain a livelihood. When the peasants protested by planting subsistence cereals in place of cash crops or by refusing to trade high-grade cash

[33] Cf. John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922–1972* (London: Eyre Methuen 1974), 28-30; Linda Grove, "Creating a Northern Soviet," *Modern China: An International Quarterly*, I (October 1975); Liu Chang (fn. 18); and Li Hsiao Ming (fn. 19).

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crops for prices unilaterally set by the collection-house agents, the landlords sent troops to force them to plant cash crops; and the cotton and tobacco agents confiscated the harvest and called on the police to imprison sellers who insisted on fair prices.

The Kuomintang magistrates did nothing to deter grain dealers from ruining the peasants. The same landlords who required tenants to plant cash crops on lands traditionally reserved for subsistence cereals refused to pay field hands enough to keep pace with grain prices, even though they sold the grain at a substantial profit. During the crop failures of 1929–1935, the Kuomintang magistrates sat back and watched the landlords force hungry peasants to pawn their implements, mortgage their lands, and give up their children for grain loans. And during the Depression, when the value of peasant incomes plummeted, usurious landlords refused to accept implements at the old credit rates, and landlord *rentiers* refused to accept land in lieu of crop rents.[34] Surely the Kuomintang officials saw that these changes were starving the rural poor: the corpses of peasants who had died from hunger lined the market roads and the marketplaces that were under the supervision of the state. Occasionally, protests for tolerable grain loans and grain prices made landlords reinstate loans and reduce prices—until they were able to persuade the Kuomintang magistrates to summon the garrison command.

On top of this, the Kuomintang tax authorities farmed out the collection rights for grain taxes to landlords in the market towns. They, in turn, transferred the burden to the rural poor, making the tenants pay the grain taxes as a precondition of tenancy, and thereby reneging on their own traditional obligation. Furthermore, the Kuomintang collected taxes based on quantity of land, individual household, and average normal harvest yield, thus neglecting the old dynastic considerations for the poor quality of the soil, the plight of labor-short peasant families, and changes in actual yield. In northern Honan and western Shantung, landlords collected these taxes in the face of oncoming famine. They almost always doubled the demands of local governments, filling their pockets with half and selling much of the grain in the markets of Loyang and Tsinan at prices no peasant family could pay. The peasants petitioned garrison commanders and threw their implements on the steps of the *yamen*, pleading for relief with the Kuomintang. The officers and officials, however, ordered the peasants to return to the land at gunpoint.

[34] William Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village* (New York: Random House 1966), 31-46.

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Finally, the Kuomintang magistrates let the local overlords purchase the government's salt franchises, permitting them to sell and levy taxes on all the salt bought by peasants for consumption and petty trade.[35] When these salt-shop owners charged outrageous prices for salt and prohibited peasants from purchasing salt for resale in the villages, the T'aihang villagers joined together in salt-shop riots and petitioned the Kuomintang magistrates to permit them to buy and sell salt at equitable prices. The magistrates promised to return to equitable buying and selling, but after the peasant delegations had disbanded and returned to their separate villages, they summoned the provincial cavalry to crush the rebel leaders.

The Kuomintang and its landlord clients chipped away at the commercial cornerstones of peasant subsistence and village autarky. Peasant families were unable to balance their budgets and replenish their funds for fuel and rent. With the bankruptcy of the more prosperous peasants, the marginal villagers could no longer rely on them for employment, loans, and contributions to village festivities. Under the Kuomintang, then, the old agrarian elite overturned a whole set of traditional peasant marketing rights and undermined the commercial bases for self-reliance and self-sufficiency. These changes crystallized while the price gyrations of the Depression overwhelmed the subsistence income of the peasants; consequently, the rural poor were ready to welcome a new order years before the Japanese invasion and the War of Resistance.

The Kuomintang paid dearly for raping the rural poor. During the Japanese offensive in Honan in 1944, the peasants assisted the Japanese Army in disarming the Kuomintang soldiers who had reduced them to wretchedness.[36] The destitute villages initially actually welcomed outside armies—including the Japanese—as saviors from the razor-sharp oppression of a morally bankrupt Chinese government.

Re-creation of Traditional Market Choices by the Communist Party (1936–1945). During the War of Resistance, the 8th Route Army removed the political restraints on peasant commerce inside the villages and recreated a network of profitable exchanges in the marketplaces.[37] The policy of free trade gave the peasants greater freedom of choice, thereby expanding the subsistence tilling and trading rights they had lost under the Kuomintang.

[35] I would speculate, on the basis of minimal evidence, that incidents of goiter among the peasants in many T'aihang villages increased as a result of these salt monopolies. Certainly, goiter was widespread in southeast Shansi. Cf. Liu Chang (fn. 18).

[36] Esherick (fn. 27), 19.

[37] *T'aihang ch'u mao yi kung tso . . .* (fn. 32), 1-56.

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In contrast to those of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party's courts permitted the peasants to regain their lands and to renew the lease on their original tenancies. Also unlike the Kuomintang, the Communist Trade Bureau helped peasants to minimize their losses by providing loans for producing subsistence crops and by permitting them to exchange their crops and crafts at free-trade prices in the old market fairs—a practice which was generally beneficial to both sellers and buyers.[38] The unions of tenants and hired hands insisted that landlords pay wages in grain or in the equivalent of the price of grain on the open market. The Peasant Associations ran the village granaries, making the customary peck-for-peck, no-interest loans; through their ties with the Grain Accounting Offices in the central markets, they regulated the flow of grain to markets under the Japanese.

At the same time, the Communist Party's Tax Bureau required landowners to reassume responsibility for the grain tax on tenant lands and allowed peasants to pay grain taxes according to the total amount of the harvest minus the amount consumed per capita. The Tax Bureau recruited its collectors from the peasants who were the leaders of the mutual-aid groups, allowing them to calculate the grain tax according to acreage, quality of soil, number of persons per family, and the actual amount of the harvest.[39] The Communist Party also broke the landlords' hold on the government *gabelles*, and freed the peasants from the fixed prices and high taxes of the past.[40] In the T'aihang Sub-Region, for example, the Trade Bureau set up sixteen shops that dispensed salt directly to peasants and peddlers at free-trade market prices. The peasants were able to purchase salt for family consumption, and the peddlers were able to retail salt on market circuits throughout the salt-short villages of T'aihang.

With the revival of rural commerce, many peasant families were able to resecure their food supplies, replenish their rent funds, and regain their funds for agricultural development. The most successful

[38] *Pingyuan tsa-chih* [The Magazine of the Plains]; *Tsun i shu* [Village Art] *Tsen yang kai tsao miao hui* [How to Transform the Temple Fairs] *Chi Tsung Lo Ku hsian yen ta hui te kao tsao* [Notes on the Transformation of Tsung Lo Ku's Big Incense Meeting]. No date.

[39] This practice of "subsistence first" in grain-tax collections under the Communists runs through all of the Communist Party documents on the T'aihang-Pingyuan revolutionary base. Cf. *Tung yi lei chin shui pan fa* [The Method of Unified Progressive Income Tax] (Special Inspector's Office of the T'aihang Seventh Administration); *Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien chu tung yi lei chin shui chan hsieng shui tze tsao an* [A Draft of the Temporary Tax Principles for the Unified Progressive Tax of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region] (Revised regulations of April 1945).

[40] *T'aihang ch'u mao yi kung tso* . . . (fn. 32), 56-100.

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peasants brought benefits to many other villagers.[41] They expanded the fields under cultivation, increased their livestock supplies, and employed other peasants as hired hands and shepherds—all to the praise of the party. These rich peasant families gave no-interest grain loans to their friends and field companions, and provided a greater share of their grain to the 8th Route Army in which their sons and brothers were fighting. The marketing successes of the peasants also removed the economic bases of the landlords. The more the peasants' entrepreneurship, credit, and free trade took hold, the less the landlords were able to operate as grain dealers and credit manipulators, and to terrorize the peasants. Moreover, the peasants used their gains to enhance their mutual-aid groups and self-defense teams—the traditional mainstays of peasant resistance to domination by the landlord.

The Impact of War on Free Trade: The Japanese Invasion and the Re-emergence of Market Restraints (1937–1945). The Japanese Army attempted to destroy the free-trade markets in the Communist districts of the T'aihang-Pingyuan region by raiding peasants in the marketplaces, attacking trade caravans on their way to and from the markets, and establishing military checkpoints along the main roads in order to direct commerce toward the market towns that were under Japanese occupation. When the Japanese troops occupied a district, landlords in the market towns felt free to reimpose their harmful market arrangements, restricting the peasants' choices as they had done in the past: by usurious grain dealings, wage payments in worthless currency, and high salt prices. These changes deprived the peasants of the benefits they had gained through free trade, and devastated the Communist Party's efforts to stitch together a viable political economy from village and temple fair markets that were to some extent separated in trade and transport.[42]

Where the Japanese were making war, therefore, the Communist Party had a very difficult time preserving the gains of the rural poor and protecting the independence of the political economy. Many of the military encounters between the 8th Route Army and the Japanese sprang from the intensifying struggle for markets in subsistence com-

[41] For an understanding of the Yenan origins of the rich peasant economy as it benefitted the entire village community, and of how the Communist Party cadres spread its development throughout the T'aihang-Pingyuan and Wutai-Central Hopei Plain base areas, see "Kuan-yu Wu Man-yu ti fang hsiang" [Concerning the Direction of Wu Man-yu] (Liberation Daily, in Outlines for Problems in Unfolding the Struggle against the Enemy and Strengthening the Economic Reconstruction of the Base Areas, Front Line Press 1943), 1-41.

[42] *T'aihang ch-u mao yi kung tso . . .* (fn. 32), 56-100.

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modities, especially grain. The Japanese wanted the grain from the T'aihang-Pingyuan region for reasons other than just provisioning their own troops. For the peasants, grain was the staff of life. For the Communist Party, grain was the basic export commodity—the party exchanged grain to earn the money for purchasing the imports that helped to develop primary agricultural products, light industries, and munitions plants inside the base area. Grain was therefore the golden bullion over which the Communist Party fought its wars of foreign exchange with the Japanese Army and the North China Political Council. Where the Japanese were absorbing large quantities of grain from the base area—as they did on the North China Plain, partly through liaisons with Chinese merchants engaged in smuggling and partly through physical coercion against peasant grain producers—they were able to deprive the peasants of their main subsistence commodity and deplete the treasury of the Communist Party. They thereby raised the fear of hunger in the villages and tilted the foreign exchange rate against the revolutionary government.

The invading Japanese Army thus compelled the Communist Party to involve itself more in fostering free-trade markets; it also slowed down the re-creation of market choices for a peasantry which had been living by its wits for a long time and which was certainly attentive to trade and profit. Of the Communist Party's efforts to organize the grain markets to offset these debilitating consequences of the Japanese occupation, several measures stand out.[43] Inside the villages, the peasant associations and grain arbitration committees made adjustments to meet the subsistence needs of each family. Between the villages and the markets, the 8th Route Army and the peasant militias provided military protection for peasants and peddlers, keeping market roads open, escorting trade caravans, and guarding market fairs. From the central markets, the Communist Party's grain accounting teams made special price adjustments and grain sales to assure peasants in distant, grain-short districts a subsistence portion of marketable grain; they sent grain by peddlers into the standard market towns, assuring the peddlers they could sell at free-trade prices; and they exported grain in exchange for basic commodities unavailable in rural areas inside the war zones.

Although these measures helped the peasants and the party, the Communist Party's trade bureau was hardly able to integrate the peasants in the war-torn districts into the beneficial free-trade markets of the more secure areas. In the North China Plain and T'aihang districts that were directly under the guns of the Japanese, the peasants lost their

[43] *Ibid.*

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free-trade rights and their harvest, and the party consequently suffered severe setbacks in its struggle for foreign exchange. It was only in the T'aihang Sub-Region, where the 8th Route Army was able to shield the peasants in their market activities, that the peasants re-entered beneficial market exchanges and that the Communist Party governments won the currency exchange wars with the pro-landlord Japanese regimes.

C. PRESSURES TO INVOLVE THE PEASANTRY IN THE WAR

In the T'aihang-Pingyuan base area, neither the Japanese invasion nor the Kuomintang's counterrevolutionary attacks prompted the peasants to take part in the Communist Party's patriotic anticolonial revolutionary war. Indeed, the party had to exhort the peasants to fight against the Japanese and the Kuomintang. It thereby jeopardized the very basis of its alliance with the peasants, because the short-run subsistence objectives of the peasants did not match up with the emergency war mobilization goals of the 8th Route Army.[44] As conservative tillers with immediate needs, Chinese peasants ordinarily devoted most of their time and energy to agricultural production. For them, the social costs of participating in war, especially a sudden and shifting mobile war against a mechanized army, were immense. Fields had to be plowed, planted, transplanted, hoed, earth-banked, weeded, and watched; crops had to be harvested, threshed, winnowed, bundled, and marketed. War, with the burden of combat duty borne by the villagers, tended to pull peasants away from their lands and markets and to jeopardize their subsistence. Where the Communist Party was unable to instantly ameliorate the burden of war service work for the peasants, therefore, the unpredictable military advances of the Japanese and Kuomintang armies during the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation almost wrecked the revolutionary deployment of the peasants for war service.

Several instances in which the 8th Route Army's struggle with the Japanese and the Kuomintang armies compelled the Communist Party to pressure the peasants for war service illustrate the conditional bases of peasant participation. As Chi Teng-k'uei has pointed out, the party was having difficulty organizing the peasants, especially the tenants, for war service work during the Japanese attacks against the Yellow River Plain in 1941–1944:

[44] *Chi-Lu-Yu chu shih ko yueh chan ch'in kung tsou ching kuang* [The Conditions of Ten Months of Combat Service Duties in the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Region] (War Participation Work No. 13, Command Headquarters of the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Rear Area, June 10, 1947), 1-22, 1-7.

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> The Workers and Peasants Union and the other organizations were all composed of local cadres. There were more than ten committee members in the various tenants and hired hands organizations in each joint district. . . . Not all of them could afford to separate from agricultural production. It was decided, therefore, that only the main cadres (the secretary of the Central Party Branch, the vanguard workers in the Peasant Salvation Association, the Youth Association, and the Women's Association) would separate from production for war service work. All of the mass leaders supported and elected by the masses were extremely poor. There were many complications and difficulties in taking these cadres away from production and sending them into the Anti-Japanese War effort. . . . The central difficulty stemmed from separating from agricultural production. The problems were: How do we leave and separate from our families, wives, and livestock, such as pigs and chickens? Who will take care of these responsibilities while we are away? How will we maintain the livelihood of our families? . . . The tenants and some of the cadres actually could not separate from production. They were too preoccupied with their work duties.[45]

A crisis in organizing and deploying the peasants for war service duties was precipitated by the Kuomintang's counterrevolutionary assault in 1946 on the Communist Party's peasant movements in the Pingyuan. Two hundred and fifty brigades were sent against the Yellow River Plain; they opened the Yellow River dykes to split Liu Po-ch'eng in Honan from Chen Yi in Shantung, and struck deep into Shantung Province.[46] The ensuing devastation prompted the General Headquarters of the Communist Party Rear Area Command in the Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Region to implement an emergency call-up of village militias, reserves, and civilian war-service workers for rear-area and front-line support to the counteroffensive of the 8th Route Army's 129th Division.[47] The base area government doubled the grain taxes in order to provision the front-line troops, and the Communist Party Rear Service Command deployed peasants in war duties during their busy seasons.[48] The war was reaching a critical point, and the support movements toward the front line most likely were essential for the survival of the Communist Party in the North China Plain.[49] Nonetheless, the party's initial response to the Kuomintang's counterrevolutionary thrusts seriously strained the combat support capacity

[45] Chi Teng-k'uei (fn. 3), 21-45.

[46] Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1970), 319-20, 350.

[47] All of these examples are from *Chi-Lu-Yu* . . . (fn. 44), 1-22.

[48] Li I-ch'ing, *Tung-yun min li yu tsu-chih min-li* [The Development and Organization of Civilian Power] (T'aihang Administrative Office, May 1, 1947), 4-5.

[49] *Ibid.*, 1-20.

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of the peasants and precipitated a crisis in getting the village people to participate in the War of Liberation.[50]

The setbacks resulting from emergency war service in several of the military confrontations on the Yellow River Plain proved unbearable for the peasantry. In the first Lung Hai Railway counteroffensive, for example, the Communist Party's cadres overextended their supply lines in enemy territory and led the peasants to believe that tasks which required several months would require only a few weeks. The peasants were angry because they were taken away from their regular agricultural routines during the busy season and were then sent back to do rush make-up planting immediately after performing these physically exhausing war-service tasks. Furthermore, the Communist Party cadres remained in the villages to carry out the land revolution when they were needed desperately to organize the supply lines, so that they failed to arrange adequate subsistence services for grain porters. Hence there were desertions.

In the Hua and Pu county campaigns, there were mass desertions by stretcher bearers because of inadequate subsistence and the emotional stresses of war. In Chuan county, the Communist Party was not prepared for sudden combat mobilizations; and in several villages, arbitrary inductions caused peasant draftees to run away, to fight against military induction cadres, and to join in antidraft demonstrations.

By summer 1946, Communist Party cadres were facing an unprecedented crisis—possibly partly of their own making—in organizing the villagers into front-line duties. They were demanding that peasants rush toward the bloody battlefields without providing them sufficient security and relief in their extra-village war-related tasks. Consequently, the same peasant rebels who had warmly welcomed Liu Po-ch'eng's 129th Division during the War of Resistance now requested the party to reduce the war-service duties and resisted the demands of the party cadres who treated their villages as colonies.

The Communist Party Rear Service Command then attempted to avert and ameliorate the pressure for war-service cadres.[51] The solutions emphasized the minimization of the peasants' losses rather than the maximization of their gains in war service. One example was the synchronization of basic tilling and war service. When peasants left their fields to serve in the 8th Route Army, the Rear Service Command cadres arranged for others to help cultivate their lands and reduced the grain tax for their families and mutual-aid groups.

[50] *Chi-Lu-Yu* . . . (fn. 44), 1-22.
[51] For most of these measures, see *ibid.*, and Li I-ch'ing (fn. 48), 1-20.

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Another service involved periodical relief for the peasants going to the war in militia teams, stretcher-bearer squads, and transportation teams. The cadres organized auxiliary teams before battles and staggered starts and stops to avoid idle waiting and to avoid battlefield exhaustion. They also organized the peasants in carter teams to help with spring and autumn cultivating, transporting night soil to be spread over the fields, and seeding and harvesting the regular crops.

A third service was protection and security. The Rear Service Command cadres organized the peasant militias under the aegis of the 8th Route Army to provide armed escorts for those peasants involved in evacuating the wounded from the front lines and moving grain, fuel, and ammunition to the battle areas. And they led the medical teams in providing bandages and blood transfusions for wounded peasant war service workers who were being carried by stretcher bearer teams to the 129th Division field hospitals.

Still another service consisted of outside transactions, such as employment, when the peasants left their home villages. The cadres arranged for them to earn wages by tilling and harvesting the fields of labor-short landowners in the villages and districts to which they were assigned. At the same time, the war-service workers were allowed to make profits from their round-trips by arranging to purchase what the markets at each war service destination offered in basic commodities, such as charcoal and cotton.

All of these measures were intended to ensure the peasants' subsistence and security in war time. Nonetheless, the burdens of war occasionally overwhelmed these efforts: production and supply crises occurred which hurt both the peasants and the revolutionary army. The Communist Party's war-service arrangements for the peasants at best allowed the revolutionary government to cope with the limits of peasant mobilization. It was in the T'aihang Sub-Region, during the War of Resistance, that the party was first able to adapt war-service duties to the subsistence objectives of the peasants. When the party applied this lesson in its life-and-death struggle with the Japanese and the Kuomintang on the plains, it was able to ameliorate the burdens of war service and secure a conditional commitment by the peasants to the risks of protracted *cum* mobile warfare, thereby enabling the 8th Route Army to sustain its surge toward the liberation of the country. Without such arrangements, however, the war-service duties weakened the peasants' commitment to the Communist Party and greatly increased the risks of national revolutionary war.

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D. PARTY DICTATORSHIP AND PEASANT FREEDOM

In the T'aihang-Pingyuan base area, the Communist Party won the revolutionary war by dictatorship and terror. Yet it may be argued that those practices were, in an important sense, enhancing the villagers' customary practices of egalitarian and equitable politics.

Traditional Peasant Practices and Modern Party Power. Rather than capture a peasant movement solely by dictatorial methods, the Communist Party borrowed from and built on a tradition of peasant counterpractices that were outside of the elitist politics of Confucian China and alien to the politics of Bolshevik Russia. In organizing the peasants for production, for example, the party cadres simply adjusted the old forms of mutual aid to advanced forms of collective production and marketing.[52] They helped each household regain its customary rights to property and profit through joint mutual-aid activities. Rather than pistol-whip peasants into large-scale collective arrangements antithetical to their customary activities, the party recruited individuals who were able to develop the roots of family mutual-aid activities into slightly stretched joint self-help arangements for production and marketing. A similar pattern of development prevailed in the evolution of revolutionary judiciary arrangements in T'aihang.[53] The party founded its traveling courts in the ongoing attempts of peasants to obtain social justice, knitting together mediation and arbitration committees from peasant families and little groups of neighbors who knew the ins and outs of local disputes, and allowing peasants to call on their friends to act as witnesses in suits against the landlords.

Peasant Mobilization and Party Policies. The Communist Party rooted its policies in the peasants' efforts to resecure the sovereignty and welfare of their local communities. Achieving revolutionary authority, then, was not a superimposition of preconceived center prescriptions for local problems. For the party members, the right to rule came from carrying out popular changes in the fields, regardless of whether anyone in some district magistrate's office approved or disapproved. The party derived its legal regulations on rent reduction, for example, from the ongoing protests of tenants for a 25 percent reduction of crop payment

[52] Cf. Isabel and David Crook, *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1959), 161-65.

[53] *T'aihang ch'u ssu-fa kung-tso kai-k'uang Hsu-ch'u-chang tsai T'aihang ch'u ssu-fa hui-i shang chih tsung-chieh pao-kao* [The General Conditions of Judicial Work in the T'aihang District, Department Director Hsu's Summary Report to the Judicial Conference of the T'aihang District] (T'aihang hsing-shu yin 1946); trans. by Wallace Douglas, *Chinese Law and Government*, IV (Fall 1973), 1-15, 22-64.

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in the aftermath of a poor harvest and for the right to glean a given amount of straw from wheat fields.[54] By enforcing these traditional social regulations, the Communist Party proceeded in consonance with the efforts of peasants to resolve their subsistence problems and revive their communities.

Peasant Immiserization and Party Terror. The question has been asked why the Communist Party used political terror. Considering the terror prevailing in the villages under the Kuomintang before and during the revolution, it is quite possible that the party was consciously aligning with peasants who were willing to use violence to put an end to hunger and humiliation.

Rural class-war existed before and during the Chinese revolution. Along the Shantung Po Hai Coast, landlords compelled tenants to transport earth from fertile lands to poor tenancy plots and to run market errands without pay;[55] they made tenants pay prayer fees at the public temple halls; and they claimed the right to intercourse with the virgin daughters of their tenants.[56]

Not all such practices were unheard of in China before the beginning of modern exploitation by the landlords. Nonetheless, Chinese peasants had traditionally had the right to payment for their labor, to arrange their marriages without interference, and to worship in their own religious traditions. When the peasants attempted to prevent landlords from violating these sacred rights of family and livelihood, however, the landlords responded with violence and terror. Along the Shantung seacoast, landlords beat peasants with sticks in their private courtyards without consulting the magistrate.[57] Around Shantung's Kun Lun mountains, landlords banished, hanged, and burned peasants who protested the rape of their daughters.[58] In T'aihang, landlords set up private rent collection bureaus and installed private jails. They apprehended and imprisoned tenants who were pleading for rent reductions and contract renewals, tying them to trees and whipping them for a whole winter night, or chaining them in pigsties for weeks without food.[59] Just as the Kuomintang magistrates did not try to stop this terror, so the Kuomintang judges actually allowed landlords to personally administer physical punishment in court to tenants who had expected to regain their basic social rights before the local judiciary.[60]

[54] Cf. Chi Teng-k'uei (fn. 3), 21-45.
[55] *Ibid.*; cf. *T'aihang jen-chia* (fn. 1).
[56] *Kuan-yu pu-bien* . . . (fn. 6), 72-74.
[57] *Ibid.*, 70-75, 80-104.
[58] Cf. Feng Ye-ying (fn. 12).
[59] Ch'i Wu (fn. 1), 99-116.
[60] Cf. *T'aihang jen-chia* (fn. 1).

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These violent reactions to the peasants' demands for their traditional rights led to the undoing of the landowning elite. During the War of Resistance, the peasants not only welcomed the Communist Party's use of physical coercion to redress these injustices; they also took the arrival of the revolutionary army as a cue to terrorize the landlords who had been reducing them to wretchedness. The Communist Party did not create the social conditions for this interclass violence; neither was it always able to restrain the peasants in their moments of moral outrage. Where the party was unsuccessful in effecting a subsistence settlement that was tolerable to the peasants—either through rent reduction or land redistribution—the party cadres were often forced to deal swiftly with the peasants' social enemies in return for the peasants' commitment to the revolutionary war. The latter were more willing to participate in the war when the party assured them that the victory of national resistance would preserve the gains of the social revolution in the villages.

IV. Some Comparative Theoretical Judgments

One longstanding thesis on the Chinese revolution is that the peasants embraced the Communist movement because of their nationalism. The outstanding version of this theory is Chalmers Johnson's justly renowned *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*.[61] According to Johnson, "Prewar pressures on the peasantry—such as economic exploitation, Communist ideology, warlord wars, and natural calamities —had never been sufficiently widespread or sufficiently intense to give rise to a peasant-based mass movement."[62] Instead, the Japanese invasion and the brutal impact of the war was what aroused the peasants.[63] "The Chinese masses—at least during the war and at the beginning of the regime—placed themselves at the disposal of the Communist Party to be used for nationalistic purposes."[64] The Communists "in their post-1937 propaganda . . . concentrated solely on national salvation."[65] Furthermore, according to this theory, the war stimulated peasant nationalism because the coercive pressure of the Japanese Army welded the peasants together in solidarity and prompted them to participate in the national resistance war of the Communist Party.[66] Finally, the Communist revolution supposedly was a modern single-party movement, and the Communist Party won a claim to legitimacy by manipu-

[61] Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962), chaps. 1-5.
[62] *Ibid.*, 2. [63] *Ibid.*, 2, 5, 7, 11. [64] *Ibid.*, 11.
[65] *Ibid.*, 4. [66] *Ibid.*, chaps. 1-2.

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lating nationalist myths which rationalized its dictatorship of a prepolitical peasant movement.[67]

Several original contributions to understanding the Chinese revolution, including Donald Gillin's superb account of warlord politics in Shansi between 1911 and 1949[68] and Mark Selden's brilliant analysis of Communist Party practices in Shen-Kan-Ning from 1935 to 1945,[69] have questioned *Peasant Nationalism* as a theory for explaining the Communist Party's development of peasant mobilization in North China. Nonetheless, none of these studies has disengaged the premises of the thesis.[70] Recently, Tetsuya Kataoka has concluded that ultimately, revolutionary success was utterly dependent on the Japanese invasion and war, and that the Communist Party rose to power by commanding primitive rebels to fight for its own goals of resistance and revolution.[71]

It is not surprising that the major premises of the theory of "peasant

[67] *Ibid.*, 1-2, 11-13.

[68] Donald Gillin, *Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911–1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1967). Cf. Gillin, "Peasant Nationalism in the History of Chinese Communism," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIII (February 1964), 269-89.

[69] Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971). Cf. Selden, "Revolution and Third World Development: People's War and the Transformation of Peasant Society," in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World* (New York: Free Press 1971), 214-48, esp. 226-27.

[70] In the initial critique of "peasant nationalism," Donald Gillin argues that the Red Army won its claim to legitimacy by championing the cause of the poor. Yet Gillin's critical overview does not develop an alternative theoretical explanation for peasant participation in the Chinese revolution. Gillin's provocative attack is almost entirely an account of the provincial elite's perceptions of Communist power tactics. The argument hardly supersedes the suppositions in Johnson's version of *Peasant Nationalism*. Although Gillin presents an explanation of exploitation in terms of relational exchanges, his evidence does *not* show that the Japanese invasion did *not* create political instability and thereby make peasants available for revolutionary mobilization, that peasants were *not* attuned to the nationalist appeals of the Communists, or that the Communists were *not* infiltrators taking over peasant communities by terrorism. Mark Selden stresses the power of egalitarian economic changes such as land redistribution—rather than of nationalist appeals—in the Communist mobilization of the peasantry. Despite his strengths on the political organization of an aroused peasantry during the early years of the War of Resistance, Selden does not disprove "peasant nationalism" because there is no way to test for the intervening independent effect of the war on the Communists' development of peasant revolution in a base area so lightly affected by the Japanese invasion. Interestingly, when making reference to war, Selden argues that the transformation of Chinese peasant society was largely dependent on the peasants' involvement in the Communist-induced people's war—an argument which, not unlike Johnson's in *Peasant Nationalism*, contends that peasant mobilization and revolutionary war were similar phenomena, if not altogether the same. For a very precise and perceptive theoretical work that raises serious questions about "peasant nationalism," see Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923–45," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1969), 50-52.

[71] Tetsuya Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution: The Communists and the Second United Front* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies 1974), 4-6, 8, 10, 32, 43, 46, 49, 54, 85, 105, 301, 311.

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nationalism" have provided the basis for much theorizing about rural revolutions, and that several scholars have adopted the tenets of this theory to explain the revolutionary victory in China. Barrington Moore argued it in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.[72] Eric Wolf advanced it in *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*.[73] And Joel Migdal accepted it in *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution*.[74] No one general work on contemporary peasant movements has seriously questioned "peasant nationalism" when making reference to the Chinese revolution.

The thesis may be valid for some regions of China, but it apparently does not hold up against the pattern of peasant mobilization and revolutionary war in the T'aihang-Pingyuan region from 1937 to 1949. Moreover, much in the pattern of revolutionary politics in this Communist Party base area matches up with evidence on other rural revolutionary movements.

The social origins and political growth of Communist power lie primarily in appeals to the deeply felt grievances of a starving peasantry. The elite's violation of the peasants' welfare provoked riots and protests against landlords and local governments at least a decade before the Japanese invasion. Long before the arrival of the revolutionary army and the Japanese occupation, the peasants were ready to support a government that would help them recapture the basic elements of social justice they had lost. Exploitation, rather than the impact of the war *per se*, was what aroused the villagers as *potential* participants in the Communist Party's revolutionary war against the Japanese—a pattern not unlike that of Central Luzon before the rise of the Huks, or of Tonkin before the rise of the Vietminh. In China, as in the Philippines and Vietnam, the peasants answered the revolutionary call to defend and liberate the country primarily because that call was in resonance with their ongoing struggle for a tolerable existence.

The Japanese intervention in China's agrarian revolutionary war enabled the landlord enemies of the peasantry to gain a new lease on life and once again to deny the basic conditions of the peasants' existence. The latter made their contributions to the war primarily because the Communists backed their fight to regain the world they had lost. For the peasants, the propaganda of national salvation became meaningful

[72] *Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press 1966), 223-25.

[73] Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row 1968), 152-53.

[74] Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 253-54.

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only when it legitimized solutions to their problems of subsistence. They had no Western notions of nationalism. Not surprisingly, then, Communist appeals to the Peasant Salvation Associations and War Committees during the War of Resistance were straight appeals to a return to the subsistence ethic as a precondition for participation in the Anti-Japanese War. The Chinese peasants were not very different from their counterparts in southern Anjou during the French counterrevolution,[75] or in Long An Province during the Vietnamese revolution.[76] The peasants were not willing to participate in the revolutionary war simply or solely because of nationalism, understood as patriotic support for a modernizing central state or patriotic resistance to foreign invaders. Where the Communists were unable to reinstitute subsistence exchanges between peasants and lords and restore the peasants' means for protection and security, the village people were unable and unwilling to rush into the revolutionary war.

Neither resistance to the Japanese nor rebellion against the Kuomintang automatically caused the peasants to support the Communists. Since these armies launched attacks that precipitated a crisis in provisioning the villages and supplying the revolutionary army, the Communists actually won the revolutionary war against their foreign and domestic adversaries *in spite of*, rather than because of, the military advances by modern armies. In China, the strains between the political mission of the revolutionary army and the social needs of the peasantry appeared during the revolution in provisioning the villages, whereas in France and Russia, for example, they appeared after the revolutionary victory, in the problems of provisioning the towns. The Communists' arrangements for the peasants, and their provisions to the uprooted rural people serving the 8th Route Army, permitted them to inspire the peasants to see the war as a quest to restore the values of family and village life and to support the great leap from local, self-defensive insurgency to national revolutionary war. In Germany, Thomas Muenzer's political movement lost the peasant war in 1524–1525 partly because it neglected to create subsistence arrangements for the peasants;[77] and in 1964–1965, the failure of the *Conseil National de Liberation* to provide guarantees for village-to-market subsistence for the rural people who supported

[75] Cf. Charles Tilly, *The Vendée: A Sociological Analysis of the Counterrevolution of 1793* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1964), 316-30.

[76] Jeffrey Race, "Toward an Exchange Theory of Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1974), 200.

[77] Friedrich Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany* (New York: International Publishers 1966), 105-6, 112.

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their rebel armies was most likely a factor that contributed to the victory of the counterrevolution in the Congo.[78] In both of these instances, where the insurgents did not relieve the pressures on the peasants, the latter did not assume the risks of supporting the revolutionary armies. Without that support, the armies began to break rank and to prey on the villages. What was a step toward a creative reappraisal of how to deploy the civilian peasant population in war-service tasks in China was a fatal stride toward pillaging and powerlessness in Germany and the Congo.[79]

In China, revolutionary power grew with the enhancement of collective services and the enrichment of egalitarian deliberating processes among the peasants. The Communists established their political order by enabling the peasants to substitute the claims of their families and villages to subsistence for those of the plundering landlords who were supported by the Kuomintang. At the same time, the Communists legitimized their political order by encouraging the villagers to replace the dictatorial politics of landlord patriarchs with their own traditional egalitarian political assemblies. Being relatively free from vertical administration, these peasant assemblies directly involved the people in planning the activities that would serve their communities. China was not unlike the Morelos of Zapata's time.[80] The revolutionaries won by making their movement embody those practices of the peasants which created populist versions of local self-rule.

TOWARD A THEORY OF PEASANT MOBILIZATION AND REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The lessons of the revolutionary victory in the T'aihang-Pingyuan region provide some starting points for a theoretical explanation of peasant mobilization and revolutionary war in other agrarian societies. If we view relations between revolutionary and peasant movements in light of the Chinese experience, we may hypothesize that a revolution-

[78] For a very rich and brilliant account of why and how the rebellion in the Congo fell apart under government pressure, see M. Crawford Young, "Rebellion in the Congo," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *Rebellion in Black Africa* (London: Oxford University Press 1971), 209-45, esp. 210-15, 242-45.

[79] In a convincing argument, Verba and Almond contend that "Internal wars lay bare the authority structures of political systems" and that "internal violence makes strong demands upon ordinary citizens for commitment to politics." The Communist Party's pressures on the peasantry for war-service duties, which were intensified in the Chinese case by foreign assistance to the internal foes of the revolutionary government, seem to substantiate this thesis. See Sidney Verba and Gabriel A. Almond, "National Revolutions and Political Commitment," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe 1964), 205-32; quotations from p. 205.

[80] Cf. John Womack, Jr. *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Alfred Knopf 1969).

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ary political order stands the greatest chance of winning peasant support where:

(1) Rural exploiters provoke social outrages among the peasants by eroding their subsistence and eliminating their market choices;

(2) Revolutionaries carry out changes, such as rent reduction and tax reform, that return land and labor to their traditional social matrix and restore peasant subsistence;

(3) The revolutionary governments foster free-trade arrangements that recreate the peasants' market opportunities, thereby developing self-sufficient networks within the revolutionary zones which redirect trade away from the colonial market towns and cosmopolitan cities toward the villages and market fairs;

(4) The mobile revolutionary army preserves the previous gains of the peasants' struggles for subsistence, prevents foreign armies from subverting the peasants' support, and adapts war-service tasks of supply, transport, and logistics to the marginal capabilities of the comparatively immobile peasantry.

When such revolutionary actions provide subsistence to the villagers without warring on them, then the peasants who are engrossed in struggles for their most basic social rights may give conditional support to revolutionaries who advocate national resistance and liberation.

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A FOREIGN POLICY MODEL OF U.S. BILATERAL AID ALLOCATION

By R. D. McKINLAY and R. LITTLE*

TWO views, founded on divergent rationales, have been used to explain the allocation of official bilateral aid.[1] One view explains the allocation of aid in terms of humanitarian needs of the recipient, the other explains it in terms of foreign policy interests of the donor. Although the foreign policy view is now clearly dominant, it has not been systematically examined. This paper develops an analytic model of the foreign policy view of aid from which a number of competing substantive models are derived. These substantive models are then tested by making a cross-national, longitudinal study of the allocation of U.S. aid over the years 1960–1970.

INTRODUCTION

Although the transfer of aid between independent countries developed only after 1945, it soon became an institutionalized aspect of international relations.[2] The two competing views that have emerged to explain its general principle are differentiated primarily by the rationale underlying the allocation of aid. The humanitarian view emphasizes the economic-assistance utility, suggesting that the provision of aid is designed to promote economic development in low-income countries, while the foreign policy view emphasizes the instrumental utility of aid,

* This paper represents part of a comparative project examining the distribution of bilateral aid. The project is funded by the S.S.R.C. (U.K.).

[1] Official bilateral aid is defined as flows of finance at concessional rates of interest and repayment which is not explicitly used for commercial gain or military purpose. It is an aggregation of grants, loans, official export credits, and other long-term capital. It excludes military assistance, private investment, and a number of other means of assistance (such as preferential entry into markets of high-income countries for the exports of low-income countries).

[2] The analysis of aid now seems to have achieved the status of a distinct field of study, and consequently there exist a large number of textbooks. For some particularly useful ones, see Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard S. Eckhaus, eds., *Foreign Aid* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 1970); Ian M. D. Little and J. M. Clifford, *International Aid* (London: Allen and Unwin 1965); Raymond F. Mikesell, *Economics of Foreign Aid* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1968); John Pincus, *Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1965); David Wall, *The Charity of Nations* (New York: Basic Books 1973); John White, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (London: Bodley Head 1974).

World Politics, October 1977, Vol. XXX, No. 1 © 1977 by Princeton University Press

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suggesting that its provision is designed to promote the foreign policy interests of the donor.

The humanitarian view of aid is sufficiently developed to be presented in the form of an explicit model. A model has three major elements: a set of components or variables, a hypothesis relating these variables, and a rationale that underlies and explains this relationship. The variables in the humanitarian model identify the major economic and welfare needs of the recipient and the amounts of aid provided to each recipient. The hypothesis stipulates that the amount of aid received by each low-income country is proportional to its economic and welfare needs. The rationale for this relationship is based on two factors. First, the standard models of economic growth assume that increases in investment provide the catalyst for growth. Until recently, capital shortages have been considered by many development economists to provide the major obstacle to growth in low-income countries. Since aid is a supplement to domestic savings or foreign exchange, and thereby to investment, it follows that aid is an important stimulus for economic development. Second, a number of changes in the international system have precipitated an obligation on the part of high-income countries to provide aid. With the breakdown of the European colonial system, a new set of independent countries emerged. It soon became apparent that many of these countries were experiencing major problems of development and had very poor prospects for achieving self-sustaining growth. The lack of growth in many low-income countries was in marked contrast to the economic success of the high-income countries, accentuating the economic divide between the two groups. It is argued that the high-income countries find this divide morally unacceptable and acknowledge an obligation to provide economic assistance in order to ameliorate the economic and welfare problems of the low-income countries.

The humanitarian view of aid, which was never universally accepted, has come under increasing attack for a number of reasons. First, variations in the amounts of aid received by low-income countries do not correspond to the variations in their levels of need. Second, the major donors have largely retained bilateral control over their aid programs, refusing to increase the supply of aid substantially through multilateral agencies. Third, it is now generally acknowledged that aid provides the donor with an element of control or leverage over the recipient. Finally, it is frequently asserted that the aid program of the United States has only been maintained because of rivalry and competition between the superpowers: Soviet Russia has emerged as a rival source of assistance;

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the cold war has had a global impact; and the United States has become progressively aware that many of its key interests—such as security, trade, and investment—are closely tied to the economic well-being of the low-income countries.[3]

These criticisms have encouraged the general acceptance of a foreign policy view of aid allocation.[4] Although both the humanitarian and the foreign policy views accept that aid provides a means of economic assistance,[5] they may be distinguished by their instrumental interpre-

[3] We have explicitly tested a humanitarian model of U.S. aid allocation. The model consists of the variables of per capita gross domestic product (G.D.P.) measuring the level of relative assistance, and two sets of variables measuring welfare needs (per capita G.D.P., per capita calorie consumption, and number of doctors per 100,000 population), and economic performance (size of international liquidity as a percentage of imports, the rate of growth of real per capita G.D.P., and gross domestic fixed capital formation as a percentage of G.D.P.). The hypothesis derived from the model stipulates that there is a negative relationship between the amount of assistance and the levels of welfare needs and economic performance. However, the regressions of per capita U.S. aid receipts onto the six independent variables do not produce a significant equation for any of the years 1960–1970. Although these results do not indicate that aid is allocated in an explicitly antihumanitarian manner, they do clearly show that humanitarian criteria do not underlie and explain the distribution of U.S. aid.

[4] For examples of studies that reject the humanitarian view of aid allocation and suggest a foreign policy basis, see Keith B. Griffin and John L. Enos, "Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XVIII (April 1976); Teresa Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 1970); Pierre Jalee, *The Third World in World Economy* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1969); Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger 1976); Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth* (New York and London: Macmillan 1973); Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1969); Edward S. Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row 1964); Tibor Mende, *From Aid to Recolonization* (London: Harrap 1973); Hans J. Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid," in Robert A. Goldwin, *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1962); Joan M. Nelson, *Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan 1968); Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 1974); Steve Weissman and others, *The Trojan Horse* (San Francisco: Ramparts Press 1974); White (fn. 1).

[5] There have been arguments that aid does not in fact provide a means of economic assistance. The standard economic models examining the impact of aid on the economic performance of low-income countries have perceived aid as assisting development by virtue of increasing investment, which, with a given incremental capital-output ratio, will then increase growth. See, for example, Hollis B. Chenery and Alan Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 56 (September 1966). The arguments that aid does not provide economic assistance have been made on the grounds that aid reduces savings, creates debt-service problems, and reduces the capital-output ratio. See, for example, Peter Bauer, *Dissent on Development* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1971); Keith B. Griffin, "Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings, and Economic Development," *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics*, XXXII (May 1970); Thomas E. Weisskopf, "The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped Countries," *Journal of International Economics*, II (No. 1, 1972). These criticisms have been well answered by Gustav F. Papaniek, "The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and Growth in Less Developed Countries," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 82 (September 1972). Although the critiques are useful in pointing out that the acceleration effect of aid on development is a function of a large number of factors, we can in general accept that aid can provide economic assistance.

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tation of aid. The humanitarian view considers that economic assistance is the primary rationale for aid, whereas the foreign policy view sees economic assistance as the means whereby a donor's interests can be satisfied.[6] However, although considerable evidence has been produced to show that aid is more strongly related to the donor's foreign policy interests than to the recipient's needs, and although there have been several enumerations both of the instrumental uses of aid and of the donor's interests or objectives which can be pursued through the instrumental capacities of aid, the evidence and enumerations have not been ordered in any systematic manner.[7] In other words, although there is strong corroboration of the foreign policy view of aid, this view has not been systematically developed into an explicit model.[8]

[6] The foreign policy interpretation of the allocation of aid is not new. From the inception of modern aid programs in the Marshall Plan, the capacity of aid to provide economic assistance to the recipient and to satisfy certain foreign policy interests of the donor was recognized. The assistance provided to low-income countries in the early fifties primarily took the form of military aid and was consequently interpreted largely in terms of foreign policy. However, starting in the late fifties, with the establishment of economic assistance programs separate from the military assistance programs, the economic orientation of aid came to the fore. More recently, the foreign policy interpretation has become dominant as it has been realized that economic assistance can be used to promote the foreign policy interests of the donor.

[7] These observations are substantiated by an examination of work by Nelson and Knorr, who have both made important contributions to the foreign policy view of aid. Nelson (fn. 4) enumerates a series of purposes, allocation criteria, and ends that can be achieved by use of the influence inherent in aid. However, there is little justification or support for the selection of the purposes, criteria, and ends; it is very difficult to distinguish between these, and they are not related in any systematic fashion. Similarly, Knorr (fn. 4) lists a number of rationales, coercive uses, and instrumental purposes of aid. Comparable problems occur in his discussion. There is confusion and overlap between the categories, and little systematic justification for the various elements. There have, however, been some studies of U.S. aid from perspectives that attempt to assess the importance of criteria employed by decision makers. See, for example: M. Kato, "A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation," in John E. Mueller, ed., *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1969); Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Western Bilateral Aid Allocations," Sage International Studies Series, 11 (No. 5, 1972). Although these studies resemble the present one to the extent that an attempt is made to identify the criteria underlying the distribution of aid by regressing aid onto an array of independent variables, they differ in that: (1) a smaller population is used; (2) a more restrictive time period is used; (3) a smaller and more restrictive array of independent variables is used; and (4) little attempt is made to evaluate the main findings in more general terms. While these studies are more precise than the work of writers such as Nelson and Knorr, they are less comprehensive in their scope and evaluation.

[8] The failure to develop a systematic foreign policy model of aid is largely a function of the neglect, except on the part of Marxists, of the study of international political economy. Though economists have widely recognized the foreign policy context of aid, they have considered an examination of this aspect of aid to be outside their sphere of competence. Political developmentalists have focused mainly on the domestic political structures of low-income countries and have to a large extent ignored the external setting of these countries. Aid does not appear, for example, in the index of many of the writings of major political developmentalists. Any reference that is made to aid usually takes the form of simple borrowing from economists. Foreign policy analysts

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We can establish two propositions from which an analytic foreign policy model of aid allocation can be developed: (1) By establishing commitment and dependency, a state can realize certain foreign policy utilities. (2) Aid can be used to establish commitment and dependency.

A commitment identifies an attempt by one state to register its support for another. Three main utilities may be associated with commitment; they account for the willingness of high-income countries to demonstrate a commitment to a low-income country. First, commitment may be used to deter intervention by a hostile state. (Intervention has become a familiar feature of the cold war.) Second, commitment may be used to discourage a developing state from moving out of a developed state's sphere of influence. (Such a policy has frequently been employed by developing countries anxious to display and assert their independence.) Finally, even when a developing country is nonaligned, there may still be a desire on the part of a developed state to demonstrate commitment to it, if only to discourage it from moving into a rival's sphere of influence.[9]

A dependency relationship exists when one party relies on another without the reliance being reciprocated. While one party can terminate the relationship with little or no cost, the other can do so only at considerable cost. The reliant party, therefore, operates in a subordinate or dependent position. A dominant state establishes dependency relationships because they generate a degree of control or influence. The main utility of dependency is the potential for control. This control can be used for a variety of ends dictated by the dominant state.[10]

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have been preoccupied with classifying foreign policy behavior and have tended to ignore the political aspects of economic behavior.

[9] The concept of commitment has been extensively examined in the social sciences. For a general theoretical discussion, see Thornton B. Roby, "Commitment," *Behavioral Science*, v (July 1960). In international relations, commitment has been most frequently employed in the literature dealing with strategic and alliance policy. For general discussions see, for example, Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press 1974); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966); Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press 1963); Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII (March 1969).

[10] Dependency has become a major concept in the literature dealing with relations between high- and low-income countries. It is frequently examined in the context of such related concepts as domination, imperialism, and neocolonialism. This literature can be confusing and polemical. In this paper we have endeavored to avoid entering into many of the debates associated with dependency, and to provide a simple and unambiguous definition. For examples of some general works dealing with dependency, see Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1968); Michael Barratt Brown, *After Imperialism* (New York: Humanities Press 1970); Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan 1974); K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., *Readings in U.S. Imperialism* (Boston: Porter

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Aid is related to commitment through the capacity of aid to signal commitment. In the first place, aid is a concessional transfer, and the donor necessarily incurs some cost when it provides aid. Since states do not incur costs for other states unless they wish to register support, donating aid provides a clear demonstration of a commitment to the recipient. Second, donors provide different amounts of aid to different recipients, and this selectivity can be used to indicate the level of commitment of the donors to the recipients. Finally, because the demand for aid exceeds the supply, the restricted allocation of aid reinforces the idea that the donor attaches some special significance or commitment to the recipient.

Two factors underlie the connection between aid and dependency. First, the provision of aid creates a relationship of unreciprocated reliance. The donor can terminate the provision of aid with little or no cost. (In fact, since aid is concessional finance, the termination of aid actually would eliminate a cost to the donor.) The recipient, on the other hand, necessarily incurs a cost when aid is terminated in that some concessional finance, and, therefore, economic assistance, is lost.

Second, aid provides the donor with a potential for control over the recipient. This potential is derived from three factors associated with aid. First, the excess demand for aid places the donor in an advantageous bargaining position. The donor consequently can dictate, to some extent, a number of conditions under which the aid is supplied. Second, the nature of aid provides the donor with a means for intervention in the recipient country. "Program aid" generally entails some intervention in the recipient's fiscal, monetary, and development policies, while "project aid" frequently entails future reliance of the recipient on the donor for the servicing and maintenance of the particular project. Finally, repayment can create another situation where the donor is in an advantageous bargaining position. Many low-income countries have already experienced difficulties with repayment; indeed, this particular problem is likely to become more acute. Development economists have come to realize that growth involves more than the injection of capital. Economic development for the low-income countries is likely to be more complex and prolonged than was anticipated in the early sixties. Many have simply not achieved, nor are likely to

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Sargent 1971); Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1969); Hayter (fn. 4); Magdoff (fn. 4); Robert I. Rhodes, ed., *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1970); Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1974).

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achieve in the near future, the anticipated self-sustaining growth. This in turn reduces their capacity to service their debts. Furthermore, aid itself has often exacerbated this problem. When aid has been provided to fund projects for which there is little productive return (many of the aid-funded "prestige" projects are of this type), the low-income country may lack the necessary finances to repay the project loans. Or, in cases where aid has been provided for development of an infrastructure (which may appear to be a useful object for aid, especially as private investment is less likely to be attracted to this area), returns are unfortunately often long-term; again, the low-income country is left without the necessary finances to service its debts. Whenever a recipient incurs repayment problems, it must attempt to reschedule its debts, thereby again placing the donor in an advantageous bargaining position.

On the basis of the propositions that aid can establish commitment and dependency and, therefore, the foreign policy utilities inherent in commitment and dependency, we can now develop an analytic model of the foreign policy view of aid allocation. The key elements are a set of interests that the donor has in or with low-income countries, and the commitment and dependency expressed through aid. These components are related by the hypothesis that the level of commitment and dependency established through aid is a function of the degree of interest that the donor has in low-income recipients. The rationale underlying this hypothesis is based on the observation that all states have external interests and are concerned wherever possible to promote and protect them. We have established that commitment and dependency provide the donor with the utilities of promotion and protection. Assuming that a high-income country wants greater capabilities of promotion or protection where its interests are greater, we would expect to find the hypothesized relationship between the level of commitment and dependency and the level of interest.[11]

The primary utility of an analytic model is to structure research. Only

[11] Three qualifications to this analysis must be noted. First, commitment and dependency can be established through a variety of other means such as trade, private investment, and military assistance. Second, the provision of aid does not necessarily guarantee a successful commitment or create dependency. For example, recipients can play one donor off against another, undermining the rationale of commitment; or recipients can refuse aid or repayments, thereby eliminating the potential for dependency. Third, even if commitment and dependency are established, the donor may fail to derive any benefits from the utilities contingent on commitment and dependency. For example, intervention by a hostile party may occur despite the existence of commitments; or in the case of dependency, the benefits accruing to the donor may become so important that it is no longer in a position to terminate the relationship, and at this point the relationship becomes characterized by interdependence rather than dependency.

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when the analytic model is translated into a substantive form—by operationalizing its key components or variables—can it actually be used. In the next section we develop operational indicators of the level and type of commitment and dependency that can be established through aid, by making a number of simple transformations of aid. We also develop operational indicators of the donor's interests which are considered to underlie the distributions of commitment and dependency.

In selecting which interests to include in the foreign policy model of aid allocation, we have been guided by the broad range of literature that examines the relationship between high- and low-income countries. This literature has produced a long and varied enumeration of donor interests which has become confusing. As a consequence, it is necessary to produce several substantive models, differentiated in terms of the type of interests that are being promoted and protected.

Our primary research objective is to evaluate and test five substantive models. In so doing, we in effect isolate the main interests pursued by the United States through its aid program.

Research Design

Before elaborating the five substantive models, it is necessary to form operational definitions of commitment and dependency as established through aid. Aid may signal absolute and relative commitment. *Absolute* commitment denotes the gross importance attached to a recipient. It is measured by the size or volume of the support received. For example, if a number of corporations require government assistance, the size of the assistance given to each will reflect the gross importance, or absolute commitment, which the government attaches to that corporation. In the context of foreign bilateral aid, the size or volume of aid given to a country measures the donor's absolute commitment to the recipient.[12]

Whenever a party makes any financial allocation, however, it will normally take the relative need or demand for that allocation into account. *Relative* commitment denotes a commitment that accommodates relative need. For example, if a government assists a number of corporations, the relative needs of individual corporations—defined by factors such as the size of the corporation, current investment position,

[12] The publication that has been used to provide gross aid figures is *The Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries* (Paris: O.E.C.D., D.A.C.). This has been published for the following years: 1960–64, 1965, 1966–67, 1968, 1969, 1970.

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or profit-loss balance—are generally taken into account. In the context of aid, the best single indicators of relative need are population and per capita G.D.P. As population increases and per capita G.D.P. declines, the relative need for aid rises. If two countries receive identical amounts of aid (that is, identical absolute commitment), but one has a larger population and lower per capita G.D.P., then some preference is being shown toward the smaller, wealthier country in the sense that its relative needs for aid are lower. This preference or deviation from the dictates of relative need constitutes relative commitment. Relative commitment is operationalized by the index:[13]

$$\text{gross aid} \times \frac{\text{per capita G.D.P.}}{\text{population}}$$

Two types of dependency may be established by aid: asset and source dependency. *Asset* dependency denotes reliance where the degree of reliance or dependency is assessed in terms of the subordinate party's assets. For example, a corporation's dependency on a government is a function of the ratio of the size of government assistance to the corporation's total assets. In the context of aid, we shall use a country's G.D.P. as the best single indicator of its assets. A recipient's asset dependency on a particular donor is operationalized by expressing its bilateral aid receipt as a percentage of its G.D.P. This provides a measure of the importance of a donor's aid to the economy of the recipient; reliance, or asset dependency, on the donor—and consequently the degree of potential control for the donor—increases with the size of aid received.[14]

Source dependency is defined by the degree of diversification in the sources that provide assistance. If a corporation in need of assistance, for

[13] Three countries, *A*, *B*, and *C*, receive different amounts of gross aid (giving them an absolute commitment ranking running from *A* to *C*), such that receipts per capita aid are identical. However, once we take per capita income into account, then *C*, the recipient of the smallest amount of aid, receives the greatest relative commitment.

CALCULATION OF RELATIVE COMMITMENT

Recipient	*Gross Aid*	*Population*	*Per Capita Aid*	*Per Capita G.D.P.*	*Relative Commitment*
A	40	100	.4	100	40
B	20	50	.4	50	20
C	10	25	.4	150	60

[14] Asset dependency could be operationalized in a variety of ways. For example, aid could be expressed as a percentage of imports or domestic savings. Although these measures have similar connotations to the index we use, we prefer G.D.P. because it is more comprehensive and stable.

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example, can attract assistance only from the government, then it is solely reliant on the government; if it can attract assistance from a variety of sources, then its reliance is reduced as a result of the diversification. In the context of aid, source dependency on a particular donor is operationalized by the size of a country's receipt of bilateral aid from that donor, expressed as a percentage of its total receipt of bilateral aid. Source dependency measures the degree of a donor's domination over a recipient's aid, and in this respect indicates a type of reliance.

Although source dependency measures a distinctive form of control potential, it is a much weaker indicator of control potential than asset dependency. To demonstrate, we may compare a donor with high asset and low source dependency over a particular recipient with a donor having low asset and high source dependency. In the former case, the donor's potential for control is mitigated to some extent because other donors will also have asset dependency. Even so, the donor with low source dependency has considerable potential for control because its aid is very important to the economy of the recipient. In the latter case, the absence of competition among donors reduces the capacity of the recipient to bargain, and consequently increases its reliance. Since aid is not very important to the recipient's economy, however, the donor is constrained in that the recipient can terminate its aid, and with it the dependency relation, without any great loss. This constraint on the donor is greater than the constraint imposed on a donor when a recipient has other sources of aid. The major limitation of source dependency, therefore, is that it fails to give an unambiguous comparative measure of potential for control. On the other hand, asset dependency does provide such a measure: other things being equal, if one recipient has higher asset dependency than another, then a higher degree of control potential is experienced. Asset dependency is therefore a more valid measure of control potential. Since source dependency can prove in isolation to be a misleading measure of control potential, we have excluded it from the main analysis. On the other hand, source dependency can indicate reliance, and its analysis can complement and elaborate an understanding of the dependency relationship. Consequently, we have included it in the descriptive analysis in the appendices.

Given these operational definitions of commitment and dependency, we can now indicate the operational form of donors' interests. The type of interest that a donor may have can be operationalized by the characteristics or attributes of low-income countries. We have already suggested that five substantive foreign policy models can be differentiated by the type of interests being pursued by the donor. These are (1) development

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interests; (2) overseas economic interests; (3) security interests; (4) power-political interests; and (5) interest in political stability and democracy. Each of these five categories of interests can be operationalized by appropriate attributes of low-income countries.

In each case we indicate (1) the main components of the model—the operational variables of commitment and dependency and the donor's interests identified by that model; (2) the main hypothesis relating the interests to commitment and dependency; (3) the rationale that underlies and explains the relationship defined in the hypothesis.[15]

The model of *development interests* focuses on the economic development and performance capabilities of low-income countries. The variables used to operationalize them are:

1. Per capita gross domestic product;
2. Rate of growth of constant per capita gross domestic product—measured for the three-year period prior to the allocation;
3. Gross domestic fixed capital formation (G.D.F.C.F.)—as a percentage of gross domestic product;
4. The size of the manufacturing section—as a percentage of gross domestic product;
5. The size of the mining sector—as a percentage of gross domestic product;
6. International liquidity holdings—as a percentage of imports.

The main hypothesis derived from this model states:

> Other things being equal, the levels of commitment and dependency established with low-income countries are a function of the levels of economic development and perfomance capabilities in those countries.

The underlying rationale for this hypothesis is:

1. Commitment and dependency provide the donor with utilities that allow it to promote and protect its interests;

[15] The sources for the data in this study are: *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, 1960–1972; *United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, 1961–1972; *United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics*, 1964–1972; *International Financial Statistics*, 1960–1970 (Washington: International Monetary Fund); *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, 1960–1970 (Washington: International Monetary Fund); *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1960–1970 (London: Macmillan); *Europa Yearbook*, 1958–1970 (London: Europa Publications); Richard P. Stebbins and Alma Amoia, eds., *Political Handbook and Atlas of the World* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1970); *Whitaker's Almanac*, 1959–1970 (London: Whitaker's Publications); *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 1959–1970 (London: Keesings Publications); *The Military Balance*, 1960–1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament*, 1968–1972 (Stockholm: Almqvist); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Arms Trade with the Third World* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 1973); Trevor N. Dupuy and others, *Almanac of World Military Power* (Dunn Loring, Virginia: Trevor N. Dupuy and Associates 1970); Richard C. Sellers, ed., *Reference Handbook of Armed Forces of the World* (3rd ed.; New York: Praeger 1971).

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2. The factors explaining the donor's interest in the economic development and performance capabilities of low-income countries are:
   a. Commitment and dependency are unlikely to be formed successfully with countries which do not have an infra- and investment structure that can take advantage of the economic assistance provided by aid;
   b. Capabilities for development and performance capabilities are supported because more successful performance is considered to indicate greater economic stability, which in turn is believed to be the antecedent condition for political stability;
   c. Greater economic stability may promote other important donor interests (for example, economic stability can lead to expanded trading markets);
   d. Greater economic stability is also thought to reduce tensions between high- and low-income countries.

The model of *overseas economic interests* focuses on the variety of domestic and foreign benefits that can accrue to a high-income country through trade and investment ties with low-income countries. The variables used to operationalize them are:

1. U.S. trade domination—the percentage of each low-income country's total exports and imports to and from the United States are standardized and added;
2. U.S. gross trading ties—the gross size of each low-income country's exports and imports to and from the United States are standardized and added;
3. Investment Income—the gross size of returns on external investment made by low-income countries;
4. Investment balance—the net balance of private investment in low-income countries.

The main hypothesis derived from this model states:

> Other things being equal, the levels of commitment and dependency established with low-income countries are a function of the size of the donor's overseas economic interests in those countries.

The underlying rationale for this hypothesis is:

1. Commitment and dependency provide the donor with utilities that allow it to promote and protect its interests;
2. The factors explaining the donor's interests in its overseas economic ties with low-income countries are:
   a. Exports and returns on overseas investment contribute to the donor's economic growth;
   b. Low-income countries provide certain essential commodities for donors;

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c. Trade and investment ties are used to establish a donor's sphere of influence;
d. Given the economic imbalance between high- and low-income countries, trade and investment ties can provide the donor with a means of control;
e. The establishment of trade and especially investment interests usually entail costs to the donor;
f. Trade and investment ties can involve the transfer of the donor's economic values and structures to low-income countries.

The model of *security interests* focuses on the security issues raised by the perceived threat of Communist expansion. The variables used to operationalize them are:

1. U.S. strategic ties—four aspects of strategic interest (defense treaty with the U.S., U.S. troops or bases, U.S. military assistance, U.S. arms sales) are scored 0 or 1 corresponding to their presence or absence, and they are then added;
2. Trade domination by the Communist bloc—the percentages of each recipient's total exports and imports to and from the Communist bloc are standardized and added;
3. Gross trading ties with the Communist bloc—the gross sizes of the exports and imports of the Communist bloc to and from each recipient are standardized and added;
4. Strategic ties with the Communist bloc—three aspects of strategic interest (defense treaty with the Communist bloc, Communist-bloc military assistance, and Communist-bloc arms sales) are scored 0 to 1 corresponding to their presence or absence, and they are then added;
5. Strength of support for the Communist Party—measured by a percentage of total votes cast for the Communist Party in the last election.

The main hypothesis derived from this model states:

> Other things being equal, the levels of commitment and dependency established with low-income countries are a function of the U.S. strategic interests with those countries.

The underlying rationale for this hypothesis is:

1. Commitment and dependency provide utilities that allow the donor to promote and protect its interests;
2. The primary factor explaining the donor's security interests with low-income countries is that, with the onset of the cold war, the United States identified its security interests at a global level. This became institutionalized in the doctrine of containment.

The model of *power-political interests* focuses on the power capabilities of low-income countries. The variables used to operationalize them are:

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1. International liquidity holdings—in gross terms;
2. Military capabilities—gross expenditure on the armed forces and gross size of the armed forces are standardized and added;
3. Militarism—military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product and manpower size per 10,000 population are standardized and added;
4. Gross size of population;
5. Constant gross domestic product.

The main hypothesis derived from this model states:

Other things being equal, the levels of commitment and dependency established with low-income countries are a function of the size of the low-income countries' power capabilities.

The underlying rationale for this hypothesis is:

1. Commitment and dependency provide utilities that allow the donor to promote and protect its interests;
2. The factors explaining the donor's interests in the power capabilities of low-income countries are:
   a. A state will attempt to maximize its power potential by optimizing its position in a balance-of-power system. The contribution of any state to the balance of power is defined by its power capabilities;
   b. The importance attached to the realignment of a state is a function of its power capabilities;
   c. High-income countries have endeavored to restore the stability of the balance of power that was disturbed by the emergence of new states following the breakdown of the European colonial system.

The model of *political stability and democracy* focuses on the political structure and ideology of low-income countries. The variables used to operationalize them are:

1. Party bans—bans on parties other than the Communist Party measured as a dummy;
2. Bans on the central assembly—measured as a dummy;
3. Number of changes of main executives—measured for the three-year period prior to the allocation;
4. Number of military coups—measured by the number of coups in the three-year period prior to the allocation;
5. Period under military rule—measured by the percentage of time in which a military regime has been in power during the three years prior to the allocation.

The two main hypotheses derived from this model state:

Other things being equal, the levels of commitment and dependency established with low-income countries are a function of the manifestation of liberal democracy in those countries;

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Other things being equal, the levels of commitment and dependency established with low-income countries are a function of the degree of political stability in those countries.

The underlying rationale for these hypotheses is:

1. Commitment and dependency provide utilities that allow the donor to promote and protect its interests;
2. The factors explaining the donor's interests in the political stability and democracy of low-income countries are:
   a. The most enduring safeguard to Western security is the promotion of liberal democracies throughout the Third World;
   b. The establishment and extension of liberal democracies throughout the Third World will encourage a greater consonance of interests between low-income and Western high-income countries;
   c. Commitment and dependency are unlikely to be formed and maintained successfully with states demonstrating a high degree of political instability.

Our primary research objective is to evaluate or test the five substantive foreign policy models of aid allocation. In so doing, we isolate the critical U.S. interests that underlie and explain the patterns of commitment and dependency, and thus the interests that the United States wishes to promote or protect through the utilities afforded by commitment and dependency. The most suitable technique for this task is multiple regression analysis.[16] For each of the years from 1960 to 1970, we regress the operational measures of commitment and dependency onto the set of operational indicators identifying the major low-income attributes that have been considered to be of interest to the United States. In interpreting the results, we use standardized partial regression

[16] We are, of course, faced with the problem of a large number of variables. This problem is unavoidable as there are no *a priori* grounds for anticipating which are the most important. Furthermore, testing the model in separate parts could be seriously misleading; variables, which may be important in simple terms, may well be of trivial importance once other variables are included; alternatively, they may take on a very different importance. It must be emphasized that we are not interested in making a descriptive profile of the characteristics of countries receiving differing amounts of aid, but in identifying the criteria, and the structural arrangement of the criteria, that dictate the pattern of the distribution of aid. This exercise requires a comparative evaluation of potential criteria. We do not, however, wish to retain all the independent variables, as the interpretation would be far too confusing; furthermore, it is conceivable that many may be of little importance. It is also possible, as the regression equation gets longer, to find variables that appear to be of some importance, but only because they are qualifying each other. There are, of course, a number of rules governing inclusion of variables such as size of beta value, level of significance, or magnitude of change in R^2. There are also certain problems associated with each of these rules; in practice, it is therefore impossible to set a hard and fast rule governing all the regressions. In general, since we are not interested in economy of estimation, we have used low values in order to produce as complex an equation as possible while remaining within the bounds of manageability.

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coefficients. This coefficient is useful in that we are able not only to identify the major critical interests underlying the structures of commitment and dependency, but are also able to indicate the relative importance of these interests.[17]

In addition to the main research objective, several interesting points can be derived from a more descriptive examination of the distributions of commitment and dependency. Although these are of secondary importance to the main research objective, they provide some important information about the central dependent variables; in this respect they supplement the main analysis. In Appendices 1 through 4, we present descriptive accounts of some important features of the distributions of absolute and relative commitment and of asset and source dependency. Appendix 1 examines the magnitude of the four variables from 1960 to 1970. Appendix 2 examines the fluctuations in each variable in order to indicate the degree of stability in U.S. commitment and dependency. Appendix 3 examines the simple correlations among the four variables in order to assess the distinctiveness of the different uses of aid. Appendix 4 examines the correlations among the distributions of commitment and dependency of the four major Western powers (United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany), indicating the degree of autonomy in the spheres of commitment and dependency of these countries.

Finally, we can outline the population of this study. The population consists of all independent, non-Communist countries that, in 1970, are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (O.E.C.D.).[18] Communist countries are excluded largely

[17] Any multiple regression analysis in the social sciences must confront the problem of multicollinearity. In this context, the use of the standardized partial regression coefficient is very useful. The beta value can be used to partition explained variance into independent and joint effects. (In the three-variable case, $R^2_{1.23} = B^2_2 + B^2_3 + 2B_2B_3R_{23}$.) In the situation where independent variables are uncorrelated, the last term disappears. This is of course unusual in the social sciences. However, this last term is extremely important for a variety of reasons, one of which is that it constantly calls attention to the presence of multicollinearity. In general, we would argue that we do not have any major difficulties. Prior to the analysis, a number of variables with high correlations—as a consequence of one variable being a substitute for another—have been rejected. In other cases, where we wished to retain two highly correlated variables in the analysis, we have standardized and added them (where it was meaningful to do so). Finally, we tested our independent variables by factor analysis. If there was a high degree of interrelation between the independent variables, then a factor analysis would produce a small number of factors with high communality scores. Factor analyses, however, did not produce these results.

[18] As countries become independent during the period examined, the population increases. A number of countries are excluded from each year because data for them are not available. The total number of potential recipients of aid and the actual number included in the analysis (the latter in parenthesis), from 1960 to 1970 are: 58 (52), 74 (68), 76 (70), 82 (75), 84 (77), 87 (80), 90 (82), 93 (83), 94 (83), 96 (84), 96 (84).

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because data are not available. Non-independent countries are excluded because the relationship between a metropolitan power and its dependent is substantively different from the relationship between independent countries. The inclusion of both types of countries would only confound the analysis. Members of the O.E.C.D. are excluded because in general they are higher-income countries which allocate rather than receive aid. There are a small number of exceptions: three O.E.C.D. countries receive aid and are included (Greece, Spain, and Turkey); four non-O.E.C.D. countries are excluded because they are higher-income countries which do not receive aid (Australia, Finland, New Zealand, and South Africa).

Findings

THE MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS

There is no general confirmation for the main hypothesis derived from the model of development interests in the context of absolute commitment. The United States, therefore, is not influenced by the capacity for development and performance of low-income countries when it establishes absolute commitment.[19]

In contrast, the strong positive relationship between relative commitment and per capita G.D.P. initially appears to give some confirmation to the hypothesis in the context of relative commitment. However, gross domestic fixed capital formation (G.D.F.C.F.) is of minor importance, and the impacts of manufacturing, mining, and the rate of growth of per capita G.D.P. are negative. Since the development interests are positively related, the combination of variables with positive and negative signs is incompatible with the hypothesis.[20] The relationship of per capita G.D.P. to relative commitment must therefore be reinterpreted. The negative impact of the development variables, excluding per capita G.D.P., suggests that they provide a corrective to the latter. This corrective element emphasizes the importance of the variance that per capita G.D.P. alone shares with relative commitment, undermining

[19] The authors will supply the results of the regressions of absolute and relative commitment and asset dependency upon receipt of requests accompanied by a self-addressed envelope and postage.

[20] On the basis of the positive relationships among the development variables, a development syndrome can be identified. Given the existence of a development syndrome, two possible sets of results are compatible with the development hypothesis. First, the hypothesis can be confirmed if a number of development variables appear with positive signs, indicating those aspects of the development syndrome related to relative commitment. Second, the hypothesis can be confirmed if a dominant variable emerges that is capable of explaining all the variance shared by relative commitment and the development syndrome.

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the development connotations of per capita G.D.P. It is possible, however, to interpret per capita G.D.P. as a relative power capability, since it is generally accepted that G.D.P. measures the economic resources of a country and can be used as an indicator of gross capabilities. Our other results are consistent with this interpretation.

The influence of the development variables is weaker on asset dependency than on relative commitment. Nevertheless, a number of significant relationships appear. Per capita G.D.P. has the most important and consistent impact, though it is reinforced, in some of the years, by manufacturing. The impact of per capita G.D.P., however, is negative. Although there are grounds for expecting such a relationship for G.D.P. (other things being equal, increases in G.D.P. make it more difficult to establish high levels of asset dependency), the negative impact of per capita G.D.P. is not consistent with the hypothesis. The most satisfactory interpretation of this result is that higher per capita G.D.P. gives low-income countries some protection against the establishment of dependency.

THE MODEL OF OVERSEAS ECONOMIC INTERESTS

There is very little support for the main hypothesis derived from the model of overseas interests in the context of absolute commitment. Thus, the formation of absolute commitment is not strongly influenced by U.S. overseas economic interests. The impact of investment income is not only weak, but also generally negative. Moreover, since the simple correlations are very low, the weakness of the impact is not attributable to other variables explaining the shared variance of investment income and absolute commitment. The impact of investment balance is even weaker, and fails to appear after 1962. Two possible explanations may be advanced for the inverse relationship between aid and investment. Aid may precede investment, being used to establish a viable structure; or aid and investment flows may represent alternative rather than complementary strategies. A pronounced inverse relationship between investment and aid would occur if either of these policies were pursued systematically. Our results do not fully substantiate either of these explanations. However, the results unequivocally demonstrate that the absolute commitment displayed through aid is not used to reinforce investment patterns. Similarly, the formation of absolute commitment is not strongly influenced by U.S. trading ties. Although there are significant positive relations between aid and trade throughout the period, once the variance that trade shares with other variables is removed, its influence is generally unimportant.

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There is limited evidence indicating the influence of overseas economic interests on relative commitment. Although the investment variables do not appear to have any consistent or significant impact, both trade variables have a relatively strong, though divergent, influence in the second half of the sixties. Although the impact of gross trade is negative, trade domination is positive. In interpreting these results, it must be noted that the two variables point to quite different aspects of trade. "Gross trade" indicates the importance of trading partners. "Trade domination" indicates the level of a country's reliance on trade with the United States, giving the latter a measure of control. Our results show, therefore, that it is a potential for control through trade, rather than trade itself, that is pursued through relative commitment.

The support for the hypothesis of overseas economic interests is weaker in the context of asset dependency. Investment variables only appear on three occasions, and always with negative signs. As with relative commitment, there is an indication that the potential for control through trade is reinforced by the asset dependency established through aid. In contrast to relative commitment, there is no evidence that the more important trading partners are explicitly avoided.

THE MODEL OF SECURITY INTERESTS

There is substantial support for the hypothesis derived from this model. U.S. security interests have an important influence on the formation of absolute commitment. Absolute commitment can be used to respond to security interests in two contrasting ways. In the first, aid is totally denied to any country displaying Communist sympathies. Our results demonstrate that the United States has never employed this strategy of withholding aid. Most of the variables identifying Communist sympathies have significant positive relations with U.S. aid, indicating that, far from avoiding countries with Communist sympathies, the United States is actually attracted to them. Our results indicate, therefore, that Washington has implemented a second, more flexible, strategy—whereby increases in aid are used to compete for, and decreases to penalize, countries displaying Communist sympathies. In particular, the United States has tended to follow the strategy of rewarding countries with whom it has strategic ties, and penalizing countries displaying internal and external Communist sympathies. There have, however, been changes in the relative emphasis given to the two aspects of this strategy. The penalization of Communist sympathies is most marked in the years 1960–1961, when internal Communist sympathies as well as trading and strategic ties with Communist-bloc countries are punished. However, during these years, strategic ties

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with the United States are not supported. The negative reaction to Communist sympathies is moderated in the period 1962–1964. Penalization of domestic Communist sympathy disappears, and although support for strategic ties with the United States develops after 1963, it is qualified to some extent by attempts to compete with, rather than to penalize, external ties with Communist-bloc countries. In the second half of the sixties, a more hard-line policy is restored. Support for ties with the United States persists and, once again, countries with external ties to the Communist bloc are penalized, though the focus is now exclusively on trade rather than on strategic ties.

Little support for the hypothesis is found in the context of relative commitment. During the first half of the sixties, only domestic Communist sympathies have the expected negative impact. However, in the second half of the sixties, two security interests—strategic ties and Communist bloc trade domination—are more important and appear more frequently. Unexpectedly, strategic ties with the United States have a negative impact. Strategic allies not only fail to attract relative commitment, but are even discriminated against. A possible explanation is that relative commitment may be used as a substitute for strategic ties—which, as we noted, are reinforced by absolute commitment. Of the variables measuring external ties with the Communist bloc, only size of trade appears (1967–1970). This discrimination against countries trading with the Communist bloc or having strategic ties with the United States may seem to suggest a policy of special preference toward nonaligned countries. Such a policy cannot be clearly identified, however, in the absence of strategic, rather than trading, ties with the Communist bloc. With the possible exception of some special preference displayed, for a limited period, to the nonaligned countries, there is, rather surprisingly, no strong positive influence of security interests on relative commitment.

Stronger confirmation for the hypothesis exists in the context of asset dependency. In particular, strategic ties with the Communist bloc have a strong negative influence. This influence is reinforced in some of the years by the negative impact of both Communist bloc trade domination and domestic Communist sympathies, and the positive impact of strategic ties with the United States. Earlier, two courses of action were identified. While absolute commitment reflects penalization and competition, asset dependency is based on avoidance. Although there is some reinforcement of direct strategic ties with the United States, the reinforcement is not extensive. The potential for control inherent in asset dependency is most widely used in those countries where ties with the Communist bloc are not extensive.

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THE MODEL OF POWER-POLITICAL INTERESTS

Very strong support for the hypothesis derived from the model of power-political interests is found in the context of absolute commitment. Undoubtedly the major interests underlying the formation of absolute commitment are those reflected in the power capabilities of population and military resources. The remaining power capabilities are also related, though only in simple terms, to absolute commitment. This gives additional corroboration to the hypothesis. As could be anticipated, militarism is the weakest variable because it is a relative indicator. G.D.P. and international liquidity have stronger simple relations than militarism, but do not generally appear in the analysis because the variance they share with absolute commitment is better explained by population and military capabilities. The stronger influence of population and military resources can be accounted for by the connotations attached to different power capabilities. The connotations associated with G.D.P. and international liquidity are primarily economic, while those associated with population and military resources are of a general security nature. It is, therefore, the power capabilities with security connotations that are the critical determinants of absolute commitment. This interpretation coincides with the general importance of a number of security interests already noted.

There is some confirmation for the power-political hypothesis in the context of relative commitment. Militarism is the most important influence, indicating that special preference is shown toward countries displaying higher levels of military development. The predominance of militarism is expected because it is a relative variable. The overall importance of power capabilities becomes more pronounced since per capita G.D.P., the single most important influence on relative commitment, has already been interpreted as a relative power capability.

Militarism has the single most important influence on asset dependency and provides strong support for the power-political hypothesis. The propensity of the United States to establish a greater potential for control through asset dependency on the basis of relative rather than gross power capabilities needs to be explained. This explanation is initially contingent on the nature of the relationship between absolute commitment and asset dependency. A perfect correlation between gross aid and G.D.P. generates a collinear relationship in which all recipients have identical dependency scores. Such a collinear relationship would show a zero correlation between G.D.P. and asset dependency. It has been established that the gross power capabilities of population and

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military resources, to which G.D.P. is strongly related, are important estimators of absolute commitment. Although the correlation between gross aid and G.D.P. is not perfect, it is sufficiently high to inhibit the development of a strong relationship between asset dependency and gross power capabilities.[21] Thus, the pursuit of one goal (gross power capabilities as sources of absolute commitment) automatically precludes, to some extent, the satisfaction of another goal (gross power capabilities as sources of asset dependency). However, the general importance of power capabilities, shown in the influence of gross capabilities on absolute commitment, is reinforced by the complementary influence of the relative power capability of militarism on asset dependency.

THE MODEL OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY

There is no systematic relationship between political instability and absolute commitment, and there is therefore no support for this hypothesis. The hypothesis relating political democracy and absolute commitment has weak but qualified support. There is an indication that in some years absolute commitment is made to those countries least likely to restrict political activity by banning assemblies and parties. This indication is countered by the finding that, from 1963 to 1970, the United States has supported military regimes—the type of regime most likely to restrict political activity. The resolution of these apparently contradictory findings is that restrictions on political activity are ignored provided a country has a military regime; in the absence of such a regime, support is withheld. A variety of interpretations has been offered suggesting a positive relationship between absolute commitment and military regimes. The explanation most consistent with our findings is that military regimes should be supported because they are believed to be antagonistic to communism.

There is some weak support for both hypotheses in the context of relative commitment. In some of the years, relative commitment is explicitly withheld from countries displaying higher levels of political instability and restrictions in political activity.

In the context of asset dependency, the findings on the whole contradict the two hypotheses. Although the findings are neither strong enough nor consistent enough to justify the extensive elaboration of an alternative explanation, they are sufficient to indicate that asset dependency is not employed to encourage political stability and activity.

[21] This point is dealt with more extensively in Appendix 3.

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Conclusion

The rationale for this paper is based on the proposition that although the foreign policy view of aid is now dominant, it has not been developed systematically. Initially we establish an analytic foreign policy model of aid allocation. The model suggests that the provision of aid enables the donor to form relations of commitment and dependency. These in turn afford foreign policy utilities that can be used by the donor to promote and protect certain of its interests.

The research objective is to identify the substantive interests pursued by the United States through its aid program over the period 1960–1970. Although there is some variation in the specific interests associated with commitment and dependency, our findings indicate that power-political and security concerns are the central interests supported by and controlled through the U.S. aid program. There is, therefore, an underlying complementarity between commitment and dependency in the sense that both are used to pursue the same sets of interests. Furthermore, we find that, during the period examined, there is a high degree of consistency and stability in the interests that are pursued.

The foreign policy model that provides the most satisfactory explanation of the U.S. aid program conforms to a general view of international relations characterized by the political interpretation of imperialism. Imperialism assumes that there is inequality among states, and that the dominant states employ strategies of control and influence to preserve their dominance. There are, however, various interpretations of imperialism that are distinguished by the rationale underlying and explaining the attempts to maintain dominance. The political interpretation characterizes the international system in terms of competing nation-states operating in an anarchic environment. The combination of competition and anarchy encourages a preoccupation with national security. The strategies of control and influence that are associated with imperialism can be used by states to enhance their security. Our proposition—that the provision of aid affords the utilities associated with commitment and dependency—permits aid to be seen as a dimension of imperialism. Our substantive finding—that power-political and security interests structure the pattern of commitment and dependency established through U.S. aid—is consonant with an explanation of the U.S. aid program in terms of the political interpretation of imperialism.[22]

[22] Although the political interpretation of imperialism has not been as well articulated as the economic, it does have a long pedigree. See, for example, Edward H. Carr,

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APPENDIX 1

The Magnitude of Commitment and Dependency, 1960–1970

ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT

The U.S. aid program, measured in constant terms, increases from $2.5 billion in 1960 to a maximum of $3.6 billion in 1963. From 1963 to 1968, the aid program remains tolerably constant, but then declines more markedly—to $2.7 billion in 1970. The decline in the volume of the annual aid program indicates a reduced willingness by the United States to establish commitment through aid. This fact is seen even more clearly when aid is expressed as a percentage of the gross national product of the United States. The decrease becomes more pronounced with a continuous fall from .63 percent in 1961 to .33 percent in 1970.

SOURCE DEPENDENCY

The annual mean level of U.S. source dependency declines from 80 percent in 1960, to 48 percent in 1965, to 35 percent in 1970. This decline is a function of three factors: the general decrease in the size of the U.S. aid program, a general increase in bilateral aid throughout the world, and the absence of any major U.S. re-allocation. The decline in U.S. source dependency has led to a number of important changes in the annual frequency distributions. Perhaps the most important of these is that the distributions change from being negatively skewed in the early sixties to being positively skewed in the late sixties. Thus, the percentage of all potential recipients that receive 60 percent or more (60 percent being used as a rough measure of monopolization) declines from 83 percent in 1960 to 40 percent in 1965, to 33 percent in 1970. Despite this decline, however, the United States continues to monopolize the aid received by a large number of states.

ASSET DEPENDENCY

With a number of minor fluctuations, asset dependency has decreased from a mean of 3.1 percent in 1961 to a mean of 1.4 percent in 1970. The decrease in dependency is largely attributable to the decline in the size of the aid program, combined with increases in recipients' G.D.P. and an expansion of the number of potential recipients. Despite the decline in levels of asset dependency, the basic shape of the annual frequency distributions has remained quite constant. Thus, even in 1970, 18 percent of all potential recipi-

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The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Macmillan 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (5th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1973); Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1935); Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (3rd ed.; London: Stephens 1964); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press 1959). For a recent analysis of the realist position, see Robert L. Rothstein, "On the Costs of Realism," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 87 (September 1972). For some recent literature calling attention to the importance of power capabilities, see Cohen (fn. 10); Wayne H. Ferris, *The Power Capabilities of Nation-States* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1973); Michael D. Wallace, *War and Rank Among Nations* (Lexington, Mass.; D. C. Heath 1973).

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ents receive U.S. aid allocations amounting to more than 2 percent of their G.D.P. One response to these dependency figures may be that they are rather low, and that therefore the degree of asset dependency is trivial. If we focus on those countries which receive more than 2 percent of their G.D.P. from the U.S., a number of factors indicate that such a degree of dependency is far from trivial. First, when the mean rate of growth of per capita G.D.P. for low-income countries is approximately 3½ percent, an addition of 2 percent through aid is not trivial. Second, when the mean size of the budget as a percentage of G.D.P. is 18 percent, an aid allocation of 2 percent represents an 11-percent addition to the budget. Third, since most low-income countries have acute capital shortages, the marginal utility of capital is likely to be very high. Finally, aid receipts represent fairly mobile forms of capital.

APPENDIX 2

The Stability of Commitment and Dependency, 1960–1970

ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT

Simple correlations of gross aid receipts from year to year are very high, indicating in the short term that absolute commitment is very stable. Such correlations, however, do not preclude the possibility that there are incremental changes that accumulate over time. To examine longer-term changes, we have computed coefficients of variation for the percentage of total U.S. aid which is allocated to individual recipients for each year. (This controls for fluctuations in the absolute size of each year's allocation.) The mean coefficient of variation is .80, which means that on average, the standard deviation of the percentage of any one recipient's annual U.S. aid receipts over the period 1960–1970 is 80 percent of its mean percentage receipt. That is certainly quite a high fluctuation which does not concur with the high degree of stability suggested by the year-to-year simple correlations. This apparent paradox is resolved, however, by an examination of the countries that experience the greatest fluctuations. The regression of the coefficient of variation of percentage aid receipt on mean aid receipt shows that the degree of fluctuation is a reciprocal function of mean aid receipt. In other words, larger fluctuations in commitment are primarily confined to the countries receiving low levels of absolute commitment, while the countries receiving medium and high levels of absolute commitment experience fairly stable commitment. (This result is consistent with the high simple correlations, as larger fluctuations among the low-commitment countries would not have a major impact on the correlation.)

RELATIVE COMMITMENT

Relative commitments tend to be stable over time. The correlations of relative commitment of one year with the succeeding year are all very high. Furthermore, there is a correlation of .94 between the levels of relative commitment of 1961 and 1970. While there are some fluctuations in the degree

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of relative commitment, the larger fluctuations tend to be confined to those countries receiving the lowest degrees of relative commitment.

SOURCE DEPENDENCY

The degree of fluctuation in the magnitude of source dependency is inversely related to the level of dependency. A simple linear fit ($r = -.50$, $r^2 = .25$) can be improved by fitting a power curve ($r^2 = .44$), indicating a steeper decrease with lower levels of domination, and then a more gradual decrease with further increases in dependency. There is, therefore, a greater stability in source dependency among the countries with higher levels of source dependency.

ASSET DEPENDENCY

The behavior of the fluctuations in asset dependency is primarily dictated by the size of gross aid receipts. In other words, the fluctuations of asset dependency correspond closely to absolute commitment and show, therefore, a high degree of stability.

There is, in general, a high degree of stability in U.S. commitment and dependency over the period 1960–1970. Furthermore, the stability of both commitment and dependency is most pronounced in the countries experiencing the greatest degrees of commitment and dependency.

APPENDIX 3

Bivariate Relations Among Commitment and Dependency Variables

In general, absolute commitment increases with source dependency, indicating that the United States manages to retain a higher degree of monopoly control over the aid receipts of those countries to which it is most committed in absolute terms. The relationship, however, is not particularly strong. In each of the years between 1964 and 1970, simple linear correlations vary between .25 and .38. Until the later sixties, the main reason accounting for the relatively low relationship is the wide dispersion in the size of commitment among the countries experiencing high source dependency. However, in each of the last three years of the period there is some evidence that the linear relationship is being replaced by a quadratic one, such that commitment initially increases with source dependency, but then decreases with very high levels of dependency.

In general, a strong relationship between absolute commitment and asset dependency could be expected on the grounds that it would be rational for the donor to establish a high degree of control in those countries which it considers to be most important. There is not, however, a strong relationship between absolute commitment and asset dependency. The relationship between these two aspects of aid is initially contingent on the relationship between the gross aid receipt and the G.D.P. of the recipient. If this relationship is collinear, then all recipients will have identical dependency scores. Although there is not a perfect correlation between aid and G.D.P., the correlation is sufficiently high to prevent a strong relationship between abso-

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lute commitment and asset dependency. Thus, a significant correlation appears in only four of the years, but even then the correlation is rather low. We have, therefore, an interesting example of where the pursuit of one goal—the use of G.D.P. as an important criterion to determine the size of absolute commitment—automatically precludes to some extent the pursuit of another goal—the establishment of variations in level of asset dependency among recipients. However, as long as the correlation between gross aid and G.D.P. is not perfect, these two goals are not totally exclusive. (The residual variance from the regression of aid on G.D.P. does in effect give a measure of the latitude which the United States has to establish variations in level of dependency.)

There is no simple relationship between absolute and relative commitment. However, scattergrams of relative on absolute commitment indicate that recipients may be divided into two sub-populations. In fact, that suggests two different types of relationship between relative and absolute commitment. For one sub-population, the regression of relative on absolute commitment is very steep. This means that, among the countries receiving lower absolute commitment, there are some to which the United States wishes to indicate a particular preference through relative commitment (i.e., the U.S. can signal some more particular attachment to a number of countries which in absolute terms do not receive a very strong commitment). This situation shows an independent use for relative commitment. In the other sub-population, the regression of relative on absolute commitment is very shallow, indicating that relative commitment is also used to reinforce absolute commitment.

With the exception of 1960, the relationships between source and asset dependency show small but significant positive correlations (ranging between .30 and .37). There is, then, some coincidence between reliance on the United States as the major donor of aid and reliance on U.S. aid in terms of the impact of that aid on the economy. The degree of correspondence between asset and source dependency indicates that the United States manages to some extent to reinforce its capacity for control.

The relationships of relative commitment to source and asset dependency are generally weak throughout the whole period 1960–1970.

There is, therefore, a degree of distinctiveness in simple terms between relative and absolute commitment, and asset and source dependency. There is some reinforcement between the two types of commitment and some reinforcement between the two types of dependency. There is, however, little simple correspondence between commitment and dependency.

APPENDIX 4

The Relationships of the Distributions of U.S. Commitment and Dependency to the Distributions of the Other Major Western Donors

ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT

There is a substantial degree of correspondence between the levels of absolute commitment of the United States and those of the United Kingdom

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(the mean annual correlation is .60) and those of West Germany (the mean annual correlation is .67). These three donors therefore have distinctive, though overlapping, spheres of commitment. There is, however, a zero correlation between U.S. and French absolute commitments.

RELATIVE COMMITMENT

While U.S. and West German distributions of relative commitment are highly related (for example, correlations in 1961, 1966, and 1970 are .86, .86, and .94 respectively), there is no strong relationship between U.S. and U.K. commitment (the correlations for 1961, 1966, and 1970 are .20, —.03, and .01 respectively). Thus, although there is a tendency for the United States and the United Kingdom to indicate the importance of low-income countries along similar lines, their particular preferences diverge. There is, however, a coincidence of interest between the United States and West Germany in terms of both relative and absolute commitment.

SOURCE DEPENDENCY

A comparison of the characteristics of source dependency of the major Western donors shows that there is very little diversification in aid receipts. Thus, between 1964 and 1970, some 67 percent of all potential aid recipients receive over 60 percent of their aid from a single donor. There is, however, a trend toward increasing diversification, in that the percentage of states receiving more than 60 percent of their total aid from a single donor decreases from 74 percent in 1964 to 62 percent in 1970. Table 1 shows some marked variations in characteristics of source dependency among the major donors. In particular, it should be noted that the United States does not maximize its potential for source dependency, as demonstrated by expressing the mean source dependency score for each donor as a percentage of its mean

TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOURCE DEPENDENCY FOR THE MAJOR WESTERN DONORS, 1964–1970

	U.S.	*U.K.*	*France*	*West Germany*
Mean percentage of cases receiving over 60 percent of total bilateral aid from a single donor	40	10	16	1
Mean source dependency score	42	11	16	10
Mean source dependency as a percentage of mean gross aid	1.1	2.6	3.0	1.6

gross aid. (This in effect controls for the absolute size of the aid program.) Once the size of the total aid program is held constant, the United States has the lowest source dependency score.

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ASSET DEPENDENCY

A comparison of the asset dependency scores of the major Western donors shows that the United States realizes the highest level of dependency. However, if we hold the size of absolute aid constant by expressing asset dependency as a percentage of total aid, then it appears that the United States and West Germany do not achieve a very high level of asset dependency. We can also calculate an expected dependency score by multiplying the percentage share of each donor in total bilateral aid with total bilateral dependency. This again illustrates the degree to which both Britain and France manage to inflate, while the United States and West Germany deflate, their asset dependency scores. (The reason is a greater predisposition on the part of the U.S. and Germany to make relatively larger aid allocations to the low-income

TABLE 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF ASSET DEPENDENCY FOR THE MAJOR WESTERN DONORS, 1964–1970

	U.S.	*U.K.*	*France*	*West Germany*	*Total Bilateral*
Mean dependency score	1.77	.74	.95	.30	4.32
Mean dependency as a percentage of mean gross aid	.04	.18	.18	.04	.06
Expected mean dependency	2.51	.28	.35	.41	

countries with larger G.D.P.'s.) These findings underscore the point that the United States is not interested in pursuing asset dependency *per se*.

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NEGOTIATION AS A MANAGEMENT PROCESS

By GILBERT R. WINHAM*

I. Introduction

NEGOTIATION is an enduring art form. Its essence is artifice, the creation of expedients through the application of human ingenuity. The synonyms of the word "art" are qualities we have long since come to admire in the ablest of negotiators: skill, cunning, and craft. We expect negotiators to be accomplished manipulators of other people, and we applaud this aspect of their art when we observe it in uncommon degree. Negotiation is considered to be the management of people through guile, and we recognize guile as the trademark of the profession.

Our appreciation of guile goes back a long way. In Greek mythology, the god Hermes was chosen by his colleagues for diplomatic missions, representing as he did the qualities of charm, trickery, and cunning. A more recent expression of the value of craftiness can be found in the writing of an ambassador from the court of Louis XIV. In a book that Sir Harold Nicolson has described as "the best manual of diplomatic method ever written," François de Callières in 1716 recorded the following observation about the diplomatic practices of a predecessor:

> Before his elevation to the cardinalate, Cardinal Mazarin was sent on an important mission to the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan. He was charged to discover the true feelings of the Duke on a certain matter, and he had the cunning to inflame the Duke's anger and thus to discover what he would never have known if the Duke himself had maintained a wise hold over his feelings. The Cardinal indeed had made himself absolute master of all the outward effects which passion usually produces, so much so that neither in his speech nor by the least change in his countenance could one discover his real thought; and this quality which he possessed in so high a degree contributed largely to make him one of the greatest negotiators of his time.[1]

* This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1976. I am grateful for research support from the Canada Council, and for the time and insights of the persons interviewed in connection with this research. I also wish to thank several who provided lengthy criticism: Denis Stairs and Glyn Berry of Dalhousie University, Howard Lentner of CUNY, and Linda Winham.

[1] François de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*, trans. by A. F. Whyte (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1963). Nicolson's tribute is in *The Evolution of Diplomacy* (New York: Collier 1954), 85.

World Politics, October 1977, Vol. XXX, No. 1 © 1977 by Princeton University Press

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In contemporary times we continue to acknowledge cunning. In a recent article on the Vietnam cease-fire agreement, Tad Szulc recorded with obvious enthusiasm the performance of Henry Kissinger in achieving a negotiated settlement to the war.[2] As Szulc's account makes clear, Kissinger certainly demonstrated on this occasion that the hoary tactics of manipulation and concealment were important tools in the contemporary management of international relations. However, lest we overstress the importance of these tools, it is well to ask ourselves why brilliant performances in diplomacy seem so few and far between, and why there are apparently so few diplomats today who enjoy the equivalent of Kissinger's reputation. Perhaps it is because negotiation, like leadership, is a skill applied in a situation, and there are relatively few situations in international relations today that call forth the skills Kissinger so ably demonstrated. Times are changing, and the world is a less suitable stage for the diplomat's machinations in the 1970's than it was in the time of Monsieur de Callières.

The typical negotiation situation today bears little resemblance to those that obtained in the service of Louis XIV. Most diplomacy is conducted less discreetly and more under the surveillance of domestic interests than was the case previously. Negotiations are often more multilateral than bilateral; even when relationships are pursued on a bilateral basis, "reality is not bilateral," as Neustadt has observed. Both the operations of domestic groups and the incidence of multilateral negotiation enormously complicate the task of the diplomat. But more complicating yet are the changes in the subject matter of contemporary negotiations. The preoccupations of traditional diplomacy were war, sovereignty, territory, and the personal ambitions of rulers; although these could be painful subjects, they at least were comprehensible through the application of political acumen and common sense. Negotiators today spend more time discussing technology than did their predecessors, because technology—whether it takes the form of information systems, industrial processes, or nuclear weapons—has a proportionately greater impact on human existence now that it did in the past. And technology is in a state of rapid change, often at an exponential rate; it creates an enormous problem of comprehension and adaptation for contemporary society.

Unquestionably, modern negotiation continues to be a contest of will and wit, but the emphasis has shifted. The principal problem for most contemporary negotiators is not to outwit their adversaries, but

[2] Tad Szulc, "How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement," *Foreign Policy*, No. 15 (Summer 1974), 21-69, esp. 23-24.

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rather to create a structure out of a large mass of information wherein it is possible to apply human wit. The classical diplomat's technique of the management of people through guile has given way to the management of people through the creation of system and structure. The process is not as glamorous and individualized, but it requires no less the application of human intelligence than did the trickery of the classical diplomat.

Modern international negotiation represents a meshing of great systems. It is commonplace today to observe that the world is becoming more interdependent—and one symptom of this interdependence is the fact that complex political and economic problems are increasingly handled at the level of international negotiation rather than exclusively at the domestic level. Today, negotiators function as an extension of national policy-making processes rather than as a formal diplomatic representation between two sovereigns. The number of people involved in international negotiation has increased sharply, with consequent depersonalization of the process. It is unlikely that the "true feelings" of leaders or diplomats are as important as they once were, but it is erroneous to assume that personalities are irrelevant—particularly as they combine in various decision-making settings. In past eras it was fashionable to describe negotiation as art, and art it continues to be, but it is now more akin to the art of management as practiced in large bureaucracies than to the art of guile and concealment as practiced by Cardinal Mazarin.

The aim of this essay is to explore the nature of modern negotiation, especially multilateral negotiation, and to contrast it with previous styles of international negotiation. The contention is that rapid changes have been occurring in the negotiation process, and that these changes should be reflected more than they now are in our thinking about international relations. It will be argued that the changes affect the nature of negotiation, and that an understanding of this fact is important in evaluating the usefulness of conducting negotiations. The changes also affect certain theories about the practice of negotiation, and they affect especially the importance of concessions and convergence in the negotiation process. Most important, the changes reflect different tactics which are employed by negotiators and which should be understood in order to propose improvements in the process.[3]

[3] The material for this essay comes from a case study of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, and from the secondary literature on several recent negotiations. Information on the Kennedy Round has been drawn from interviews with participants, as well as repeated runs of a simulation of a multilateral trade negotiation. The simulation was originally designed for graduate students, and has been used in various negotiation

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II. The Nature of Modern International Negotiation

POLITICIZATION

Since 1945, international negotiation has been under pressure from two sides. External pressure has occurred from significant changes in the international system—principally from the increased number of nation-states and the consequent trend toward multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations system. Internal pressure has occurred from the increasing impact of citizen input and bureaucratic politicking on the negotiating process. International negotiation is a more politicized affair than previously, and as a consequence the distinctions between foreign affairs and domestic affairs are blurring.

Some aspects of the external pressure on negotiations are well known. Some time ago, Sir Harold Nicolson called attention to the increasing trend toward conducting negotiation by public conference, and observed that the process violated the rule that sound negotiations must be confidential and continuous.[4] More recently, certain developments have occurred that Nicolson did not foresee. The increased number of nation-states since 1945 has ensured that national positions are more varied and more difficult to reconcile than ever before. New states tend to raise issues that more established ones consider as settled; as a consequence the negotiation process can rely less on precedent to create a common referent for bargaining. This problem was illuminated in a study of the Law of the Sea negotiation in 1958, where some of the newer states objected to the concepts of international law and the administrative-legalistic style of negotiation with which Western countries had long been familiar.[5] A similar example occurred at the U.N. Environmental Conference in Stockholm, where less developed countries were successful in forcing the issues of human poverty and underdevelopment into the definition of environment, and hence onto the agenda of the conference.[6]

Internal pressures have also affected the negotiation process. In de Callières's day, the process of representing a sovereign abroad was

training courses at the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, and at the Department of State, Washington, D.C. The simulation is briefly described in Winham, "Complexity in International Negotiation," in Daniel Druckman, ed., *Negotiations: A Social Psychological Perspective* (New York: Halsted Press 1977).

[4] Nicolson (fn. 1), chap. IV.

[5] Robert L. Friedheim, "The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study," *World Politics*, XVIII (October 1965), 20-41.

[6] S. Kwasi Nyamekye, "Environmental Politics in the United Nations: An Analysis of the Role and Influence of the Less-Developed Countries," Ph.D. diss. (McMaster University 1975).

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simpler than it is now. Monsieur de Callières viewed negotiation neither as troubled by bureaucratic constraints nor as a bureaucratic process in itself. The contrast between this image and that of modern negotiation could not be more striking. Most modern negotiations are carried on between teams that represent bureaucracies, and in large negotiations the teams themselves approach the status of small bureaucracies.[7] That this system would increase the scope of bureaucratic politics in negotiation is self-evident, and there are many examples. John Newhouse, writing on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, observed that the U.S. SALT delegation replicated the SALT bureaucracy in Washington, and that "most importantly, SALT [was] an internal negotiation."[8] A similar sentiment was expressed by an experienced U.S. negotiator: "I would say about nine-tenths of my time of negotiation was done with my own side."[9] In the Kennedy Round, the leaders of major delegations had to exercise considerable skill in managing internal problems, and one such leader described his role in terms of mobilizing effectively the resources of the team, of reconciling different interests, and of bringing in the right people at the right time to handle the tasks that confronted the delegation.[10]

The bureaucratic dissensus that negotiators must contend with is often a reflection of the demands of pressure groups at home. In any major negotiation the interests of large groups must be accounted for, and this creates a problem of organization, distillation, and representation for the negotiating team. The problem was accurately, if perhaps unjoyously, portrayed by a U.S. official in connection with the American position at the current trade negotiations in Geneva: "The U.S. negotiating team is particularly restrained by having to respond to 45 private-sector committees composed of 900 knowledgeable people who are well aware of their own interests. . . . The E.C. confronts the same problem."[11] Nor is this problem appreciably lessened in a smaller system. In connection with the same trade negotiation, the Canadian Government received a request from the Province of Manitoba to include representatives from the Province during the final stages of the

[7] For example, the U.S. delegation to the Kennedy Round numbered nearly 40 individuals. See Ernest Preeg, *Traders and Diplomats* (Washington: The Brookings Institution 1970), 92.

[8] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1973), 43.

[9] Robert W. Barnett, in *Observations on International Negotiations* (Transcript of an Informal Conference, Greenwich, Conn., June 1971, Academy for Educational Development, Inc., 1971), 112.

[10] Personal interview.

[11] S. Bruce Wilson, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Washington, D.C. (personal communication, April 1, 1976).

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negotiation. Since the positions of the Federal and Provincial Governments on trade and tariff matters are not congruent, the outcome of Manitoba's request will probably complicate the work of the Canadian delegation no matter how the issue is resolved.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

The increased complexity in negotiation due to human factors is matched by an equivalent impact from non-human factors. Technological change is occurring in all countries, and with increasing intensity. The rate of change poses two principal problems that frequently create difficulties at the negotiating table. One is the scale, or variety, of relationships. International relationships today encompass an enormous variety of interaction which gives rise to an equivalent variety of items in the negotiation process. Consider one example. In the Kennedy Round, the negotiators dealt with levels of protection on tens of thousands of products traded by 82 states, and in addition considered questions such as problems of dumping and assistance to less developed countries. Most states were therefore burdened by a portfolio of staggering complexity, which would be unknowable in any sense in which we might apply the term.[12] Nor was this problem a special product of economic relations, trade negotiations, or the Kennedy Round in particular. A similar situation obtained in the SALT talks and in the current Law of the Sea negotiation. Indeed, it seems that when one looks at the areas where major negotiations have been held, the complexity of the sort described in the Kennedy Round is the rule rather than the exception.

A further problem is uncertainty. If technological progress creates variety, it also creates uncertainty, for in many areas we are simply unaware of the implications of modern technology on human life. Moreover, we are uncertain about the means for managing such technologies. These observations apply to defense, to off-shore mineral exploitation, and to food distribution (all areas in which there have been international negotiations), but they pertain especially to problems of the international economy. Economists are simply uncertain about some of the most important questions regarding the international economy, and this uncertainty is reflected at the bargaining table when governments negotiate on various problems. In trade negotiations, for example, there are no satisfactory ways to measure the effect of tariff reductions on trade, and hence this creates the difficulty of not having

[12] As one interviewee put it, "so few people understood the Kennedy Round, including the top people."

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any ultimate guidelines by which to evaluate the results of the negotiation. The same is true of weapons negotiations, where there are no clear and unambiguous ways to assess the relation between numbers of nuclear weapons and the national security. The conclusion, then, is that the environment within which states must conduct their relationships is becoming increasingly complex, both because of the operation of technological progress and because of certain changes that have occurred in the structure of domestic and international politics.[13]

RESPONSE TO COMPLEXITY

The political response to the increasing complexity in domestic societies has been to enlarge the scope of the governmental bureaucracy. Bureaucracy helps to structure the political process by providing rules and standardized procedures within which that process can operate. Furthermore, bureaucracy provides a means for coping with the variety and uncertainty inherent in an increasingly complex environment: it provides variety in governmental operations to match the variety in the environment,[14] and it provides guidelines for action in situations that are too uncertain for rational (or synoptic) analysis.[15] In short, the function of bureaucracy in domestic governments has been to increase human control over changes in the society, thereby reducing the uncertainty and increasing the stability of human life. In international politics, however, there is no organizational structure to accomplish the function that bureaucracy serves in domestic society. Certainly there has been an increase in international bureaucracy, but there is insufficient consensus in international politics to permit a "bureaucratic-rational" solution to many problems. Instead, governments turn to the negotiating process—a method that has gained acceptance in the history of nation-states—to achieve the same purpose that bureaucracy achieves in domestic society.

[13] The problem in international relations is similar to that which has also been addressed in the literature of organizational adaptation: "A main problem in the study of organizational change is that the environmental contexts in which organizations exist are themselves changing, at an increasing rate, and towards increasing complexity. This point, in itself, scarcely needs labouring." F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," *Human Relations*, XVIII (February 1965), 21-32; quote from p. 21.

[14] The establishment of bureaucracy reflects in human institutions the principle that variety in the regulator is needed to control variety in the environment (i.e., Law of Requisite Variety). See W. Ross Ashby, *An Introduction to Cybernetics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1956).

[15] For further discussion, see James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1958), esp. 169–71, "Organization Structure and the Boundaries of Rationality."

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The main thesis of this paper is that much international negotiation, especially multilateral negotiation, occurs as an attempt by the parties to manage some aspect of their environment. Negotiations often do not occur simply to resolve specific points of dispute between the parties, although disputes are certain to be embedded in the fabric of any negotiation. An important purpose of negotiation is to reduce complexity; the technique is to achieve, through negotiated agreement, a structure that will limit the free play of certain variables in the future.[16] This can be seen quite clearly in the case of the Kennedy Round. The immediate objective of the Kennedy Round negotiators was to reduce barriers to international trade, especially tariff barriers. However, an underlying and more important concern was to secure a regulated level of tariff support that would preclude the destabilizing forces of competitive protectionism. Once tariffs are regulated by international agreements, the nations participating in these agreements are locked into a pattern of mutual obligation. That is true even where tariffs are not reduced, as in the case where governments agree not to raise low tariffs (i.e., bind). Observance of these obligations effectively reduces unilateral control, and therefore reduces the uncertainty about tariff levels with which exporting countries must contend.[17]

A similar concern occurs in other negotiations as well; the SALT negotiation affords an excellent example. The impetus behind SALT, as Newhouse's excellent analysis has made clear, was not a desire to reduce arms, but rather a need to stabilize defense relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The main threats to stability were a competitive arms race, uncertainty about future force levels, and the consequent need to assume the worst in projecting defense needs in the future. SALT did not reduce arms appreciably, but it did permit Soviet and American planners to exercise greater control over the environment in which they project defense needs. As in the case of the Kennedy Round, an underlying purpose of SALT was control of uncertainty, as was made clear by the U.S. chief delegate to SALT, Gerard C. Smith:

> A major driving force behind the strategic arms competition—at least from the American standpoint—has been uncertainty as to what future

[16] Clearly there are many negotiations in which control of complexity is a lesser problem, such as disputes over fishing quotas or beef imports. However, negotiations on specific issues (for instance, Canadian-Egyptian negotiations on cotton textile imports) often occur within the context of a more general negotiated framework. Thus, the Cotton Textile Agreement of 1964, established to regulate international textile trade, sought the purpose of reducing uncertainty as outlined here.

[17] Negotiations are employed to reduce not only uncertainty, but also variety in the international environment. An example is the attempt at the current multilateral trade negotiation to identify and codify various types of non-tariff restrictions to trade.

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> Soviet force levels would be. If the Vladivostok accords evolve into a formal limitation agreement, the U.S. will be assured of the maximum number of Soviet launchers during the next decade. Even though the number is high, it will be known. . . . Assurance about the future maximum size of the forces . . . should encourage stability in the American-Soviet strategic relationship.[18]

The attempt to reduce variety and uncertainty through negotiation, and consequently to increase international stability, is not a new feature of international diplomacy. Indeed, as Nicolson has noted, the chief aim of diplomacy is international stability, and governments have long tried to reduce their uncertainty about the intentions or capabilities of their adversaries through negotiated agreements. What is different is that the complexities of the present age are greater, due largely to technical change, and as a result environmental control is a more urgent task than before. National leaders are uncertain about the future, and, as Newhouse reminds us "it is the unknown, not the known, that fosters instability."[19] Many statesmen today feel under pressure to create values or structures in international politics that will replace the uncertainties of unilateral action with the certainty of negotiated agreements. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed such a sentiment when he said of the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (L.O.S.): "Unilateral legislation would be a last resort. . . . It [the Conference] must succeed. The United States is resolved to help conclude the Conference in 1976—before the pressure of events and contentions places international consensus irretrievably beyond our grasp."[20]

The use of negotiations by foreign policy makers to manage the international system has some interesting analogies to decision making in large business firms. In their study of organizational decision making, Cyert and March found that business managers tended to avoid uncertainty by establishing a "negotiated environment" for their activities.[21] The main purpose of such negotiation was not to fix prices, but rather to establish certain common business practices that would

[18] Smith, "SALT after Vladivostok," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIX (Spring 1975), 7-18; quote from p. 8.

[19] Newhouse (fn. 8), 77.

[20] Address by Secretary of State Kissinger, "International Law, World Order, and Human Progress," delivered before the American Bar Association at Montreal, Canada, on August 11, 1975. *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 73 (September 8, 1975), 335-62; quote from p. 359.

[21] "Our studies, however, lead us to the proposition that firms will devise and negotiate an environment so as to eliminate the uncertainty. Rather than treat the environment as exogenous and to be predicted, they seek ways to make it controllable." Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1963), 120.

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help to stabilize expectations in a given industry, and hence to permit intelligent economic planning within the firm. A similar argument has been advanced by Emery and Trist. These writers argue that in highly uncertain environments, individual organizations cannot adapt successfully through their own actions but seek the emergence of values (or common assumptions) that have overriding significance for all members of the field. "Social values," the authors state, "are here regarded as coping mechanisms that make it possible to deal with persisting areas of relevant uncertainty."[22] This argument is clearly related to the "negotiated environment" of Cyert and March, for the values that business firms negotiate—such as the rate of markup, price lines, and standardized cost procedures—help to remove relevant uncertainties for the firms' managers. In international politics, negotiations serve the same function for the decision makers of countries. The values that are established in international negotiations—such as nuclear arms parity and nuclear force levels, or most-favored-nation treatment and percentage tariff reductions—provide coping mechanisms for reducing the uncertainty in international transactions.

IMPLICATIONS

To view international negotiations as a process for reducing uncertainty involves important implications for our understanding of the negotiation process. One implication is that negotiation is no longer viewed principally as a dispute-settlement or distributive procedure. This distinction was apparently appreciated by Dr. Kissinger when he described the L.O.S. negotiation in the following terms: "We are at one of those rare moments when mankind has come together to devise means of preventing future conflict and shaping its destiny, rather than to resolve a crisis that has occurred or to deal with the aftermath of a war."[23] Dispute settlement, or crisis resolution, is the common model we usually adopt for understanding most international negotiation. This model usually entails the tabling of an opening position, and the movement (or convergence) toward a compromise position through step-by-step concessions. The burden on the negotiator is to maintain as much of his position as possible while moving toward an outcome that will be mutually acceptable. This process emphasizes concealment, competitive strategies, and the ability to persuade.

The model of dispute settlement continues to be appropriate in international politics, and certain elements of it can operate in negotiations

[22] Emery and Trist (fn. 13), 28.
[23] Kissinger (fn. 20), 359.

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where dispute settlement is not the main purpose of the negotiation. At the Kennedy Round negotiators certainly engaged in haggling and compromise; they exchanged concessions; and they vigorously tried to persuade other parties of the justice and merit of the positions they had staked out. However, the basic structure of the negotiation, viewed in its entirety, was quite different. A more appropriate model for negotiation in a complex situation is one that replaces strategy with search for information, and is concerned with process as opposed to outcome. Negotiators tend not to estimate acceptable outcomes, because outcomes are distant and unknowable. They focus instead on the process of negotiation and what they want the process to achieve, such as exchange of information about both parties' principal concerns, decision-making procedures, or the like. The process of negotiation involves a search for acceptable solutions, where strategy is more a matter of forestalling the consideration of certain unattractive solutions than a matter of extracting a change of position from an adversary. This process is akin to the tactics of integrative bargaining as described by Walton and McKersie, or the procedures of "debate" as described by Rapoport.[24] The process will be further explored in the next section of this paper.

The second implication of viewing negotiation as a process for reducing uncertainty is that the development of common perceptions becomes more important to the negotiating process than the exchange of concessions.[25] In complex situations, negotiators tend to negotiate over the "definition of the situation,"[26] and theories of how people develop common perceptions of complex information are more likely to be useful than theories of how people outwit others in bargaining contests. When negotiators deal with each other over complex subjects, they often represent societies that have evolved entirely different methods of accomplishing certain social tasks, and as a result the first problem is to establish a definitional basis from which to proceed. Newhouse has appreciated this aspect about the SALT negotiations; he concludes a

[24] Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1965); Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1960). See also Sawyer and Guetzkow: "The process of devising more favorable alternatives and outcomes may be characterized as one of 'creative problem-solving' since it involves innovation rather than mere selection among given possibilities. As with creative processes more generally, however, relatively little is understood of its operation." Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in Herbert C. Kelman, *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1966), 466-520; quote from p. 485.

[25] I acknowledge debt to the analysis of I. William Zartman, "Negotiations: Theory and Reality," *Journal of International Affairs,* XXIX (Spring 1975), 69-77.

[26] One Kennedy Round negotiator summarized what was a common theme in many interviews: "Disputes are a matter of how they are defined."

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description of the first negotiating session with the statement: "The two sides parted as they met, still speaking a different strategic vocabulary." He further quotes an interviewee: "We were so absorbed in our own definitional problems we made no serious effort to anticipate theirs."[27] In Zartman's words: "The whole process of the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiation is a search for referent principles and then for the implementing details."[28]

The process described above normally requires some agreement on the negotiating rules, or some similar formula for standardizing the approach of different parties. In the Kennedy Round, the problem of negotiating rules was dealt with explicitly, but it may be more common for negotiators to establish referents or formulas implicitly as part of the discussion of a problem. Also, establishing such formulas can be an ongoing procedure during a negotiation, and will be part of the process that occurs naturally when parties take up new issues. An analogous procedure to the use of negotiation formulas is the creation of a bargaining language to assist negotiators to exchange proposals. A bargaining language essentially consists of cognitive structures that facilitate communication between negotiators. These structures can be very general, such as the notions of "parity" in weapons negotiations, or "reciprocity" in trade negotiation,[29] or they can be common definitions or evaluation procedures that enable negotiators to evaluate their progress in the negotiation. In complex negotiations, a bargaining language can serve as a mechanism for simplifying the information that negotiators must handle in the course of moving toward an agreement. It is a means of developing common perceptions about the bargaining environment, and its use in itself constitutes some measure of agreement between the parties.

III. The Practice of Modern International Negotiation

If the purpose of international negotiation has changed since de Callières's time, so also has the practice. Negotiation today is an extension of the policy process from the domestic to the international arena, and negotiators behave in a manner more akin to that of national bureaucrats than of classical diplomats. The distinction between negotiation and management is blurring. The most useful concepts for

[27] Newhouse (fn. 8), 176. [28] Zartman (fn. 25), 73.

[29] For example, Evans notes: "When a negotiator invokes his right to reciprocity, he is speaking a language that both he and his fellow bargainers understand." John W. Evans, *The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), 23.

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understanding the practice of modern negotiation come from the literature of decision making, business management, and organization theory, and not necessarily from studies of negotiation or bargaining theory. Of special importance are the concepts for understanding decision making in complex situations—most notably the principles of cybernetic decision making.[30]

The practice of negotiation in complex situations is heavily influenced by a desire to maintain control over the situation and to avoid uncertainty. The principal activity is a process of creating one's own position while adapting to the demands and offers of others. This activity is a bureaucratized activity (e.g., negotiation by working groups), dealing with a subject matter that has been decomposed into compatible subgroups (e.g., product sectors in trade negotiations). Large-scale negotiations like the Kennedy Round evolve over considerable time. Negotiators proceed toward agreement by initially tabling a position that is exploratory at best. At this stage, negotiating teams rarely have a concept of what a final, acceptable agreement might look like, for two reasons. The first is lack of attention by governments; serious thinking about what is acceptable is often done only after serious negotiation has begun. The second reason is that what is acceptable is a function of what is available, and that is only demonstrated in the act of negotiation. The result is that negotiators proceed with more understanding of and attention to the process of negotiation than of where the process will lead.

The negotiating process is a programmed set of operations that has evolved from considerable experience. It consists of tabling a position, decomposing and aggregating the relevant information wherever possible, and then setting about point by point to reconcile the different positions of the parties. Negotiators incrementally explore the interface between the bargaining positions of states much as army ants explore the interface of their colony and the environment. Over time, the negotiation accumulates a settlement from the bottom up, a phenomenon which the participants refer to as "building a package." In this process, negotiators monitor certain feedback variables, such as domestic support for the negotiation, which indicate the willingness of their government and others to cooperate in a negotiated settlement. Inherent in the programmed nature of the negotiation is the risk that negotiating procedures will not be sufficiently flexible to take advantage of unusual or unorthodox opportunities. For example, in the Kennedy

[30] See John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).

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Round agricultural products were not included in the general agreement. Agricultural restrictions are generally not amenable to the same negotiating procedures as industrial tariffs, and in the opinion of several interviewees, opportunities to liberalize agricultural trade were missed because this area was outside the "ground rules" of the negotiation.

The negotiation process described above contains several elements that deserve further attention. One such element is the concept of problem-solving search, and particularly search as a means for establishing communication and structure between the parties. A second element is programmed operations, which bring about most of the reconciliation of the conflicting positions of the parties. Finally, a third element is the conclusion of a negotiation and the codification of the process that has been occurring. Special problems arise at the conclusion of a negotiation that set it apart from the rest of the process.

PROBLEM-SOLVING SEARCH

A common way to portray international negotiation is a continuum. The positions of the parties are juxtaposed at opposite ends of the continuum, and if an agreement is to be reached, it is through a process of compromise and convergence. In this conception, negotiators think of their position in terms of what they desire and what they will settle for, and they try to generate realistic expectations about the "probable outcome" of the bargaining and the "minimum disposition" of their adversary.[31] Concessions are a crucial step in this process, and the strategy of concession making has been a major focus of studies of negotiation and bargaining.[32] The concern over concession making is understandable, for if one portrays negotiation as a process of convergence, one can almost define negotiation itself as a process of exchanging concessions.

However useful the concepts of continuum and convergence may be for describing certain aspects of modern negotiations, they do not serve as an adequate picture for the overall process, and consequently are not a good guide for negotiating behavior. The notion of continuum loses force in the complex situations that characterize many international negotiations. The imposition of a continuum on negotiation represents a considerable degree of structure. However, international negotiations

[31] For example, see Fred Charles Iklé and Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (March 1962), 19-28.

[32] Concession making has been a focus of bargaining studies in economics and social psychology. See, for example, John G. Cross, *The Economics of Bargaining* (New York: Basic Books 1967); and Otomar J. Bartos, *Process and Outcome of Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press 1974).

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are often characterized by structural uncertainty[33]—that is, where the nature of the possible outcomes and not just the probability associated with different outcomes is unknown. In many situations, negotiators negotiate precisely to find out what the issues are; hence, it is beyond the scope of their analytical abilities to project probable outcomes. Furthermore, in keeping with an unstructured situation, negotiators do not have a conscious strategy on concessions worked out in advance, nor do they appear to evolve one during the negotiation.[34] In sum, the concepts of continuum and convergence assume more structure than is usually present in large negotiations. A better way to conceptualize large negotiations is as trial-and-error search, which is a basic concept in cybernetic decision making.

Cybernetic decision making occurs in environments that are too complex to permit analysis; hence, decision makers define their environment through their actions, and not through analysis. Decision makers take actions, assess their outcomes, and then recalculate the actions that led to the outcomes obtained. Analysis is a matter of comparing a past action with an outcome, deciding whether it was a good outcome, and then choosing another action. Negotiators proceed very much in the same way. Negotiation in complex situations is largely a matter of trying out new combinations of ideas in an effort to "move the negotiation along." Where the ideas are accepted, they create a structure along which the negotiation will proceed; continued success will enable the negotiators to "build a package." Where ideas are not accepted, they are scrapped, and something else is tried. If too many ideas are scrapped, the negotiation runs the risk of becoming "bogged down" or running into a "dead end." In such cases the negotiation will continue, if at all, after the occurrence of a "breakthrough" at which major concessions may have been granted; more likely, there will have been a redefinition of the problem, moving the negotiation onto a different plane. The entire process is more akin to fitting the pieces into a puzzle than to convergence along a continuum.

There are two types of creative acts that often occur in the process just described. One is to establish structure through the use of a formula or referent principle (or "negotiating rules") to guide the negotiation. This practice is fairly well understood and is overtly pursued by negotiators. In the Kennedy Round, two formulas were instrumental in moving the negotiation along: one established the principle of linear

[33] The concept of structural uncertainty is elaborated in Steinbruner (fn. 30).

[34] This observation is supported by interviews and by observation of the trade negotiation simulations. For example, one interviewee stated: "Concessions cannot be explained in logical terms." For further elaboration of this argument, see Winham (fn. 3).

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cuts, where states negotiated tariff reductions over large numbers of products rather than on an item-by-item basis; a second one ("decoupage") helped to break an impasse that developed late in the negotiation in the crucial chemical sector.[35] In the SALT negotiations, a more implicit referent principle served as a point of departure through the entire negotiation. This was the analysis, originally presented by Robert McNamara to the Soviets at the Glassboro meetings in 1967, that the development of an ABM system was an inherently destabilizing factor in the nuclear balance between the superpowers. Throughout the ensuing negotiation, this referent principle appeared to be a major motivating factor in the negotiating strategy of both sides.[36]

A second procedure by which negotiators establish structure in complex situations is to create hierarchies in the negotiating situation. This procedure is often used implicitly, although it is less well understood in an analytical sense. The principle behind the use of hierarchy to establish structure has been explored in a philosophical essay by Herbert A. Simon: "Hierarchy, I shall argue, is one of the central structural schemes that the architect of complexity uses."[37] For Simon, hierarchy has at least two meanings. One is the common notion of formal organization, which is a system composed of subordinate subsystems. This form is commonly encountered in society; business firms, governments (and negotiating teams) exhibit this kind of parts-within-parts structure. A second notion of hierarchy is perceptual, and amounts to an ordering that can be imposed on an environment. The second notion is dependent on the property of "decomposability," or the extent to which systems can be reduced to subsystems that are approximately independent of each other. The capacity of decision makers to perceive (or, presumably, to create) decomposability in a complex environment is related to the capacity to understand and take action in that environment. As Simon says, "The fact, then, that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, hierarchic structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, to describe, and even to 'see' such systems and their parts."[38]

In complex situations like trade negotiations, negotiators use hierarchy and relational thinking to understand and to create structure in their environment. Some hierarchies are easily established and follow

[35] See Preeg (fn. 7), 172-77.

[36] Newhouse (fn. 8), 95, quotes former Secretary of State Dean Rusk as saying that SALT may have begun for the Soviets at Glassboro.

[37] Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," in *The Sciences of the Artificial* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1969), 87.

[38] *Ibid.*, 108. A senior GATT official expressed a similar sentiment when he said one of the most important abilities of a negotiator was to "grasp relationships."

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naturally from the data in the environment. For example, products can be grouped and negotiated in sectors, and sectors can be further categorized in turn. Formal organization (such as working groups) can be created to jibe with structure implicit in the subject of the negotiation. Also, less orthodox hierarchies can be established and the material dealt with, depending on what serves the purpose of the negotiation. For example, products or sectors can be ranged in terms of the percentage of world trade each accounts for, or by the nature of trade barriers applied; or a ranking might be established depending on the extent of disparity (and hence, presumably, the extent of negotiating difficulty) between the tariff structures of various negotiating partners.

The more creative hierarchies are less obvious. One important hierarchy that must be established is a ranking of priorities in relation to the negotiating process. In the course of the negotiation, negotiators must establish what they principally want; without this, the negotiation cannot generate the major trade-offs that are the structure around which agreements are built. Achieving a ranking of priorities is a difficult process; experience from the Kennedy Round and the simulations of the Kennedy Round suggest it can be done effectively only as part of the negotiating process, and not simply as an internal process prior to participating in the negotiation. A time schedule is another hierarchy. The time dimension is of crucial importance to a negotiation because of the sequential and compartmentalized nature of the process. A time schedule forces negotiators to think hierarchically over time—that is, to think of the completion of parts within parts of an overall agreement, and hence to build up the components of a general settlement. An obvious deadline is likely to be advantageous to the negotiation process. Without such a deadline, the time schedule imposes proportionately less structure on the negotiation, and thus less pressure for resolution of the issues.

PROGRAMMED OPERATIONS

The reality of negotiation is not a rapid exchange of creative ideas, even though creative ideas are part of the process. The reality of negotiation is tedium. There are good reasons why this is so. First, the barriers to agreement are political, not intellectual, and it takes time and patience for governments to persuade themselves to accept change.[39]

[39] This observation was made by Robert W. Barnett (fn. 9), 150, in the course of explaining the function of trivia in negotiations. Newhouse (fn. 8), 191, has made an analogous point ("tedium has its place in the negotiating process") in the course of criticizing the fast-paced strategy of the U.S. SALT delegation.

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Second, the search for agreement is a combination of trial and error plus insight, and it takes time for the process to be played through. Negotiations reflect the cutting edge of change in the international system, and the process of accepting change is a discontinuous and drawn-out affair.

Most actual negotiation is a form of programmed operations that follows from general principles established by the parties. As one Kennedy Round interviewee put it, "The orchestration of negotiation is almost mechanical." Problem areas are broken down into their constituent parts, and are taken up by small working groups of negotiators. Working groups have agendas, and these agendas call for a sequential treatment of the topics scheduled for discussion. Topics are usually discussed rather than haggled over (admittedly, this is a fine distinction), particularly through the early and middle stages of the negotiation. Bargaining is exploratory and communication is relatively free.

There are several principles that govern the programmed operations in a large negotiation. One is the quasi-resolution of conflict.[40] Issues are brought up sequentially and the positions of the parties are explored. Where disagreement exists, various suggestions are pursued to resolve the disagreement. Trade-offs are discussed, and alternative compromises are attempted. In some cases, the conflict will be resolved through concession, compromise, and convergence. Where conflict is resolved, the issue is put aside and is usually not raised again. As the area of agreement widens, the parties develop a greater stake in the negotiation, and this creates a positive momentum toward a final, overall agreement. If in this process parties are unable to agree, they will drop the issue and hence postpone the conflict. The issue in question will be moved up for consideration at a higher level in the negotiating bureaucracy. The same procedure will be used; hence, the most difficult and conflictual issues will be put off until the end of the negotiation.

A second principle is that negotiators do not try to deal with all the material that comes under their cognizance in a complex negotiation. They solve the problem of too much variety in the situation by ignoring much of that variety, concentrating instead on simple operational feedback variables.[41] These variables tend to be internal, relating to the organizational work of the negotiating team or relations with the home government, rather than external. The reason is that negotiators are more concerned with presenting their own position than with relating to their adversary. That point has been made in both classical and

[40] Cf. Cyert and March (fn. 21).
[41] Cf. Steinbruner (fn. 30), esp. chap. 3.

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modern literature, and has also been observed in the runs of the trade negotiation simulation.[42]

There are several feedback variables that negotiators focus on especially in complex negotiations. One is their organization and control over their own negotiating position. Problems of control over the negotiating position stem from bureaucratic politics on the negotiating team, from the constant need to obtain new information to defend the position and its changes, and from the inherent difficulties of maintaining consistency when a large body of data is in constant change. It is especially important that negotiators be able to project an image of being in control of their portfolio; failure to do this provides ammunition for whatever opposition may exist at home. Another key feedback variable is the extent to which negotiators can maintain domestic consensus for the negotiation. Objectively this variable is always important, but it has a profound subjective impact on negotiators because of the difficulty of communicating structural problems to the adversary. In the Kennedy Round, American negotiators worried about Congress, and their anxiety was increased by E.E.C. negotiators who apparently did not appreciate the need to maintain support for the negotiation in Congress. Conversely, E.E.C. negotiators worried about the uncertainties of decision making in the E.E.C. and the fragility of support for the Kennedy Round, and *their* anxiety was increased by apparent American insensitivity to Brussels.[43]

Another feedback variable that is monitored, and one that relates primarily to the adversary, is the "will to negotiate." Governments enter a negotiation to achieve certain principles, and they monitor the behavior of their adversaries to ensure that it does not represent a pulling back from the principles of the negotiation. Individual concessions are not a major concern—they are a fairly structured and hence unimportant phenomenon—but the failure to resolve certain problems, or the failure to "move in a certain direction" can become a major stumbling block in the negotiation. In such cases, disputes crop up, often on fairly trivial matters. A case in point was the bitter dispute in the Kennedy

[42] "Most men in handling public affairs pay more attention to what they themselves say than to what is said to them." De Callières (fn. 1), 121. "And yet, we found in our experiments that our subjects were overwhelmingly 'introverted,' that their demands were primarily determined by their own past demands, and that they paid little attention to one another's offers." Otomar J. Bartos, "Concession-Making in Experimental Negotiations," in Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson, *Sociological Theories in Progress* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1966) 3-28; quote from p. 21.

[43] These anxieties often are expressed as principles. For example, one E.E.C. negotiator stated: "It was difficult for our partners to understand our decision-making process . . . we faced a *simultaneous* negotiation . . . it was part of the *democratic* process."

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Round between the Common Market and the United States over the matter of the American Selling Price (A.S.P.) in chemicals.[44] This issue, as the American negotiators correctly pointed out, was of little direct consequence to trade, but the form of the restriction gave the American Government the unilateral right to decide the issue, either in applying the restriction or in dropping it (which required congressional confirmation). The Common Market found the A.S.P. repugnant because, by maintaining a unilateral freedom of movement for the Americans, it created uncertainties for the Common Market countries and hence was contrary to one of the fundamental purposes of the Kennedy Round negotiation. From the perspective of the E.E.C., the A.S.P. was a matter of principle because it raised the question of the United States' "will to negotiate" reductions in trade restrictions.

A third principle inherent in the programmed operations of negotiation is organizational learning, a concept which has been analyzed in the literature of organization theory.[45] Negotiating teams are usually assembled from governmental bureaucracies on an *ad hoc* basis, and are disassembled at the conclusion of their task. These teams confront problems that are often novel in substance, and are certainly novel in terms of procedures and personalities. In the succession of encounters that constitute day-to-day negotiation, the teams achieve various kinds of organizational learning: they gather and store information, they develop procedures for communication, and they adapt organizational goals to fit the possibilities in the situation. Above all, negotiating teams learn how other countries perceive the problems that are up for negotiation, and what priorities these countries place on different issues.

Over time, negotiating teams learn to develop procedures that facilitate negotiation. Negotiators are required to develop concepts, or to create relationships in the bargaining situation that are not obvious to internal decision makers, but that may be necessary to facilitate bargained exchanges between states. Negotiators accomplish this partly through the creation of a bargaining language, which, like other bureaucratic languages, is a collection of task-oriented symbols or concepts that facilitate the work of the organization. There were several examples of bargaining language in the Kennedy Round; the concept

[44] The A.S.P. provides for assessment of duty on foreign products based on the value of a "like or similar" domestic product. It works as follows: an American customs official decides if an imported good is "similar," values it in comparison to the domestic good, and then applies the existing tariff rate. The system creates uncertainty for exporters (Preeg calls it "irregularity"), and in some cases very high tariffs (Preeg notes that one effective tariff was 172%, and it became known as "Mont Blanc" in the Kennedy Round). Preeg (fn. 7), 171.

[45] See March and Simon (fn. 15), and Cyert and March (fn. 21).

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of "reciprocity" has already been mentioned in this context. The notion of reciprocity was itself refined into more specific concepts, such as measures (e.g., weighted average reductions) for making quantitative assessments of reciprocity. By common agreement, such measures were not accurate in an economic sense, but they did give negotiators a language for communicating and for exchanging tariff reductions.[46] These measures allowed negotiators to build an agreement, but they had inherent limitations from the standpoint of reaching a final settlement. In order to reach a final settlement, negotiators had to develop the flexibility to move beyond the structures and the bargaining language that had been successful throughout most of the negotiation.

FINAL AGREEMENT

Most negotiations have a deadline for the completion of the work. Occasionally such deadlines are beyond the immediate influence of negotiators. However, even when deadlines can be manipulated, they create a pressure to conclude the negotiation, since senior members of governments cannot be detained indefinitely in an exercise that appears to be going nowhere. The expectation that negotiation must soon be concluded not only increases the tempo of the exercise, it also changes the nature of the task. Concluding a negotiation puts more emphasis on decision making than occurs in the early phases, and proportionately less emphasis on bargaining and communication.

The situation as complex negotiations like the Kennedy Round or SALT negotiations conclude is that many outstanding issues must be woven together into a package deal. In different areas of the negotiation, issues which have proven troublesome have been postponed. Conflicts have only been partially resolved. The negotiators must bring the unresolved problems together in the concluding period of the negotiation in a way that the various governments can accept. Usually, difficult issues cannot be resolved by dropping them: they have become interlocked in a complex negotiation, and to drop any major issue late in the game leads to an unravelling of other agreements that are contingent on its solution. Negotiators are thus put in a position where they must find a formula to resolve the principal issues or acknowledge that the negotiation has failed to produce the agreements that had been envisioned.

The elements in the conclusion of a negotiation inescapably increase

[46] One highly placed interviewee commented: "The advantage of tariff negotiations is that you can put phony numbers on things." For further discussion, see Winham (fn. 3).

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the pressure on the negotiators. There will usually be considerable political momentum behind a negotiation, especially where the negotiation is publicized, visible to internal politics, and where it is obvious that much effort has been put in. The negotiation normally will represent a considerable sunk cost in terms of government decision-making time, and there will be a major personal and professional investment for the negotiators concerned. Furthermore, there will be an increasing awareness of the political values that will be lost if the negotiation fails, especially the value of extending greater control over the international environment through international agreement. All these factors will militate toward compromise and settlement of the outstanding issues. On the other hand, as the conclusion nears, negotiators will be under increasing pressure not to give way on issues of concern to home governments and domestic interests. Those issues are outstanding precisely because they are areas where change is least easily accepted. The conclusion of a negotiation tends to expose these areas, and the government and domestic interests involved counter by bringing pressure not to reach settlement in the negotiation. One Kennedy Round negotiator summed it up simply: "The pressure comes from everywhere."

The conclusion of a negotiation increases the complexity and uncertainty that have faced the negotiators throughout the exercise. The sequential handling of issues gives way to a situation that demands that many issues be handled at once. Negotiators find it more difficult to resolve problems within established categories (e.g., the category of industrial products in trade negotiations); they are required instead to seek relationships between dissimilar categories (e.g., agricultural versus industrial sectors). This means that the programmed operations that have evolved for achieving balances thus far in the negotiation are less helpful as a guide to negotiators in the last stages of the negotiation. Striking a final overall balance is less a bargaining process with the other side than a political process of convincing capitals to accept what negotiators are prepared to deliver. New methods must be evolved to deal with what have become old problems in the negotiation.

The task of concluding a negotiation necessarily falls to senior negotiators, and Kennedy Round interviewees agree that it is more political than administrative in nature. The bureaucratized procedures, programmed operations, and technical notions of balance that delegations may have relied on previously have become less relevant. There is a need for negotiating teams to change "set"; that is, to shift from procedures that facilitate interdelegation bargaining (e.g., procedures for

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calculating reciprocity in trade negotiations) to procedures that permit general overarching restatements of the problem. A clear example of this need was observed in the trade negotiation simulations. As in the real negotiation, simulation subjects used various quantitative measures to calculate reciprocity. However, subjects were unable to use these methods profitably at the end of the negotiation because there was insufficient time to make the needed calculations and because the methods produced results that were too precise for the needs of the moment. In fact, subjects who persisted in such calculations lost their grip on the overall developments in the negotiation, usually to their own disadvantage. The simulations support the contention that the conclusion of a negotiation requires the same kind of general, formula-oriented solutions as does the start of a negotiation. It is primarily an exercise in creative problem solving, where educated political guesswork is more important than shrewd calculation of advantages.[47]

There is ample evidence that the last-minute decisions in a large-scale negotiation are taken amid great confusion. Interviewees from the Kennedy Round admitted as much, and in an interesting way. Senior political members of negotiating teams asserted that much of the competence to understand the accords rested with the technical people, while the technical people maintained that much of the Kennedy Round was "political" and hence outside the scope of their competence. In short, each group professed a lack of competence to understand the overall process, albeit for different reasons. Others as well have remarked on the confusion and uncertainty that obtains at the conclusion of a large negotiation. One of the most perceptive journalists covering the Kennedy Round started his story about the completion of the negotiation with the following paragraphs:

> Deep and very widely shared satisfaction over settling the major Kennedy Round controversies is alternating here with genuine ignorance as to what the settlements may mean in detail. At this stage even senior officials in the various delegations have not yet broached the task of analyzing the precise contents of the agreements reached.
>
> It is not just a matter of detailed information remaining unpublished until the accord has been formally signed a few weeks hence. The hasty deals reached by top negotiators in the frantic final hours often have not yet been translated into actual texts, nor sometimes even communicated to those on the next steps of the hierarchy.[48]

[47] An interviewee summed it up in the following terms: "Negotiation is a subjective affair: at the end you just take the best guess."

[48] H. Peter Dreyer, "Tariff Talks Package Gets Mixed Reaction," *New York Journal of Commerce* (May 1967), 1.

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Lest this observation be thought confined to trade negotiations, one can cite a similar observation by Newhouse about the conclusion of the SALT negotiation in Vladivostok: "As confusing as all this may seem, it was only slightly less so to the experts themselves. After the White House party returned to Washington, several meetings of the verification panel were spent largely in trying to establish exactly what had been agreed to on SBLM's and what precisely it all meant."[49]

The fact that the negotiation becomes increasingly difficult to comprehend does not mean that negotiators are incapacitated by complexity, or without a strategy for concluding the process. For one thing, negotiators tend to focus on aspects that are relatively certain, such as the positions that governments take on the issues, and pay less attention to those that are less understandable, such as the significance or value of those positions. Thus, the conflict that is inherent in any negotiation helps to clarify and structure that situation, and it is taken advantage of by negotiators. Second, negotiators try to structure the way they handle conflict. For example, a Kennedy Round interviewee indicated that on conflictual issues, negotiators at different levels tended to argue their position "to a point of incompetence," after which (as we have seen) the issue would be taken up in the next higher level in the negotiating bureaucracy. This procedure brings new faces and new ideas to difficult problems. Also implied in this procedure is a stratagem that was followed by some delegations in the Kennedy Round, namely that of keeping senior people at home and away from the negotiation until late in the game. This stratagem helps to avoid delegations from becoming psychologically committed to single interpretations of difficult problems, and it creates the flexibility and freedom to make decisions on the solution of issues.

IV. Conclusion

In this essay it has been argued that the nature and practice of international negotiation have changed; namely, the kinds of issues that are raised on the agenda of international relations have changed, which changed the diplomatic processes whereby governments handle those issues. In brief, these diplomatic processes have become more bureaucratic and more characteristic of decision making as it is practised in big government and big business.[50] Given this development,

[49] Newhouse (fn. 8), 254.

[50] It is interesting to consider the reverse of this proposition: just as there is more bureaucracy in negotiation, there is also more negotiation in bureaucracy. See the literature on "bureaucratic politics"; see also Anselm Strauss and others, "The Hospital and

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one can reflect on the nature of the negotiation process itself. Why do states negotiate international issues? Are they likely to continue to use negotiation (and bargaining) as principal methods of conducting diplomacy? And, are they likely to turn to formal international bureaucracy instead of international negotiation, to accomplish in form what —as has been argued in this paper—already exists in practice?

The reasons why states (or any organization) negotiate an issue is because they share a mixture of agreement and disagreement with other states on that issue. Negotiation is a mixed-mode relationship—a mixture of cooperation and conflict; if either mode is absent, the relationship between the parties will change. Pure conflict brings hostilities, or if governments pursue conflict passively, it brings boycotts or other measures whereby states studiously ignore one another. Pure cooperation brings rules, normally in the form of administration or bureaucracy, whereby governments agree in advance how to handle the issues and leave the process to formal mechanisms. A mixture of conflict and cooperation brings negotiation, where there are few rules, but where cooperation is sought because states seek ends they cannot achieve unilaterally. The area in international relations where mixed-mode relationships are appropriate is growing. Today, governments need more control over forces in the international environment than they can manage independently; conflictual acts like military hostilities, imperial relationships, or alliance building cannot establish the control they once might have. On the other hand, there is not sufficient consensus in world politics to turn over the most pressing of the world's problems to international organizations. We are entering an era in which international negotiation appears to be the predominant mode of relations between states, and conditions in the international system are likely to maintain this mode for some time to come.

There is much bureaucracy in negotiation, but it does not seem desirable that any attempt be made to substitute bureaucratic organization for negotiation, even in areas where this might seem feasible. Negotiation is a very good normative model for handling large-scale problems in international relations, and for several reasons. For one thing, negotiation fosters, and even forces, a large flow of communication between the participants. Negotiation avoids an ossifying structuring of communications that can occur in bureaucracy. Any topic can be raised in a negotiation, and often is; at a time when the international system is going through major fundamental changes, that is probably

Its Negotiated Order," in I. William Zartman, ed., *The 50% Solution* (Garden City: Anchor Books 1976), 98-117.

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desirable. In theory at least, the negotiation model encourages national leaders to think through fundamental positions from the standpoint of what they want to get out of the negotiation; if elements of bureaucracy, incrementalism, and muddling through creep in, it is only as a normal concession to the complexity of modern international transactions. A second reason for the usefulness of international negotiation is that it is a historical model with which foreign policy establishments are familiar. Most diplomats instinctively think of relations between states in terms of bargained relationships; in cases where they do not, bargained exchanges are at least an accepted relationship.[51] Finally, negotiation is a useful model because the conflict inherent in negotiation helps to structure the situation within which governments must deal with one another. Conflict creates a comprehensible situation out of one that might otherwise be incomprehensible, and hence difficult to take action in.[52] In negotiation, governments are encouraged to take a position, and positions, whether they mean anything or not, can usually be stated with some clarity. The participants are called upon to "resolve conflict," and this may prove a more doable task than other things that could be expected of international decision makers. In the negotiation model, the business of the international community is ostensibly framed in terms of conflicts; these conflicts are resolved by diplomats who are schooled in conflict resolution. This is probably not a bad way to manage the world's business.

A final point is one that clearly occupied much of de Callières's thought: What sort of personal qualities are needed in a good diplomat? The list of such qualities drawn up by de Callières must strike most modern readers as rather quaint; it was exhaustive, and one wonders where such extraordinary people could possibly have been found.[53] While de Callières's requirements may have been overly exhaustive, the exercise itself was not quaint or even unmodern. Personal qualities flow from the way the process is conceived, and thus de Callières's concerns of getting the right person for the job ought to be as important to modern negotiation as they were in renaissance diplomacy.

[51] An analogous observation was made by a State Department official about the adversary process in international relations, and particularly "the structuring effect this procedure has on disputes at the international level." Herbert J. Spiro, in *Observations on International Negotiations* (fn. 9).

[52] See Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press 1956), esp. chap. VII, "Conflict—The Unifier."

[53] Nicolson has sensibly reduced the list to seven virtues: truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty. However, he "takes for granted": intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage, and even tact. Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1963), 67.

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There is an argument today that personalities and personal qualities are unimportant in negotiation; that the job is done by "professionals," and that professionalism requires attention to the facts and not the personalities of the situation. Certainly most negotiators interviewed at the Kennedy Round agreed with this position in the abstract. However, they were unwilling to say that personalities were unimportant, and on one interesting point they revealed just how important they thought personalities were. It was occasionally observed at the Kennedy Round that the chief negotiators (but not the Heads of Delegation) of the United States and the E.E.C. did not have an amicable working relationship. When interviewees were asked the general question whether personalities could affect the progress of a negotiation, most said no; but when they were asked whether the chief negotiators of the United States and the E.E.C. could have concluded the negotiation in the absence of their respective Heads of Delegation, many disagreed or else declined to answer the question. This appeared to be a startling recognition of the fact that personal qualities can be an important factor in negotiation, particularly as they occur in combinations from different nations.[54] It should not be surprising. There is a lot of decision-making work that negotiators from different nations must do together, and it is only reasonable to assume that their personalities and working styles should mesh, much as we would expect this to be true of any team in any decision-making organization.

What, then, are desirable personal traits for negotiators in a modern context, particularly qualities that were not mentioned by de Callières? They are not immediately obvious, because negotiation is an enduring form in human history, and de Callières wrote what is indeed an enduring book. For new personal qualities to be added to the list, it would be necessary for the nature of diplomacy itself to change. This of course has happened in the past. Nicolson notes that de Callières is unconcerned about the quality of oratory, a quality that the ancient Greeks found indispensable in their diplomacy: in ancient Greece, diplomats were expected to plead their city's case before the assembled throngs of other city states, a practice which had disappeared by de Callières's time.

[54] The same theme wase eloquently stated about the Law of the Sea Conference by Ambassador Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka: "The potential of the individual personality at the Conference to construct or destroy, cannot be overstated." "The Oceans: National Interest and Global Perspective," speech delivered before the Colloquium sponsored by the Canadian Group of the Trilateral Commission, Halifax, January 21, 1976.

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Today what has changed most about international diplomacy is (1) the need to manage information, and (2) the fact that important societal decision making occurs at the level of international negotiation, at the expense of the processes of national government. For the first, the skills needed are those of a systems analyst, which fortunately are not wholly native, but can be imparted through training. Computer programming might well be a valuable ability, not because computers are necessarily useful in international negotiation (for instance, they were not useful in the Kennedy Round), but because the process of thought that is involved in computer programming is one that leads to the handling of information in a systematic fashion, and to the development of a hierarchical, recursive style of search and decision making.

For the second change in diplomacy, the quality needed is political courage. This did not occur to Monsieur de Callières because in his day diplomats represented sovereigns; the actions of these diplomats were not visible to many, and consequently the pressures on them were less burdensome. Today the situation is different. Modern international negotiation is more like representing a labor union than a king, and union negotiators confront problems dealing with their constituents that classical diplomats never had to face. Moreover, negotiation today generates new issues and new problems that negotiators themselves are better aware of than anyone else. Negotiators have to take final responsibility for making some decisions (or at least for making recommendations that effectively become decisions) because no one else is in a position to do the job better. This fact itself raises questions about the public accountability of the negotiation process, and it is an issue that will increasingly confront democratic societies in the future. From the negotiator's standpoint, however, it cannot be gainsaid that the job has become more difficult. Negotiators must often make decisions in highly uncertain yet bureaucratically visible situations, with the full knowledge that they may be seriously criticized at home for whatever they do. They need to have political courage to do their job properly.

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Research Note

COGNITIVE MAPS OF THREE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS

By JEFFREY A. HART*

I

THE main premise of this paper is that the domestic and foreign policies of Latin American states are strongly influenced by the belief systems of their domestic and foreign policy elites.[1] Specifically, I will assume that beliefs about the causal relationships among conceptual variables, called "cognitive maps" here,[2] which constitute a

* Revised version of a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1976. The criticisms and comments of Robert Axelrod, David Collier, Robin Dawes, Fred Greenstein, Bernard Grofman, and Albert Hirschman are gratefully acknowledged.

[1] Some of the reasons for adopting this premise may be summarized as follows: (a) Latin American nations, like other developing nations, are less constrained in their actions by mass public opinion or by bureaucracies than are developed nations; (b) their leaders usually adopt a distinctive style of policy making that emphasizes the fit between policies and ideology which is often lacking in the incrementalist politics of developed countries; (c) whenever there is a change in leadership in Latin American nations, there is usually a change in domestic and foreign policies which reflects the beliefs of the new leaders. In support of point (a), I would simply argue that there are very few liberal democratic regimes surviving in Latin America at the moment, and that if there were much bureaucratic politics in Latin America, a literature about it would have developed by now. The only works that I know of which discuss the constraining effects of interagency conflict or bargaining on state politics in Latin America are Peter S. Cleaves, *Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1974), and Franklin Tugwell, *The Politics of Oil in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1975). The idea, point (b), that beliefs and ideology are particularly important in determining the policies of Latin American elites—because of the lack of public pressures and the distinctive problem-solving style of those elites—was first discussed by Albert O. Hirschman, in *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961), 231. In support of point (c), I could cite the cases of the change in foreign policy which accompanied the elections of Jânio Quadros in Brazil, Salvador Allende in Chile, Rafael Caldera in Venezuela, and Juan Perón in Argentina. I could also cite many cases of changes in policy produced by extralegal changes in regimes. This matter has not received sufficient research, however, and it remains to be seen whether changes in policy can best be explained by the changes in belief systems that sometimes accompany changes in government personnel, or by other factors.

[2] I will define cognitive maps as sets of causal beliefs or assertions, though some scholars use the term to stand for general beliefs about the fundamental characteristics of some aspect of a physical or social environment, whether or not such beliefs are causal. I am indebted to Ole Holsti for this point. Other scholars are interested in sets of causal assertions as they are used in discussions and arguments among groups of

World Politics, October 1977, Vol. XXX, No. 1 © 1977 by Princeton University Press

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rather limited subset of the broader belief systems of these individuals, can help to explain—and perhaps even predict—their policy choices.[3] It is possible that, in studying these cognitive maps, we may learn something about cognition in general. In this introductory section, I will try to explain what a cognitive map is, how one is obtained through coding of documents, and why I chose to study the cognitive maps of Latin American elites. In subsequent sections, I will present detailed analyses of cognitive maps of three important individuals: (1) Carlos Andrés Pérez, the current President of Venezuela; (2) Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Finance Minister of Brazil from 1964 to 1967 and colleague of succeeding Finance Ministers (Antonio Delfim Netto and Mario Henrique Simonsen); and (3) General Aurelio de Lyra Tavares, the Brazilian Minister of War from March 1967 to August 1969. I will then compare the three maps in terms of a number of characteristics to be introduced below. I will conclude with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of studying cognitive maps.

A. COGNITIVE MAPS

Every individual's perceptions (and actions based on those perceptions) are filtered through clusters of acquired concepts and beliefs. The process in which this is accomplished is called cognition. A belief system is a set of interrelated beliefs that help the individual to make sense out of what might otherwise be a confusing array of signals from his environment. *A cognitive map is a representation of the causal beliefs or assertions of a specific individual.* To the extent that the cognitive map represents beliefs, it may be considered to be a subset of the individual's belief system.

Causal beliefs here are assumed to take one of the following simple forms: (1) an increase in A produces an increase in B (represented graphically as $A \xrightarrow{+} B$), or (2) an increase in A produces a decrease in B ($A \xrightarrow{-} B$).[4] Because people do not always speak in such a

policy makers. Such sets are more correctly called "rhetorical maps," because they do not assume that the individuals *believe* the causal assertions that they make in order to persuade others to go along with a particular policy. See Robert Axelrod, "Argumentation in Foreign Policy Decision Making," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1976.

[3] In other words, I am not denying the probable effects of noncognitive variables on the policy choices of individuals; but I am arguing, as Fred Greenstein does in *Personality and Politics* (New York: Norton 1975), xvii-xix, that the behavior of political actors cannot always be explained in terms of "situational" determinants and that therefore psychological explanations may sometimes be useful.

[4] Other types of causal beliefs may be assumed to exist and may be incorporated into the empirical study of cognitive maps. See Hart, "Comparative Cognition: Politics of International Control of the Oceans," in Robert Axelrod, ed., *The Structure of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976).

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simple causal language, it is necessary to establish elaborate coding rules for the translation of normal language into causal assertions. Since this has already been accomplished by Robert Axelrod and his students and associates in such a way as to produce a high level of intercoder reliability, I will use his rules here.[5]

Cognitive maps may be observed and recorded through a variety of means. The main ones are: (a) systematic coding of documents representing the writings or statements of the individual; (b) coding of verbatim transcripts of private meetings in which the individual is a participant; and (c) the eliciting of causal beliefs through questionnaires or interviews. The advantages of the first method are obvious: documents representing an individual's ideas and beliefs are usually easy to find; there is often a series of such documents that may help one to trace changes in beliefs over time; and, because the individual is usually writing for a general audience, the causal assertions are likely to represent defensible—if not always sincere—beliefs.

Of course, there are always temptations for political elites to misrepresent their beliefs. Whether the motive is to conceal their "true" aims or to be better able to persuade others, the effect is the same. Axelrod maintains that political elites are more likely to reveal their beliefs in private decision-making contexts, and therefore argues for the superiority of transcripts over public documents as a source for cognitive maps. Yet, both methods are vulnerable to insincerity, and transcripts are much rarer than documents. The problem of insincerity also exists for questionnaires and interviews, but in this case there is at least the possibility of discovering it through the insertion of certain types of items or through the face-to-face encounters that are only possible in interviews. The best approach would be to use as many means as possible. In this study, I must regrettably rely on documents only. I plan, however, to supplement this analysis with interview data in later stages of my research.

B. THE CODING OF COGNITIVE MAPS

In order to demonstrate how it is possible to estimate the cognitive map of an individual from his or her writings, I will present a sample coding for the first individual to be analyzed below, Carlos Andrés Pérez. The following paragraph is taken from President Pérez's speech to the Venezuelan people on August 29, 1975, after signing the bill that nationalized the petroleum industry.

[5] See Margaret Wrightson, "The Documentary Coding Method," in Axelrod (fn. 4).

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(A) The enterprise we propose to undertake has the colossal dimensions required for the Venezuela of today and of the future. It
(B) demands the joint effort of all Venezuelans. It is not only a matter of government decisions, nor is it only a legal and practical procedure for the conveyance of the ownership of the industry. Beyond that it is our true responsibility for the effective management (C) of an industry which operates in areas that were never
(D) before covered by Venezuelans, by means of a state organization (E) which we recognize to be clumsy and inefficient as well as still lacking in adequate public spirit which is essential to success.[6]

The first step in the coding of a document is to identify the conceptual variables that its author has emphasized. That is done by underlining key words and labelling them with capital letters. Usually each word or phrase so labelled has a two-letter code, the first letter indicating the page on which it was found, and the second letter indicating its sequential order on that page. In this example I have simply used a single letter.

The second step is to list the conceptual variables. Some rewording of the variables is usually required, but the phrasing should remain as close as possible to the original:

List of Variables

A = the enterprise
B = joint effort of all Venezuelans
C = effective management of the nationalized industry
D = operation of the industry in areas which were never before covered by Venezuelans
E = operation of the industry by means of a state organization

The third step is to identify the causal relationships explicitly stated or implied by the author. This is usually done in the margins of a photocopy of the document being coded. Here I will simply list the relevant statements.

List of Causal Statements	Coded
1. A . . . "demands" . . . B (B is necessary for A)	$B \xrightarrow{+} A$
2. D may have a negative effect on C (implicit)	$D \xrightarrow{-} C$
3. E may have a negative effect on C (since E is "clumsy and inefficient")	$E \xrightarrow{-} C$

One then looks for possible direct correspondences between variables. In this case it seems that "the enterprise" (A) and "the efficient management of the nationalized industry" (C) are really the same variable,

[6] *Towards a Great Venezuela: Nationalization of the Oil Industry* (Caracas: Oficina Central de Información 1975), 11.

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stated in different words. Therefore, the final coding of the paragraph, subject to revisions that may be suggested by its context in the entire document, would be as follows:



C. COMPARISON OF COGNITIVE MAPS

Based on the form of the map and on the document itself, it is usually possible to classify all the conceptual variables according to the following typology: (1) *utility* variables; (2) *goal* variables; (3) *policy* variables; and (4) *peripheral* variables. Utility variables exist in every cognitive map. Any time an individual places a positive evaluation on a certain value of a variable (as Carlos Andrés Pérez does on the efficient management of the nationalized oil industry, for example), one can assume a direct positive effect of that variable on a utility variable. In the case of President Pérez, the utility variable concerns the welfare of all Venezuelans, but utility variables may also concern the welfare of individuals and collectivities other than the state. Goal variables are variables that directly effect the utility variables, without mediation by other variables. Policy variables are variables that the individual seems to designate as being susceptible to control or manipulation by his government. Generally speaking, policy variables are not directly connected with utility variables, but they usually are connected indirectly through their effects on goal variables. Peripheral variables are variables which are not utility, goal, or policy variables. Peripheral variables come in three varieties: (1) variables that are directly or indirectly affected by policies, but that do not affect policies; (2) variables that directly or indirectly affect policy variables, but are not affected by policies; and (3) variables that affect, and are affected by, policy variables. One possible way to compare cognitive maps is in terms of the frequency with which utility, goal, policy, and peripheral variables appear in the maps.

Several additional properties of cognitive maps concern the nature of the causal *paths*, or chains of causation that follow the direction of the effects without going through any variable more than once in the individual's cognitive map. Since there are only two main types of

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causal assertions, there are also only two types of paths: *positive* and *negative*. Positive paths contain an even number of negative assertions; negative paths contain an odd number. Thus, in the map shown below, the path from A to D which goes through B is negative, and the path from A to D which goes through C is positive. The path from A to D



going through B is negative because an increase in A produces an increase in B, which in turn produces a decrease in D. Therefore, an increase in A produces (indirectly through B) a decrease in D. The sign of the path tells us the nature of the indirect relationship between the variables at the end points of the path.

An important property of cognitive maps is path-balance, or the degree to which parallel paths between pairs of variables have the same sign. In the example above, the signs of the two paths from A to D are not the same. Thus, we would say that the map is not path-balanced. The importance of path-balance lies in its relationship to the consistency between policy choices and cognitive maps. A *consistent policy choice* is defined as the setting of a policy variable to a certain value so that all causal effects, direct or indirect, have a positive effect on utility. For a policy choice to be consistent, the paths that connect it to the utility variables must be balanced. Path-balance is therefore a prerequisite for consistency as defined above. Several scholars have hypothesized that decision makers will prefer to make consistent policy choices of the sort defined here.[7] We can therefore compare cognitive maps in terms of the degree to which they are path-balanced.

Finally, we may be interested in two characteristics of cognitive maps which have nothing to do with the sign of the causal beliefs but are connected with the general pattern of linkages: the presence of causal cycles, and the density of the map. A *causal cycle* exists when it is possible to connect the endpoints of a causal path with a causal belief asserting that the terminal variable in the path affects the initial variable. Thus, the assertion that "A causes B, B causes C, and C causes A"

[7] Robert Jervis, "Consistency in Foreign Policy Views," in Richard L. Merritt, ed., *Communication in International Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1972); Axelrod (fn. 4), "The Analysis of Cognitive Maps."

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constitutes a causal cycle. It has been found in previous studies that cognitive maps coded from documents or transcripts rarely contain causal cycles; maps coded from certain types of questionnaires are more likely to contain them.[8] This property is interesting because it reflects a possible simplifying bias of normal verbal discourse.

The *density* of a cognitive map is simply a measure of its degree of interconnection. It is computed by dividing the number of causal assertions by the maximum possible number of causal assertions; that is,

$$\text{density} = \frac{n}{m(m-1)} \quad \text{where } n = \text{the number of beliefs and } m = \text{the number of variables.}$$

I will supplement the density measure with information about the relative frequency of conceptual variables per word of each document for each of the individuals. This measure will be called *variable frequency*.

In brief, it will be possible to compare cognitive maps in terms of the following characteristics: (1) the frequency of utility, goal, policy, and peripheral variables; (2) the degree of path-balance; (3) the degree to which policy choices are consistent with the maps; (4) the frequency of cycles; and (5) the density and variable frequency of the maps.

D. WHY LATIN AMERICAN ELITES?

There are a number of reasons for being interested in the causal assertions of Latin American foreign policy elites: (1) most obviously, because they are a subset of the universe of foreign policy elites and have not previously been studied in this way before (although in *Journeys Toward Progress*, Albert Hirschman clearly was concerned with accurately describing the causal beliefs of Latin American policy makers);[9] (2) because there are reasons to believe that the policies of developing nations are more affected by the cognitions of their elites and less by the constraints of large-scale bureaucracies and mass political pressures than the elites in developed nations;[10] and (3) because now that the developing nations have more bargaining power in international politics—thanks to OPEC and UNCTAD—the way in which their elites conceptualize their situations should be of increased interest to students of international politics in both the developed and the developing nations.[11]

[8] See the introductory chapter by Robert Axelrod in Axelrod (fn. 4).
[9] Hirschman (fn. 1), esp. chap. 4.
[10] See fn. 1.
[11] Since the actions of OPEC in 1973, several books have appeared which underline this theme. See, for example, *The Americas in a Changing World* (New York: Quad-

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The three particular individuals were selected because of the importance of the the countries they represent—Brazil and Venezuela—and because they provide an opportunity to compare the cognitive maps of persons of varying degrees of political responsibility. I have chosen a chief executive, a finance minister, and a defense minister, on the assumption that the chief executive will have broader political responsibility than the other two. Also, the three individuals represent different points on the rather broad spectrum of opinion among Latin American elites concerning economic ties to the United States and other developed nations.

II

A. THE COGNITIVE MAP OF CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ

On August 29, 1975, President Pérez signed the Bill Reserving to the State the Industry and Commerce of Hydrocarbons. This legislation authorized the nationalization of fourteen foreign subsidiaries in the Venezuelan petroleum industry. The actual takeover occurred on January 1, 1976, and despite severe misgivings of the nationalized firms about the fairness of the terms of compensation, the nationalization occurred in a smooth and orderly manner. On the occasion of signing the bill, President Pérez made a speech, quoting from a number of earlier speeches, justifying the decisions connected with the nationalization.[12] In my opinion, and in the opinion of a number of Venezuelans I interviewed, the speech reveals many of his central causal beliefs.

I coded 43 distinct conceptual variables in the speech, the length of which is approximately 3000 words. The list of variables is given in Table 1; the cognitive map of causal beliefs linking those variables is shown in Figure 1. One can observe immediately from the cognitive map that there are several peripheral variables that affect policy variables; e.g., ID affects IC. There are some unbalanced paths. There are no causal cycles. There are also relatively few peripheral variables compared to the number of policy and goal variables, because the paths connecting the many policy variables to utility variables are, on the average, quite short.

Notable among the peripheral variables that affect policy variables are AB (national consensus) and ID (dependence on foreign technology). President Pérez asserted that national consensus affected the de-

rangle Books 1975); Luigi Einaudi, ed., *Beyond Cuba* (New York: Crane Russak 1974); and Ronald Hellman and H. J. Rosenbaum, eds., *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role* (New York: Halsted Press 1975).

[12] *Towards a Great Venezuela* . . . (fn. 6).

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

Variables with no causal linkages: GA, LC, DD, CA, FB and OA. I am counting AA and BC as policy variables because they have no direct effect on U_{VEN}, despite their direct effect on U_{LA}.

FIGURE 1. COGNITIVE MAP OF CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ

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cision to nationalize the oil industry, and that dependence on foreign technology affected the decision to seek the cooperation of foreign technicians. Both of these effects contribute to the lack of path-balance in the map. While national consensus (AB) positively affects national sovereignty (FA) according to Pérez, by influencing the decision to nationalize the oil industry (AA), it increases Venezuela's dependence on petroleum (LA), and hence lowers national sovereignty. Similarly, dependence on foreign technology (ID) indirectly increases the efficiency of the management of the nationalized oil industry (IB), while it directly decreases national sovereignty.

The variables with the highest number of beliefs originating from (or terminating at) them are AB, FA, and IB—national consensus, national sovereignty, and efficient management of the nationalized industry. Judging from their frequency of appearance, these variables also seem to be the most important ones in the speech. CF (joint effort of all Venezuelans) was also linked to IB (efficiency of the nationalized industry) in at least three different places.

President Pérez did not assert that there was a causal relationship between efficient management of the nationalized industry (IB) and establishment of a sound economic base by means of Venezuela's own national resources (LB) (which I take to mean the ability to convert oil wealth into self-sustained economic growth). Instead, he suggested that it is the duty of Venezuelans to turn a potential linkage into an actual one. "If we are not capable of establishing a sound economic base by means of our own natural resources, we will have betrayed the profound sense of this historic act."[13]

TABLE 1

LIST OF CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES IN THE COGNITIVE MAP OF CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ

AA	nationalization (signing of "Bill Reserving to the State the Industry and Commerce of Hydrocarbons")
AB	national consensus
AC	nationalism; nationalistic consciousness
BB	recovery of the management of prices of oil (December 1970)
BC	opportunity of Venezuela to offer Latin America cooperation in the common struggle for independent development; cooperation of Venezuela with brother-nations of Latin America; Latin American integration
CA	dogmatism (shouting; demagoguery; disorder; haste)
CB	appointment of a broad presidential committee to study alternatives before submitting the plan for nationalization to Congress

[13] *Ibid.*, 23.

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CC mustering the participation of the entire community
CD operation of the oil industry in areas that were never before managed by Venezuelans
CE management of the oil industry by the state (clumsy; inefficient; "lacking in adequate public spirit")
CF joint effort of all Venezuelans
DA identification and feeling of solidarity
DB seeking the advice of OPEC and European and Latin American nations that have nationalized their oil industries
DC consultation and seeking of consensus
DD nationalization of iron mines (January 1, 1975)
EA debates within legislative chambers
FA national sovereignty ("attainment of the Great Venezuela that will make us the true masters of our destiny"); "independence, national will, and the affirmation of our creative ability"; "economic liberation"
FB strategic interests of any continental or extracontinental powers
GA use of oil as instrument of subordination or dependency; as means of aggression or international disturbance
HA setting the example of international solidarity
HB possession of petroleum by OPEC nations
HC ability to bring the industrial nations to a dialogue and to a realization of the need for a new economic order
HD unity of Venezuela with the Third World
HF serious dangers faced as a result of the decisions taken
IA entrance of Venezuelan youth into fields of science and technology, enthusiastically and in great numbers
IB efficient and stable management of the nationalized industry
IC eliciting of cooperation of foreign technicians
ID dependence on foreign technology
JA promulgation of the law of culture
JB cultural development
KA democratic humanism
LA dependence on oil industry
LB establishment of a sound economic base by means of our own national resources
LC establishment of the *Petroleos de Venezuela* holding company not subject to the contingencies of political life
NA development of masses of workers who are conscious of their rights
NB appropriation of the national product by a few
NC wasting of the national product by the State
ND enjoyment by some workers of privileges over others
OA change of employers under nationalization law
OB turning over of the company houses in which they are living to some of the oil workers
OC crisis of misunderstanding being undergone by the industrial countries
U_{VEN} utility of Venezuela
U_{LA} utility of Latin America and "all countries that have been the victims of the economic totalitarianism of the big industrial nations"

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There seems to be an implicit equation of the interests of Venezuela with those of all other nations in Latin America and in the Third World. Although Pérez qualified this equation slightly by mentioning the "current favorable historical circumstances" which made it possible,[14] the emphasis on solidarity and harmony of interests in the speech is quite striking.

B. THE COGNITIVE MAP OF ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

In 1963, Roberto Campos participated in the Conference on Inflation and Economic Growth in Rio de Janeiro. As a Brazilian economist, he was asked to speak on the subject of investment policy; he decided to focus on the relationship between inflation and foreign investment.[15] His response is of interest as a source for his cognitive map prior to assuming the post of Minister of Finance for Brazil from 1964 to 1967. It may be possible to explain his subsequent official policy decisions using the estimated map. In later stages of this research, I will compare this map with one coded from an article and a book written after his term of office.[16]

It is possible that the difference in the audience of Pérez and Campos may be responsible for the difference in their cognitive maps, since Pérez was addressing the Venezuelan people and Campos was addressing an international group of economists. Nevertheless, in looking at other works of Campos and at his official policies, it appears that he was indeed most interested in inflation and foreign investment and much less interested in the things that concerned Pérez—for instance, national sovereignty, national and international solidarity, and appropriation of the national product by a small proportion of the population. Indeed, he and his colleagues were later to argue that an increase in the concentration of wealth was a prerequisite of development.[17] Undoubtedly Campos shared with Pérez the goal of encouraging economic growth, yet the breadth of Pérez's concerns certainly exceeded that of Campos, while the sophistication of Campos's map clearly exceeded that of Pérez's.

[14] *Ibid.*, 10.

[15] Campos, in "Panel: Investment Policy," in Werner Baer and Isaac Kerstenetzky, eds., *Inflation and Growth in Latin America* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1964).

[16] Campos, *Reflections on Latin American Development* (Austin: University of Texas Press 1976); Campos, "A Retrospect over Brazilian Development Plans," in Howard S. Ellis, ed., *The Economy of Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1969).

[17] See Bruce Handler, "Flying High in Rio," *New York Times Magazine*, June 8, 1975, pp. 16-17, 87-94; Mario Henrique Simonsen and Roberto de Oliveira Campos, *A nova economia brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio 1974).

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

FIGURE 2. COGNITIVE MAP OF ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

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Table 2 lists the conceptual variables, and Figure 2 shows the causal beliefs in Campos's cognitive map. There are 34 distinct conceptual

TABLE 2

LIST OF CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES IN THE COGNITIVE MAP OF ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

AA	inflation
AB	foreign investment (ability to capture foreign resources to supplement domestic development or stabilization efforts)
AC	foreign private investment
AD	mobilization of loans, both public and private
BA	foreign direct investment (private)
BB	foreign portfolio investment (private)
BC	debt default in bond markets
BD	balance-of-payments difficulties
BE	exchange risks
BF	periodic exchange-rate devaluations
BG	windfall profits to foreign investors
BH	exchange overvaluation
BI	exchange controls
BJ	restrictions on profit remittances
BK	uncertainty (particularly in the case of slowly maturing investment with a long gestation period)
BL	expectations of balance-of-payments difficulties
BM	freezing of "critical" prices
BN	rigidity in certain sectors
BO	internal profitability of price-inflexible sectors
BP	transferability of profits (internationally in price-inflexible sectors)
CA	size of the expanding market
CB	optimistic price expectations
CD	protection of home markets
DA	special legislation on profit remittances which established quantitative limits for yearly remittances and excluded reinvested profits from the capital basis for computation of future remittances
DB	availability of public loans from international agencies and national governments
DC	ability to pay back loans in the future
DD	export performance
DE	private loans
DF	united loan financing (private)
DG	availability of suppliers' credit (private)
EA	export promotion in creditor nation
EB	favorableness of financial terms of loans
EC	formation of commercial arrears
ED	involuntary financing of debt by foreign governments
U_{BRZ}	utility of Brazil

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variables coded from a text of approximately 2000 words. In comparison with President Pérez's map, Campos's map has more peripheral variables, fewer policy variables, and more parallel paths between the two main variables—inflation and foreign investment. As in Pérez's map, not all the parallel paths have the same sign, and some peripheral variables directly affect policy variables. Unlike Pérez, Campos has a cycle of causation in his map, connecting favorability of financial terms of loans (EB) to balance-of-payments difficulties (BD), to ability to pay back loans (DC), to availability of public loans (DB), and back to favorability of terms. In the text, Campos commented that "we have here some sort of vicious circle."[18]

C. THE COGNITIVE MAP OF GENERAL AURELIO DE LYRA TAVARES

General Tavares was a member of the upper circle of the military elite that took power in Brazil in 1964. He was the Minister of War under President Costa e Silva and was one of the three officers who formed a provisional government after Costa e Silva suffered a major stroke.[19] The document used here for estimating his cognitive map is an excerpt from General Tavares's book, *O Exercito Brasileiro visto pelo seu Ministro*.[20] The excerpt was selected and translated into English by Paul Sigmund with the obvious intent of doing justice to General Tavares's ideas without translating the entire book. The original was meant for a general Brazilian audience, and thus may be compared to President Pérez's speech.

The cognitive map is shown in Figure 3, and the list of conceptual variables is given in Table 3. There are 37 distinct conceptual variables in the text of approximately 1500 words. Tavares's map is more like Pérez's than Campos's in that it has more goal variables, more policy variables, fewer peripheral variables, and therefore shorter paths from policy variables to utility than Campos's map. Nevertheless, Tavares's map has fewer policy variables than Pérez's; many of its goal variables are concerned with the utility of the Brazilian army rather than of the nation as a whole.

Tavares, unlike Pérez, showed no concern for the utility of other Latin American nations. In Tavares's map there are no causal cycles and there is only one pair of unbalanced, parallel paths, i.e., the paths

[18] Campos (fn. 15), 461.

[19] Anyda Marchant, "The Political and Legal Framework of Brazilian Life," in John Saunders, ed., *Modern Brazil* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press 1971), 115.

[20] Aurelio de Lyra Tavares, "The Brazilian Army and Politics," in Paul Sigmund, ed. and transl., *Models of Change in Latin America* (New York: Praeger 1970). Tavares's book was originally published in Recife in 1968.

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

FIGURE 3. COGNITIVE MAP OF GENERAL AURELIO DE LYRA TAVARES

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connecting intervention by the army in Brazilian politics (CG) and the utility of Brazil. On the one hand, Tavares admitted that intervention constitutes a violation of the legal structure of the country (CA); on the other hand, he argued that failure to intervene would have constituted betrayal of the nation's trust (CB).

Like Pérez's, and unlike Campos's, Tavares's map includes a variable reflecting the distribution of wealth. He asserted that the contrast between the wealth of a small minority and the poverty of the general population (BF) had resulted in an increase of the "subversiveness" of the population (AI), especially in Brazil's Northeast. Unlike Pérez, Tavares treated this concept as a peripheral variable rather than as a goal variable, or at least he made no assertion about the feasibility or desirability of reducing the concentration of wealth.

The sincerity of Tavares's map is put into question by the great pains that the General took to show that, despite the seizure of power by the military, it has maintained a civilian orientation and a commitment to democracy. There are fairly convincing reasons to believe him on this matter, such as his argument that the commitment to democracy (BJ) has helped to maintain the cohesion and discipline of the army (AF) while at the same time strengthening the democratic structure of the state (AE). But the linking of democratic structure (AE) to the use of civil liberties by certain groups that criticize the military government (DA), and thence to the subversiveness of the population (AI), casts some doubt on the nature of the military's commitment to democracy. At least, it appears that Tavares had misgivings about the civil libertarian aspects of democracy.

Judging from the number of assertions originating from, or terminating at, the different variables, it seems that General Tavares was most concerned about cohesion and discipline of the army (AF), recruitment of subversive elements (AL), and subversiveness of the population (AI). These concerns, and the clear division between (but implicit equation of) national and strictly military goal variables, suggest that the General's military role had a very strong influence on his concerns and beliefs. The heavy stress on subversion smacks of the ideological indoctrination that was commonly seen in the inter-American military training centers of the 1960's. If these beliefs were sincere—and I think they were—it would be interesting to trace their origins more precisely.[21]

[21] See Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origin, Politics, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1973); Stepan, *The Military in Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971).

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TABLE 3

LIST OF CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES IN THE COGNITIVE MAP OF GENERAL AURELIO DE LYRA TAVARES

AA	independence of the army from change in the government
AB	power of the government to select, promote, and assign military leaders
AC	politicization of the army
AD	professionalization of the army
AE	stability and development of the democratic structure of the state
AF	cohesion and discipline of the army
AG	international Communism (external force)
AH	distortions and fluctuations in the policy of the government
AI	negative attitude of the worker in the city and the countryside toward the army; subversiveness of the populace
AJ	pacifism in the working class
AK	lack of education of the populace
AL	recruitment of subversive elements
BB	explanation of the meaning of free government and the dignity it assures to the man of the less favored classes
BC	pointing to the participation of the army in constructive civic-action and -aid programs
BF	contrast between the wealth of a small minority and the poverty of the general population
BH	Communism in Brazil
BI	organization of the peasants
BJ	commitment of military officers to democracy
BK	hierarchical structure of the army
BM	support and confidence of the people of the Northeast
BN	influence of the army in civic education, aid, and training programs
BO	support that the Corps of Engineers enjoys in the interior of the Northeast because of the essential public works it undertakes for the improvement of the living conditions of the people
CA	violation of the legal structure of the country
CB	betrayal of the country of which they are supposed to be the ultimate guardian
CC	militarism
CD	dictatorship
CE	civilian orientation of the military in Brazil (respect for civil power)
CG	intervention of the army among the parties, to take power for the sole purpose of re-establishing the democratic order
CH	prestige of army
DA	use of civil liberties by opponents of the restoration of Brazilian democracy to present the revolution of March 31 as a movement by the armed forces to establish a military dictatorship

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DB	development
DC	development of the interior
DD	building of highways and opening up of distant regions by construction battalions of army
DE	defense by the army of petroleum and other subsoil resources
DF	military dictatorship
U_{ARMY}	utility of the army
U_{BRZ}	utility of Brazil

III

A. COMPARISON OF THE THREE COGNITIVE MAPS

In comparing the three maps in a more precise and comprehensive manner, I will confine myself to comparisons that may help to generate hypotheses for further examination and testing.

(H1) *The broader the political responsibility of the individual, the greater the number of goal variables.*

For the purposes of this section I will assume that one can rank the three individuals according to the breadth of their political responsibility, from broadest to narrowest, in the following manner: Pérez, Tavares, Campos. In terms of distance on a metric scale, I would place Tavares closer to Pérez than to Campos because of the great power of the military in post-1964 Brazilian governments. In column 1 of Table 4, it can be seen that individuals with greater responsibility did indeed have more goal variables.[22]

(H2) *Individuals with broader political responsibility will have fewer peripheral variables relative to policy variables.*

The evidence in favor of this hypothesis may be seen in column 4 of Table 4.

(H3) *Individuals with broader political responsibility will be more likely to believe that peripheral variables affect policy variables.*

In each map, I counted the number of policy variables that were directly affected by peripheral variables. The results are given in col-

[22] One might want to control for the size of the map by controlling for the number of conceptual variables. Since the maps have roughly the same number of variables (see Table 6), controlling for the number of variables does not radically change the results. One might question the decision to count those goal variables that affect U_{BRZ} together with those that affect U_{ARMY} for General Tavares while not counting variables that affect U_{LA} for President Pérez. It seemed to be appropriate because I was surer of Tavares's equation of the interests of the Brazilian Army with those of Brazil than I was of Pérez's equation of the interests of Venezuela with those of the rest of Latin America.

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umn 1 of Table 5. This hypothesis cannot account for the case of General Tavares: one would expect him to perceive effects of peripheral variables on his policy variables, but he does not. If one uses other measures of the extent to which peripheral variables are seen to affect policy variables, the results remain the same. Thus, hypothesis 3 does not appear to be as promising as the first two hypotheses.

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FREQUENCY OF CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES

Individual	*(1)* *No. of Goal Variables*	*(2)* *No. of Policy Variables*	*(3)* *No. of Peripheral Variables*	*(4)* *Ratio of Peripheral to Policy Variables*
Pérez	10	17	14	.82
Tavares	10	9	16	1.77
Campos	1	6	26	4.33

Source: Figures 1-3.

(H4) *Cognitive maps will tend to be path-balanced.*

Despite the fact that none of the cognitive maps estimated here were path-balanced, the fact that only one policy variable was connected with utility by unbalanced paths in two of the three maps, and only two policy variables were connected with utility by unbalanced paths in

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PERCEPTION OF EFFECTS OF PERIPHERAL VARIABLES ON POLICY VARIABLES, PATH-BALANCE, AND THE PRESENCE OF CYCLES

Individual	*(1)* *No. of Policy Variables Directly Affected by Peripheral Variables*	*(2)* *No. of Policy Variables Connected to Utility by Unbalanced Paths*	*(3)* *No. of Causal Cycles in the Cognitive Maps*
Pérez	5	2	0
Tavares	0	1	0
Campos	3	1	1

Source: Figures 1-3.

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the third map, seems to confirm, rather than to disconfirm, the hypothesis (see column 2 of Table 5). It will therefore be possible to use the cognitive maps of the three individuals to explain or predict their actual policies, using the criterion of consistency.

(H5) *Individuals with greater political responsibility will be more likely to assert beliefs which result in maps that are not path-balanced.*

This hypothesis clearly lacks promise, since all three individuals were about equally unlikely to have unbalanced paths in their maps.

(H6) *Cognitive maps coded from documents will tend to lack cycles.*

According to column 3 of Table 5, we can see that only Roberto Campos had a causal cycle in his cognitive map; in fact, he self-consciously asserted that such a cycle existed. Since this was the only cycle in the three maps, this hypothesis is supported by the data.

(H7) *Maps of individuals with broader political responsibility will have lower variable frequency and density than maps of individuals with narrower political responsibility.*

According to the figures in Table 6, the hypothesis appears to be reasonable, except that Tavares's map has higher variable frequency

TABLE 6

THE VARIABLE FREQUENCY AND DENSITY OF THE THREE COGNITIVE MAPS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE BREADTH OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

Individual	*(1)* *No. of Variables* m	*(2)* *Approx. No. of Words in Text* x	*(3)* *Variable Frequency* m/x	*(4)* *No. of Causal Beliefs* n	*Density* $\frac{n}{m(m-1)}$
Pérez	43	3000	.014	43	.024
Tavares	37	1500	.025	47	.035
Campos	34	2000	.017	47	.042

than Campos's (according to the hypothesis, the reverse should be true). One might account for this finding by the fact that the document from which Tavares's map was coded was edited by the translator. According to the translator, with whom I discussed this problem, it is quite likely that variable frequency was increased by the editing. In any case, the seventh hypothesis is supported by the data.

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B. CONSISTENCY IN POLICY CHOICES

Since the estimated maps of Pérez, Tavares, and Campos are almost path-balanced, it is possible to ask whether their actual policy choices were consistent with their maps. That is, did their policies set policy variables to values that produce an increase in utility, regardless of the number of paths that connect the policy variable to utility? In trying to answer this question I made a list of each individual's policy variables, specified the value that the variable would have to have in order to produce an increase in utility, and compared that value with the actual policies of the individual up to the time that the document was produced or shortly thereafter. For example, according to his map, Roberto Campos should have been opposed to periodic exchange-rate devaluations, exchange controls, and restrictions on profit remittances. This is in accord with his actual policies. Similarly, according to President Pérez's cognitive map, he should have been opposed to state management of the oil industry. In this case the policy is not consistent with the map, since Pérez established a state agency, called PETROVEN, to supervise the nationalized subsidiaries of foreign oil firms.[23] This was the *only* case of inconsistency for all three individuals, however.

One would naturally expect policy elites to demonstrate a high level of consistency in the short run between their policies and their assertions. A more interesting and important question is how they maintain or modify their assertions and beliefs in response to challenges from competing elites or the consequences of their own policy choices over time. In this regard, it may be interesting to note that Roberto Campos opposed the relaxation of anti-inflationary policies when this measure was proposed by President Costa e Silva shortly after he succeeded President Castello Branco in 1967. Costa e Silva, like Tavares, believed that the inequalities between rich and poor in Brazil were producing opportunities for political dissidents, and saw no contradiction between increased growth and a small amount of inflation.[24] Campos, on the other hand, may have perceived inflation to be incompatible with growth because of its negative effect on foreign investment. At least, that is what his unmodified cognitive map would tell us to expect from

[23] This should be seen in the light of the "depoliticization" of PETROVEN being attempted by Pérez. Pérez appointed General Alfonso Ravard, former head of the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (and a man known for his integrity), to be the head of PETROVEN. See "Oil, Democracy and Development," *The Economist*, December 27, 1975, p. 12 of "Survey on Venezuela."

[24] "Artur da Costa e Silva," *Current Biography Yearbook 1967* (New York: H. W. Wilson 1967), 87.

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his actual behavior. Thus, cognitive maps have a predictive, as well as explanatory, capability which remains to be tested in future research.[25]

C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The cognitive maps estimated here exhibit a number of interesting regularities that have been found in other studies, as well as some new properties that have not previously been investigated. As in earlier studies, the maps tend to be path-balanced and acyclic, making it possible to examine the consistency of the policy choices of the three individuals. With only one exception, all the policy choices of the three individuals were consistent with their cognitive maps.

A totally new set of findings is derived by examining the effects of variance in the breadth of political responsibility on the cognitive maps of different individuals. In general, we can say that breadth of political responsibility is positively related to the frequency of goal variables, negatively related to the ratio of peripheral to policy variables, and negatively related to the density and variable frequency of the map. The breadth of political responsibility appears to be unrelated to the tendency to assert unbalanced causal paths or to assert effects of peripheral variables on policy variables. Finally, the policies of the three individuals were, on the whole, consistent with their cognitive maps, suggesting that the maps may have some explanatory (and perhaps even predictive) capability. Clearly, I do not want to make any claims for the universality of these findings based on a decidedly non-random sample of three documents of three individuals. Yet the results are encouraging enough to continue these investigations using a broader and more representative sample.

IV

Having summarized the empirical findings in section III, I will focus in this concluding section on the relative advantages and disadvantages of cognitive mapping. The following are general criteria for theoretical approaches in social scientific inquiry: (1) parsimony, (2) generality, (3) descriptive power, (4) explanatory power, and (5) richness of normative implications.

Parsimony is the ability of a theoretical approach to generate a large number and variety of significant propositions from a relatively small

[25] For an example of the predictive power of cognitive maps, see Matthew Bonham and Michael Shapiro, "Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970," in Axelrod (fn. 4).

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number of assumptions. Cognitive mapping clearly scores high in this regard.

Generality is the ease with which a theoretical approach may be applied to different subject matters. Since cognitive maps have been used to study such disparate phenomena as the American constitutional convention, British imperialism in Persia, the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, the crisis in the Middle East,[26] and now the policies of Latin American elites, it is safe to score the approach highly on this dimension.

Descriptive power is the ability of a theoretical approach to suggest strategies for observation which result in reliable and valid measurements of real-world phenomena. An independent test of the reliability or validity of measurements was not made in this paper, but in earlier studies a high level of intercoder reliability and face validity was obtained. Thus, the approach usually scores high on this dimension.

The *explanatory power* of a theoretical approach is a function of the plausibility of its assumptions and of the accuracy of its predictions (including the idea of "postdiction," or predicting relationships among variables which may have held in the past). It is here that certain important questions arise concerning cognitive mapping. How plausible is the assumption of sincerity? Does the notion of "policy consistency" really *explain* the policy choices of elites, or does it merely *reflect* the attempts of elites to justify their policy choices after they have been made? The case in favor of the explanatory power of cognitive maps is strengthened by any evidence of truly predictive capabilities. That is, when one can use a cognitive map estimated at time T_1 in the past to predict an individual's policy choices at time T_2 in the future, assuming that the map at time T_2 contains (or at least strongly resembles) the map at time T_1, then the score for explanatory power rises. Since it was not possible to make such a prediction based on the material in this paper, the assessment of explanatory power must rest on the few studies in which such predictions were made and tested. So far, the record has been good.

All social scientific approaches have *normative implications*. That is, they all carry with them some prescriptive propositions that either justify or arise out of the inquiry itself. For example, I have justified the study of Latin American foreign policies by citing the increased bargaining power of the developing countries and the effects of this increased power on the interests of all nations. While it is the aim of

[26] See *ibid.*, throughout.

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this research to increase our understanding of Latin American foreign policies, the question of how this understanding is to be translated into action is another matter.

Cognitive maps have the advantage and the disadvantage of taking the causal assertions of political elites as they are, not as they should be. The approach requires a temporary suspension of criticism so that the beliefs of the observer do not contaminate the beliefs of the observed. If this temporary suspension turns into a permanent one, the normative power of the approach is greatly diminished. But the criticism of another person's beliefs must be based on standards that go beyond the personal beliefs and experiences of the critic.

Several such standards are suggested in this paper: (1) the degree to which the individual fails to make distinctions that are commonly made by others (which I will call the *conflation of concepts*); (2) the degree to which the individual's assertions agree with those made by persons of similar levels of expertise and experience; (3) the degree to which the individual's assertions reflect a certain amount of consistency over time; and (4) the degree to which changes in assertions reflect an ability to learn. Since I have not examined changes over time in this paper, I will concentrate on the first two types of standards.

The conflation of concepts was particularly useful as a standard in criticizing the assertions of Carlos Andrés Pérez and Aurelio de Lyra Tavares. Pérez conflated the interests of Venezuela with those of all Latin American and many other Third-World nations. Tavares conflated the interests of the Brazilian army with those of the Brazilian nation.

In omitting any consideration of the distributional effects of his anti-inflationary and pro-foreign investment policies, Campos was guilty of violating the second standard. On the other hand, both Pérez and Tavares included a distributional variable in their maps, as have many policy makers and commentators on policy making in developing nations. The absence of that conceptual variable in Campos's map reflects a lack of sensitivity to that question.

Perhaps the most important application of cognitive mapping, therefore, would be to provide the user with a list of concepts which he himself distinguished but which others did not, and vice versa. Similarly, one could provide the user with a list of assertions made by others which do not agree with those that he himself would make. The purpose of such an application would be to prevent the sort of talking at cross-purposes that often takes place at political negotiating sessions in both domestic and international settings.

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In summary, cognitive mapping scores high on all the criteria: parsimony, generality, descriptive power, explanatory power, and richness of normative implications. The approach certainly seems desirable as a supplement to the currently available alternatives to the explanation of foreign policies, including what has come to be called the study of "comparative foreign policy," theories of imperialism and dependency, and the various power-political approaches. This statement is based on the idea that individual belief systems are an important factor in determining policies. If alternative approaches do not allow for variance in individual belief systems,[27] they are likely to have much less explanatory power. Nevertheless, it is possible that belief systems of elites are closely related to "structural" characteristics of the nation-state (its power, its degree of dependency, the nature of its political institutions, and so forth), and that even better theories can be produced by a combination of cognitive psychological and "structural" approaches. It seems reasonable to require, however, that cognitive factors receive much greater attention now than they have received in the past.

[27] The comparative foreign policy approach allows for variance in perceptions at the national level in explaining the actions of the state. Yet it does so only in a grudging manner, so that perceptions remain secondary, and "structural" variables are primary. See the introductory chapter by the editor in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Comparing Foreign Policies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage 1974).

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Review Article

FROM REVOLUTION TO POST-REVOLUTION: How Much Do We Really Know about Yugoslav Politics?

By SUSAN LAMPLAND WOODWARD*

Ichak Adizes and Elisabeth Mann Borgese, eds., *Self-Management: New Dimensions to Democracy; Alternatives for a New Society*. Santa Barbara, California, and Oxford: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1975, 162 pp., $12.75 cloth; $4.75 paper.

Milovan Djilas, *Parts of a Lifetime*. Edited by Michael and Deborah Milenkovitch. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, 442 pp., $15.00.

Alex S. Edelstein, *The Uses of Communication in Decision-Making: A Comparative Study of Yugoslavia and the United States*. New York, Washington, and London: Praeger Publishers (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government), 1974, 270 pp., $18.50.

G. David Garson, *On Democratic Administration and Socialist Self-Management: A Comparative Survey Emphasizing the Yugoslav Experience*. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1974, 53 pp., $2.50.

A. Ross Johnson, *Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito*. Beverly Hills and London: The Washington Papers, Sage Publications, 1974, 67 pp., $2.50.

Lars Nord, *Nonalignment and Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*. Stockholm: Raben and Sjogren, 1974, 306 pp., 55 kronor.

Fred Singleton, *Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, 346 pp., $15.00 cloth; $5.95 paper.

Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism*. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 302 pp., $15.50.

HISTORY deals no more even-handedly with nations than fate does with individuals, and the impact on national pride and self-consciousness is real. In 1959, Milovan Djilas exulted for Yugoslavia: "Revolution introduced us into the world arena and everything that is humane will be exposed to the world. . . . Long enough have we been the orphans of history" (p. 118). Social scientists' treatment of con-

* I would like to thank Robert Bezucha for his generous help on this article.

World Politics, October 1977, Vol. XXX, No. 1 © 1977 by Princeton University Press

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temporary Yugoslavia, however, threatens to undermine the recognition won by its revolution and subsequent independent path.

A part of the problem lies with the subject. Although the sheer quantity of published research on Yugoslavia in the last decade suggests that inaccessibility is no longer an obstacle, some topics cannot be studied in Yugoslavia, and certain categories of quantitative data are unavailable. Further, a vital stage of scholarship, rich in detail and accurate in description, is missing for postwar and, to a certain extent, interwar Yugoslavia—lost somewhere between old-fashioned political history and the application of current economic and behavioral analysis. What other country is still known to the reading public by a travelogue of the 1930's, full of the prejudices of the day and of its author?[1] Neither the romantic image of the Balkans nor the Iron Curtain label on the Yugoslav state have been supplanted in the public's mind.

The real difficulty, however, seems to lie in the concepts, assumptions, and questions with which many scholars approach their study of Yugoslavia. When a perceptual apparatus based on the particular meaning of certain behavior and of politics in modern American society skims the surface of a society that is structurally and ideologically so different, much distortion necessarily occurs.[2] Despite recent attention to the provincialism of behavioralism, the blindness of operationalism to the cultural essence of social action, and the ideological assumptions built into the epistemology of the current discipline of political science,[3] little has been done to examine the result of such biases in studies of any particular society. On the contrary, the meanings of behavior within the American context have become the givens—the known constants—of comparative analysis, and the scholarly enterprise has become that of locating behavioral "equivalents" beneath cultural "particularities." Once the generalizations have been made, it is all too easy to forget that behavior is meaningless outside its structural and cultural context

[1] Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia*, 2 vols. (New York: Viking Press 1964; first published in 1940, 1941).

[2] One might use Zeno's paradox ("A Cretan says all Cretans are liars"), and particularly a modern reformulation of it ("Social scientists say that every man's knowledge of society is the product of that society") to invalidate this position. Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press 1964), 325, n.24. On the contrary, I want to argue here that the paradox has been considered an excuse to focus attention on technique and to avoid the kind of rigorous analytical self-consciousness which it suggests is essential.

[3] For relevant examples, see Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books 1973), 3-30, and Adam Przeworski, "Production of Social Relations: Comments Prepared for Panel on Comparative Politics," paper presented to the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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unless that context is incorporated into the nature of the comparisons being made. Unfortunately, this tendency—to see culture, and in its political aspect, ideology, as a removable mask rather than as an essential part of the subject (social action) itself—is reinforced by the behavioralist's concern with objectivity. The attempt to separate an observer's values from the "facts" he is observing has made values of any kind, even the meaning of the behavior observed, suspect. This segregation of values has been reinforced and institutionalized by the disciplinary separation of political philosophy from political science.

As a postrevolutionary society whose politics are entwined with an ideology that is explicit, conscious, aimed at a transformation of the forms of social action of an entire society, and thus only partially integrated into current behavior, Yugoslavia was bound to pose difficulties to scholars in the behavioralist tradition. Its ideology became the subject either of those interested in the systematic exposition of ideas, the origins of these ideas among leaders, and the relation of these ideas to the great philosophies, or of those who saw ideology as cover, vision, or weapon of those in power. One consequence was to rigidify an already inappropriate distinction between rulers and the masses; another was to identify ideology as normative theory, equating it with only one of its many functions. The literature painted one of two distorted images. The Hero (drawn predominantly by political philosophers) was self-managing, progressive, anti-Stalinist, and socialist "with a human face." The Villain (drawn predominantly by political scientists) was a one-party authoritarian state, an embarrassment to its proclaimed ideals. Seen from the perspective of political behavior in Western competitive party systems, the two images were occasionally represented as alternating stages in a zigzag between liberal and conservative periods of federal politics. More often, however, they became the sides of a chasm called "the gap between theory and practice." With few exceptions, only those scholars openly committed to a moral evaluation of Yugoslav politics have combined the two images in their analysis; in an ironic reversal of the logic of scientific inquiry, however, their question (whether asked hopefully or skeptically) often has become "Do the facts fulfill the theory (the ideology)?" rather than "Does my empirical theory fit the facts?" Many other writers have provided as many "facts" as they command, with much of the description as interesting as the country itself, but innocent of any susceptibility to either ideology or power.[4]

[4] Two exceptions are Bogdan Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1976) and Dennison

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The purpose of this essay is, through an examination of a number of recently published works, to raise questions about how much we really know about Yugoslav politics. I want to suggest that, by changing spectacles, social scientists may yet give Yugoslavia its due exposure as Djilas once expected.

I

"The function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful."[5] That is, "ideologies are always concerned with authority"[6] because they define the context and modes of political action which are legitimate. The interplay between authority and ideology is most apparent during political revolution since it is fought primarily to give a new set of rulers the right to impose their own definition of social order. The changes in forms of social action subsequently introduced make the period after the political revolution more revolutionary in reality than it is in appearance, but this fact is obscured by scholars who fail to realize that the relationship between ideology and authority is constantly changing. In Yugoslavia both of these changes show up in the constant adaptation of the language of social interaction. Since it is this conscious process of collective redefinition that interests political scientists, they are naturally attracted to the new language. To decipher it, much time is spent in translation, *explication de texte*, and relating new forms to content. At a certain stage, skilled "translators" are the respected figures of the profession.[7] But this approach has its dangers: at that stage, the form is so obvious that it may be thought not to represent anything real and so be dismissed, or the language may be overvalued and take on a life of its own apart from the action it guides. Above all, the political purposes of this definitional instrument may be forgotten.

The threat of misinterpretation is greatest when, as is the case with most descriptive accounts of Yugoslav developments, the translation is not a prelude to analysis. A. Ross Johnson's *Yugoslavia: In the Twilight*

Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1977).

[5] Clifford Geertz, "Ideology As a Cultural System," in Geertz (fn. 3), 218.

[6] Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968), VII, 68.

[7] The dependence of students of Yugoslav politics on the current doyen of interpreters, Dennison Rusinow, who writes for the American Universities Field Staff, illustrates the significance of this skill.

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of Tito, a monograph on "current Yugoslav affairs" (p. 5), clearly earns the author a place among the skilled translators[8] and serves to illustrate the tendency to ignore new meanings.

Johnson's discussion focuses on the recent devolution of federal powers to the republics (regions), on events which in his view foreshadow the direction of politics after the death of octogenarian President Tito, and on two neglected subjects—the army and its civilian counterpart, General People's Defense.[9] Although Johnson's discussion provides few clues—either for extending his analysis in time or beyond the narrow reaches of palace politics, or for predicting internal politics should the "external threat" (p. 57) to Yugoslav integrity intensify—it does achieve a welcome tone of balance. It is neither of the Hero nor the Villain school, as fits the descriptive mode. While emphasizing the centrist tendencies of recent policy, Johnson's approach to the immediate cause of this centrism—the "nationalist crisis" of 1967–1971—provides an example of the pitfalls of mere translation.

For Johnson, the "key domestic Yugoslav issue" (p. 2) is multiethnic conflict (ironically, called the "national question" by Yugoslavs), which he melodramatically identifies as "national hatreds of an intensity unsurpassed in modern Europe [which] have been submerged, not uprooted" (p. 54). Although it would be foolish to reduce the problem of ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia to its ideological context, it is also unwise to forget that context. One should remember that the soil in which Yugoslav Marxists grew was infested not only with poverty and inequality, but also with nationalist conflict which eventually eroded the legitimacy of the Kingdom; and, as Habermas reminds us, "The theoretical interpretations in terms of which the subjects come to know themselves and their situation are retrospective . . . changes of attitudes which result from insight into causalities *in the past*."[10] The Yugoslav economist Branko Horvat puts it another way: any attempt to improve the world begins with "a blueprint for a good society in which the

[8] Johnson is also the author of an intelligent study of the ideological origins of Titoism, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case 1945–1953* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1972). Readers should be made aware, however, that the monograph contains some surprising misspellings, such as the reference on page 18 to Senja Dapčević-Kular rather than the correct Savka Dabčević-Kučar.

[9] Since the nationalist crisis of 1971, however, heightened concern in the West about the role that the army might play in any future Yugoslav crisis, whether over succession to Tito or a renewal of the nationalist threat of secession, has stimulated research. The best recent article is Robert W. Dean, "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia, 1971–75," *Armed Forces and Society*, III (Fall 1976), 17-50.

[10] Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. by John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press 1973), 32-40; quote from 38-39, emphasis in original.

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manifest evils of the present society will be eliminated."[11] As victors of the civil war, the Marxists could not ignore the destructive conflict of the 1930's if they were to stay in power. Their solution was ideological (both as theoretical interpretation and as blueprint): attributing nationalist strife to the traits of the former regime, they defined the political aspect of ethnic identity as illegitimate, and so felt safe in fulfilling their wartime promises of ethnic equality in the new regime. But their tactics, a product also of retrospection,[12] were organizational, and they created a structure which, as it became more rather than less important, provided an arena for political expression of the ethnic conflict that they had expected to disappear.

Popular memories of the interwar conflict reinforce the rulers' definition of the situation, for the same Yugoslavs who consider the power of the League of Communists a contradiction in their self-managing society also grant legitimacy to this power when it appears essential to Yugoslav independence and the survival of the socialist regime. The threats to survival that Yugoslavs perceive are those of civil war or internal dissension arising from national conflicts, which would give an excuse for foreign intervention or subversion; therefore, the very nationalist expression that poses a challenge to the League's legitimacy also strengthens it. Foreign scholars, concerned as they often are with Yugoslav political stability and the growth of modern, nonparticularistic identities, are inclined to support the perspective of the party as sole integrator in Yugoslavia. In Johnson's version of this common attitude, "continued LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] rule is probably a precondition of domestic unity, for no alternative, all-Yugoslav state-preserving political force is at hand" (p. 55). It may be that the League itself is ambivalent about manifestations of "the national question" since it benefits when political issues are cast in nationalist language, making the terms of conflict unbargainable, compromise impossible, and the imposition of its authority imperative.[13]

[11] Horvat, "A New Social System in the Making: Historical Origins and Development of Self-governing Socialism," in Branko Horvat, Mihailo Marković, and Rudi Supek, eds., *Self-governing Socialism*, 2 vols. (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press 1975), I, 3.

[12] The European workers' movement had by then become tied to organizational solutions; further, it was generally considered that the failure of the Kingdom had been its unitary structure, its unwillingness to federalize.

[13] See Dennison Rusinow, "A Note On Yugoslavia: 1972," *American Universities Fieldstaff Reports*, Southeast Europe Series, XIX:3, on the paralysis of decision making at the center, caused by republican veto politics in the nationalist crisis of 1967–1971. Much has been written lately, particularly in Europe, on issues in multicultural politics which are unbargainable. See, for example, Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective* (Boston: Beacon Press 1971).

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At the same time, political competition in Yugoslavia is structured to highlight nationalist coloration. Since political, administrative, ethnohistorical, and, to a certain extent, even economic boundaries coincide in the federal structure, any organized attempt to challenge the current distribution of power and privileges which does not begin at the center can easily be associated with the interests of one nationality, and so becomes a threat to the others. Once an issue is perceived as a disagreement among national groups, all the symbols, allegiances, and sentiments of the past are readily available to those prepared to manipulate them;[14] the lack of regular political participation outside the League means that such manipulation is likely to lead to enthusiasm and excess. Played skillfully, the game promises high returns, for ideological guarantees of national equality ensure attention to the demands; but the risks are also high. The central leadership can use a threat of nationalist revival to impose authority, as it did in 1971–1972, on the grounds of state survival.

As long as the game of politics remains within party walls, there seems to be no vital concern over its nationalist potential; but when the contest includes an appeal for outside support or encourages popular participation, political identity is automatically perceived on the basis of ethnic identity; the competition becomes, by definition, illegitimate and a crisis of the system. Consider, for instance, the difference between 1966 and 1971. The purge of Vice President Ranković in 1966 has been retrospectively viewed as a victory for non-Serbian nations, particularly the Albanians and the Croats; yet it has never been labelled a "nationalist crisis." On the other hand, the Croatian students who protested federal regulations governing the distribution of foreign currency in their strike in November 1971—an attempt at political participation—were assumed to be nationalists from the start; the inability of the Croatian League to maintain control of the events brought on a crisis.

Johnson states that "institutionalization of the political system had not developed by 1972 to the degree asserted by some Western scholars" (p. 12), and that the key conflicts in the last decade have been over decentralization—"the issue of federal versus republican control" (p. 13); yet he continues to view the national issue as "the country's most urgent internal task" (p. 2). As a result of this automatic acceptance of the public interpretation and of the Balkan inclination to reflex historicism, he diverts attention from the source of conflicts to their

[14] In fact, the issues precede any Serb-Croat conflict; for a discussion of Croatian grievances against the Hungarians after the establishment of the Dual Monarchy, which parallel those of 1967–1971, see Oscar Jászi, "Croatia versus Hungary," in *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1929), 366-375.

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institutional expression. Moreover, he fails to analyze the crucial role of leaders in the political definition of inevitable processes of social and cultural differentiation,[15] and ignores developments that pose a serious challenge to the regime but receive little attention from leaders or the press.[16] After all, what *a priori* political interpretation would one attach to the following story of national feeling told by Fred Singleton?

> The well-known Serbian painter, Milić of Mačva . . . returned a letter sent to him by the National Museum of Valjevo[17] with a covering note stating that: "the Milić of Mačva Atelier receives no letter written in the Latin alphabet from the Socialist Republics of Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro or Macedonia. . . . If you wish to write me in the Latin alphabet, please do so from Croatia or Slovenia" (Singleton, 230).

The scholar who labors to penetrate the social definition imposed by an ideology without taking into account its relation to authority will also encounter difficulties in the translation itself. As he is translating *to* as well as *from* a set of ideologically defined perceptions, the reader —and even the translator—may supply his own political context for the one that is missing. For example, Johnson identifies the political attack on philosophy professors at Belgrade University with the conservative response to the nationalist crisis of 1971 because the purge occurred in 1974;[18] yet evidence suggests it was the final step in Tito's revenge for the professors' support of the student protests of 1968 (see, for instance, Singleton, 299). Johnson "mistranslates," apparently assuming a sequentiality appropriate to electoral competition in Western democracies. Even apart from the assumptions that partisan labels carry single, recognized meanings over time, and that such swings characterize all politics, this approach would trim off a great deal of meat with the fat in order to satisfy the Western palate. It confuses the nature of power with the locus of power; it ignores the differences between political spheres in Yugoslavia, the constant concern with legitimation in one-party states, and the changes possible by simply changing personnel; it interprets authoritarianism as a product of traditional culture;[19]

[15] Rusinow (fn. 13), emphasizes this key role of leaders. See also his four-part article, "Crisis in Croatia," *ibid.*, XIX, Nos. 4-7.

[16] For example, the growing differences between the socialist and private sectors: the acute urban-rural differences and the split between the socialist and private workers. See Ellen Comisso, *Workers' Control between Plan and Market*, unpub., chap. 5, "Market Socialism in Yugoslavia: Inequalities and Economic Performance."

[17] Valjevo is located in the Republic of Serbia where the Cyrillic alphabet predominates.

[18] Johnson refers to the "campaign against 'liberalism'" (p. 28); the nine faculty members have since lost their teaching posts; see Johnson, 26-28.

[19] Remarkable similarities in Yugoslav and Chinese politics, such as the authoritarian structure, a reliance on technocrats at crucial points, and particularly the popular in-

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and it loses a valuable opportunity to study politics where goal and method are considered separable.

Another approach to the difficulties of translation which plague all descriptive writing on Yugoslavia is to view ideology as rationalization and consciously eliminate its defining role from serious consideration. Politics is presented as a catalogue of problems to which practical persons offer temporary solutions based on a straightforward recognition of the complexity of the issues. The value of such an approach, as Fred Singleton's *Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia* shows, lies in its emphasis on the importance of context to policy, on the process of daily accommodation at the base of Yugoslav survival, and on the probability that a focus on doctrine alone would underestimate the responsiveness of ideas and leaders to conditions that threaten the security of those in power.

Thus Singleton tells us that "Yugoslavs have rarely let ideology impede pragmatism for very long, and their ideology is remarkably malleable" (p. 159). Nationalism—"only one of the many problems which face the Yugoslavs" (p. 288)—is introduced by a thorough presentation of its historical, demographic, economic, and legal background, removing any doubt as to the Yugoslavs' sensitivity to it. A "shotgun marriage" (p. 66) created the Yugoslav state in 1918 and wed peoples on two sides of an ancient "great cultural divide" (p. 30) that was subsequently reinforced by regionally patterned, economic inequalities. Changing patterns of natural population increase and migration (p. 223), an imbalance between levels of economic development and of possession of natural resources (p. 22) which portends future difficulties as in Belgium and Britain, and a failure of governmental policy "to close the gap in income level between the developed and underdeveloped regions" (p. 257), have all helped to keep sensitivities alive. Even though the Communists "believed that they had solved the problem" (p. 223) in the early postrevolutionary days, it erupted again in the late 1960's for at least three reasons: (1) feelings of group (ethnic) resentment and exploitation, even "deep-rooted anxieties about the survival of the nation [that is, ethnic group]" (p. 226) aroused by the structural inequalities in the economy; (2) "the tendency for policy makers and officials to develop a loyalty to the institutions in which

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clination to petition the ruler personally in times of difficulty, are usually attributed in the individual cases to the persistence of cultural traditions, despite the obvious differences between the two cultures. For China, see Joseph Lelyveld's review of *The Wind Will Not Subside* by David Milton and Nancy Dall Milton and of *Mao Tse-tung* by Lucian Pye, in the *New York Times Book Review*, May 9, 1976, p. 6.

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they operate and to strengthen their own positions within the institutional hierarchy by emphasizing its historical and cultural antecedents" (pp. 238-39), or what Djilas labels "bureaucratic nationalism" (Djilas, 382-85, 501); and (3) expansion of "the area of permitted dissent" (p. 225), which allowed public expression of popular grievances. Despite these political aggravations, Singleton views Yugoslav nationalism at root as "the world problem of relations between developed and underdeveloped regions" (p. 243), with the additional difficulty that "regional differences in economic development are reinforced by cultural, linguistic and religious differences between the [Yugoslav] peoples" (p. 243).

Singleton is a seasoned observer of the Yugoslav scene; his book reflects knowledge and reasoned judgment, although he makes no attempt at more than casual analysis or at revising interpretations systematically, and the untutored reader is left with an overwhelming complexity. What is important, however, is that Singleton's pragmatic approach and insolicitude to the role of ideology—even while he focuses on leaders and problem solving—leads him to deceptively apolitical, and often gloomy, conclusions. In the end, Singleton, like Johnson, views nationalism as a problem capable of solution rather than a collection of attitudes and behaviors whose definition as a problem, and thus whose resolution, depends on politics.

Self-Management: New Dimensions to Democracy; Alternatives for a New Society stands in contrast to Singleton's approach. It is a record of a seminar on participatory systems in Yugoslavia, Norway, and Israel, held at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, arranged and edited by Ichak Adizes and Elisabeth Mann Borgese. The constraints of setting are missing, the participatory systems are skeletal abstractions of their real selves, but the attention to the consequences of ideological definition for each is invaluable. The articles by Adizes and Kardelj particularly, as well as the recorded dialogue among participants, should convince readers that empirical analysis of workers' self-management cannot afford to ignore the role of social definition.[20]

[20] See also the work of industrial sociologists, best represented in this case by Josip Županov, for further attention to the importance of definition; two especially useful examples are Županov, "Yugoslavia: A Socialist Alternative," in Charles De Hoghton, ed., *The Company: Law, Structure and Reform in Eleven Countries* (London: P.E.P., and Allen and Unwin 1970), 320-36, and "Proizvodjač i riziko" [The Producer and Risk], in Županov, *Samoupravljanje i Društvena Moć* [Self-management and Social Power] (Zagreb: Naše Teme 1969), 13-38. See also Adizes, *Industrial Democracy Yugoslav Style: The Effect of Decentralization on Organizational Behavior* (New York: Free Press 1971), and Deborah D. Milenkovitch, *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1971).

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Adizes's article places the Yugoslav system in a universe of eight other participatory systems and properly defines self-management as a structure of relationships within an organization rather than characteristics of isolated behavior; it translates the conceptual model of self-management by comparing it explicitly to both market and statist systems (which, Adize argues, together pose the alternative to "community systems" such as the Yugoslav). Although he uses a borrowed framework of the productive process for comparison (the inputs of labor, capital, and natural resources, and their managerial prerogatives in each system), he succeeds in incorporating both the Yugoslav context and the interplay between politics and conditions. Indeed, Adizes's assessment of the Yugoslav experience with self-management is that current difficulties are a product of ideological assumptions about and thus definitions of the role of capital in particular (and so the concept of social ownership), and of the manager in the self-managing enterprise. Elsewhere Adizes argues that environmental pressures in Yugoslavia require ideological changes for adaptation, and that "If those changes will not take place now, while Tito's leadership exists, one wonders if future leaders will have enough power to counter the turbulence that might occur when these ideological changes will be called for."[21]

II

The unusual earnestness with which Yugoslavs seem to take their ideology initially attracted many of us to study socialist Yugoslavia. Ironically, however, this admiration has often led into a trap when questions for research are formulated. The ideology is viewed only as a set of ideals and is placed on a pedestal; the approach has become tied to measuring how close daily life has come to these ideals—to an evaluation, that is, of "the gap between theory and practice." As a result, the whole from which information is drawn remains hidden from view; what is lost is a sense of a fully functioning society in which people (who are neither infallible nor humorless) live their lives.

Thus, in *Nonalignment and Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*, Lars Nord chooses Yugoslavia because its "foreign policy has a far more elaborate theoretical framework than that of any other nonaligned country" (p. 4). His intention is to investigate "the incompatibility of nonalignment and socialism" (p. 4), an aim which he later defines as "the compatibility between ends and means"

[21] Adizes, "Economic Change in Yugoslavia," *East Europe*, XXI (August 1972), 14.

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(p. 80).[22] Accordingly, Nord divides his work into two parts. Part I presents theory as the concepts of imperialism, world revolution, and peaceful coexistence elaborated by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia; he also presents it as a set of goals—general (that is, nonalignment), socialism, and national security—which specify the principles of Yugoslav foreign policy (pp. 71-73). In Part II, he depicts practice in the form of three conferences of nonaligned nations (at Belgrade, Cairo, and Lusaka), and four events of international conflict (Suez and Hungary, both in 1956, the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, and Czechoslovakia in 1968). Using content analysis of official statements from each case, Nord codes the extent to which Yugoslav goals were promoted. His quantitative measures argue that the policy of nonalignment was unsuccessful: the nonalignment conferences failed to promote goals of national security; the cases of conflict, while promoting goals of socialism and national security, did not promote goals of nonalignment. Seeming to reverse himself, Nord concludes that Yugoslavia's socialist theory is a "handicap" (p. 286) to the foreign policy devised to promote it.

Quite apart from methodological criticisms (his choice of cases, the source of data, the method of coding, and the extent to which his findings are influenced by his definition of goals), it is Nord's view of ideology, practice, and their interrelationship that leads him into trouble. Having begun with an interest in the compatibility of nonalignment as means and socialism as end, Nord concludes by identifying nonalignment as a principle derived from socialist theory, as a goal in conflict with socialist goals, and as a practice consisting of official restatement of ideological principles that are abandoned when they conflict. What is it about ideology that leads to such confusion?

Even more surprising is the fact that Nord neglects the essentially political role of nonalignment for Yugoslavs, as well as the blatant differences among the foreign policies of socialist states. At the close of Part I, he suspects that "a characteristic trait of socialist states" is "expressing and disguising political measures in ideological terms"

[22] In contrast to Alvin Rubinstein, who attempts to explain the choice of a policy of nonalignment by its fortuitous linking of theory and practice (it "was ideologically congenial and politically feasible"), Nord believes that such an approach leads to description only and fails to relate ends to means (p. 4). See Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 37; for other studies of Yugoslav nonalignment, see John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road* (New York: Harper and Row 1967); Leo Mates, *Nonalignment, Theory and Current Policy* (New York: Oceana Publications 1972); and B. Dadić, ed., *Jugoslavija u svetu. Medjunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1941–1969* [Yugoslavia in the World. International Relations and Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1941–1969] (Belgrade: Mladost 1970).

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(p. 72), yet he never attempts to lift that disguise. By failing to recognize the domestic origin of foreign policy,[23] the repercussions of international conflict on socialism at home (a *domestic* goal),[24] and the range of diplomatic actions included in the policy of nonalignment (such as elaborate electoral politics in the United Nations), Nord overlooks the richness of the international arena (where various ideologies do coexist) as a source of inquiry into the link between normative theory and practice. Consider, for instance, the following article hidden on the back pages of the *New York Times*:

> As a result of changes in Yugoslav policy toward foreign investment, the Dow Chemical Company and Yugoslavia's largest oil and petrochemical company, INA, signed an agreement recently to build a petrochemical complex in Yugoslavia. The largest American investment in Yugoslavia ever, Dow's share of the partnership will be 49%. It will be jointly managed by DOW and INA.[25]

The gradual return of about a million Yugoslavs now temporarily working—and learning—in capitalist countries is another example.[26] Both cases raise questions about self-managing socialism and the role of foreign policy about which Yugoslavs, at any rate, are worried.

One could disregard Nord's approach for any number of reasons, but it is a popular one. Its reappearance in far more elaborate form in Sharon Zukin's *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* suggests the need for a second look. Zukin argues that her "interest in studying alternative forms of socialism" (p. 2) demands an examination of "how everyday practice diverges not only from

[23] Stipe Šuvar, a prominent and politically active Yugoslav sociologist, uncategorically states, "If we were to have something different [than self-managing production relations], then it's all the same to me whether Yugoslavia remains united or falls, which country will establish hegemony over us, and so forth." *Samoupravljanje i druge alternative* [Self-management and Other Alternatives] (Zagreb: Naše Teme 1972), 183. Robin Remington argues that "in this maverick socialist state the issues of internal and international security are hopelessly entangled. They cannot be isolated; it is artificial to deal with them separately." See "Yugoslavia and European Security," *Orbis*, XVII (Spring 1973), 98. It is also worth remembering that the problem of counterrevolution, fostered either by emigrés or the Soviet Union, is an issue of foreign rather than domestic policy for Yugoslav leaders.

[24] See, for instance, Johnson's discussion of General People's Defense (pp. 43-50), a clear example of the domestic repercussions of one of the cases Nord considers—Czechoslovakia 1968; self-management itself began as a domestic response to foreign politics, as a memorable strategy in the war against the Soviet Union after the Cominform Resolution of 1948.

[25] "Dow and Yugoslavs Sign a Record Deal," *New York Times*, March 27, 1976, p. 35.

[26] See William Zimmerman, "National-International Linkages in Yugoslavia: The Political Consequences of Openness," paper presented to the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; Zimmerman maintains that Yugoslavia is a particularly good example of obvious "international-national linkages" (p. 5), and illustrates his argument with the case of foreign workers from Yugoslavia.

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Marxist theory, but also from official Yugoslav ideology" (p. 4). Her format is much the same as Nord's: first ideology, then practice, and finally a judgment. Zukin views the latter more broadly as "social criticism"—offering Yugoslavs, "as well as other readers, several categories for thinking about and some standards for positively criticizing their society" (p. 266). In addition, the topic "calls for" sociological as well as social criticism (p. 267). This criticism is aimed at current "comparative sociological and political research" (p. 267): an "imperialistic, quantitative social science" (p. 267), which "tends to exploit its subjects" (p. 268) with "mechanistic concepts and abstract categories" (p. 268), and as such is inappropriate to a study of socialist ideology in Yugoslavia: its questions are "unrelated to either the life-problems of real people or the struggle toward universal and societal goals" (p. 268).[27] According to Zukin, one must examine "the lives of ordinary citizens" (p. 1) rather than "elites, processes, and institutions" (p. 2); that focus is noticeably absent from the other studies in this review. Finally, since the "gap" between ideological prescriptions and practice is created by the practical response of masses "with degrees of belief or disbelief, participation or withdrawal" (p. 4) to choices offered by a leadership and its ideology, ideology—itself reified and abstracted—becomes the measure of public attitudes and behavior in contemporary Yugoslav society. Zukin's concept of ideology shapes the remainder of the study.

As social critic, Zukin argues that Yugoslavs do not behave as socialists ought; that self-management is irrelevant to her subjects' lives; that politics are no less professionalized, hierarchical, and exclusivist than elsewhere; that industrialization and traditional culture have influenced social consciousness more than "socialist humanism" (p. 198), and have produced corruption, self-interest, and a race for the *dinar* rather than social relations of mutual respect, trust, a sense of social obligation, and self-managing communalism (p. 34); that youth are apathetic and skeptical and their parents disillusioned; in sum, that economic development and socialist goals are in conflict. The fault lies

[27] I do not mean to imply that her assertion is always misplaced, as a glance at Alex S. Edelstein, *The Uses of Communication in Decision-Making: A Comparative Study of Yugoslavia and the United States* (New York: Praeger 1974) will show. A compilation of 141 tables of percentages of responses to a survey, without sample sizes or any indication of the raw data on which these percentages are calculated, with 23 chapters giving a verbal rendition of the statistics, and no more analysis than an occasional "we found this to be of interest" (p. 69), it also illustrates the consequences of ignoring the Yugoslav context and of applying a foreign framework. Although its title refers to an increasingly crucial problem in the system of self-management, a subject of interest to many, it is actually a study of citizens' use of the mass media.

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with "the leadership's opportunism or pragmatism" which creates a "conceptual confusion between politics and economics" (p. 240). She does not specify what would not be confusing. Like Nord, she concludes that the problems are inherent in the ideology itself (pp. 71-75).

Why is this final step necessary? Many of her interpretations are shared by others.[28] By her own admission of a *parti pris* for "participatory democracy and economic equality" (p. 265), there is a hint of utopianism and of prior expectations that reflect Polanyi's paradox.[29] As she says at the outset, "Perhaps I was reacting with the American distrust of (another country's) political slogans, or with my generation's disillusionment with established priorities, but I wondered how far institutionalized self-management had reached into the lives of ordinary citizens" (p. 1).

The ideology guiding *Beyond Marx and Tito* is that of revolutionary fervor: a Utopian promise, an incitement to action, a bond of comradeship, a reason for sacrifice. It originates with leadership and, before it, with thought; it is philosophical and pure despite the intensely realistic conditions of battle; and it does not represent the ideology of a regime in power. Zukin turns to two philosophers (purged critics of the regime), Milovan Djilas and Svetozar Stojanović, and one less critical academic, Najdan Pašić, rather than to a Tito, Kardelj, or Bakarić, for the official ideology. She ignores both Habermas's distinction among theory, the organization of enlightenment, and the political struggle,[30]

[28] William N. Dunn, in a provocative article, "Ideology and Organization in Socialist Yugoslavia: Modernization and the Obsolescence of Praxis," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, v (August 1972), 21-56, focuses on the "tension" that "derives from an inherently inconsistent and ineffective combination of sociocultural goals (socialism) and utilitarian modes of compliance (material incentives)" (p. 25n.); Adizes (fn. 21), 14, also currently finds "disenchantment" among Yugoslavs with their system of self-management.

[29] The term is David Apter's, in "Introduction: Ideology and Discontent," in Apter (fn. 2), 15-16, and refers to Polanyi's characterization of the modern mind: "A new destructive scepticism is linked here to a new passionate social conscience; an utter disbelief in the spirit of man is coupled with extravagant moral demands. We see at work here the form of action which has already dealt so many shattering blows to the modern world: the chisel of scepticism driven by the hammer of social passion."

[30] Habermas (fn. 10), 32, writes, "The mediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified if to begin with we distinguish three functions, which are measured in terms of different criteria: the formation and extension of critical theorems, which can stand up to scientific discourse; the organization of processes of enlightenment, in which such theorems are applied and can be tested in a unique manner by the initiation of processes of reflection carried on within certain groups toward which these processes have been directed; and the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of the political struggle. On the first level, the aim is true statements, on the second, authentic insights, and on the third, prudent decisions. Because in the tradition of the European working-class movement all three tasks at once were assigned to the party organization, the specific differences have become obscured. . . ."

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and the less than steady voices of scholars in the Yugoslav government.[31] From the masses, on the other hand, she expects self-management and revolutionary spirit.

In place of self-management, she finds that "Yugoslavs' perceptions of socialism are related to their standard of living" (p. 77) with which they are "preoccupied" (pp. 78, 98), and that they equate socialism with a "tremendous change in lifestyle" (p. 79) and self-management with "economic rights" (p. 77, 98). Self-management does not "appear as salient to ordinary citizens as other formative experiences" such as upward social mobility, the struggle for wealth, and the war and its aftermath (p. 77). Yet, if we accept that ideology becomes a part of consciousness through retrospective reflection on the manifest evils of a regime and one's place in it, such attitudes are not at all unexpected. For ordinary Yugoslavs, the aims of their revolution were social and economic justice: "It was misery that led many to take up the Communist path" (Djilas, 23). No one died for self-management; it is the product of a struggle among leaderships, incorporated by legislation into the ideology a decade later. If one perceives disgruntlement in Zukin's material, it is with persistent economic inequalities rather than with domination by superiors. As one of her respondents says, "You know, self-management without a material base isn't self-management" (p. 98).

In place of revolutionary fervor, Zukin finds a "decline of revolutionary activism" (p. 120), a lack of public spirit, a disillusionment and cynicism made even more pronounced by the romantic memories which the older generation nurses of the golden age of struggle and personal involvement (pp. 91-92). Young people care more about completing their education than about self-management. Voluntary work brigades have been replaced by monetary investment in social projects where the return, the author asserts, is more important than the contribution (p. 129). Although she documents an important change, it is not the atrophy of ideology but of its revolutionary function.[32] Forms of social action are not more or less ideologically correct so much as their ideological character depends on and varies with conditions.

Zukin bestows her greatest attention on change in human character under socialist rule. Perhaps because such change is the least developed

[31] See Singleton, 286-87, for example; the reference to scholars here includes what the Yugoslavs call the "humanistic intelligentsia," rather than the "technical intelligentsia."

[32] Dunn (fn. 28), also sees a decline in the function of mobilization with post-revolutionary, more settled conditions in Yugoslavia. Oddly enough—especially if one takes a Gramscian view of things—he calls this an "obsolescence of praxis."

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aspect of socialist doctrine, she is forced to rely on her own concept of socialist behavior and becomes trapped by the tradition in which she was trained. To counter behavioralism, she looks to the techniques of anthropologists like Oscar Lewis: the in-depth, prolonged study of selected families to probe into "the consciousness of ordinary citizens" (p. 278). Unlike an anthropologist, however, she never gives us her questions, and she ascribes her own meaning to the responses. Where one would expect her to rely most heavily on her informants—for instance, in the chapter on "Cultural Parameters of Yugoslav Society"—she abandons them and turns to the work of other social scientists. Similarly, her evaluation of behavior—public interaction and political participation—is based on her own experience in Yugoslavia rather than on that of her subjects. Yet, when information about attitudes is needed, the subjects are allowed to speak directly for themselves.[33] In spite of her distaste for the way social scientists absorb living individuals into the abstractions of their concepts, she lets her respondents represent all of Yugoslav society. Perhaps out of concern to avoid what she sees as the exploitation of quantification, her sample consists of ten families, all Serbs from Belgrade, chosen casually through acquaintances and interviewed for a total of 65 hours. This is a study of a workers' state, but twice as much interview time is devoted to the five middle-class families than to the five families of workers. It is also a study of the potential of self-management, but only one respondent belongs to a workers' council. And it is a study of Yugoslav society, but six of the ten families include current members of the League of Communists. When she needs a measure of reliability after all, Zukin seeks out aggregate socioeconomic data and the quantitative studies of other social scientists. One wonders nevertheless whether the preoccupation with economic grievances that she found would have had another meaning had her sample been rural, less predominantly middle-class, or even non-Serbian.

[33] As Marx reminds us, however, "All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." *Capital*, III (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House), 797; cited in Maurice Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality in Economics*, trans. by Brian Pearce (London: NLB 1972), 1. Godelier states in his introduction, p. xxvi, that "It is therefore impossible for scientific cognition to be built up from the spontaneous representations formed by individuals of their social relations, and this radically refutes empiricism in all the fields where it operates. There is no fundamental difference between the spontaneous models of their society that individuals make for themselves, 'the set of ideas' they have regarding their 'social structure in practical situations' (Leach), and the learned models constructed by sociologists and economists who start from the same spontaneous representations and whose models 'exist only as logical constructions in [their] own mind' (Leach)."

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Finally, this study of self-managing practice looks at the behavior and attitudes of individuals, not at their social relations. Zukin's examples of unself-managing behavior, such as "egoistic competition" (p. 197) and collective "irresponsibility" (p. 199), come from the street, not the workplace; she assesses democratic participation in voters' meetings rather than in associations of workers. Yet, if democracy for liberals means democracy in the polity but not necessarily at the workplace, is there a reason why the reverse should be less democratic?[34] Having "expected something more democratic from self-management" (p. 191), Zukin concedes too easily before apparently bourgeois attitudes for which she had sought alternatives. Attributing the meaning of similar manifestations in a developed, capitalist democracy to what she observes in Yugoslavia, she assumes that these manifestations contradict self-management. As a result, we learn what self-management means to the author, but not what it means to her subjects.

Zukin concludes that the "gap between theory and practice" in Yugoslav socialism is wide and that it results from four factors: (1) traditional culture; (2) industrialization and economic development; (3) the professionalization of politics; and (4) intergenerational differences. All of this has been said before. The second and third are from Djilas's well-known thesis developed in the early 1950's.[35] The first and fourth, Shils has argued, always modify the success of ideologies in power.[36] But what if we separate Zukin's question from her data?

Freed from the specter of Utopia, *Beyond Marx and Tito* is a book about social and geographic mobility, the formation of political generations, and the adaptation of ordinary individuals to uncertainty and rapid societal change. For example, there are scattered hints that the apathy, withdrawal from politics, and "bourgeois" values Zukin finds in her sample do not apply to other Yugoslavs, particularly the rural poor. Political activism, according to her younger respondents and to what she has gleaned from sociologists such as Olivera Burić, is a means of climbing the social ladder. Rural youths hide their insecurity, both psychological and social, behind political activity; the lower social strata are the seat of idealism among the young. Also, the unsocialist public behavior to which the fascinating discussion of chapter six is devoted might reveal, on different examination, the "ruralization of

[34] See Carole Pateman, "A Contribution to the Political Theory of Organizational Democracy," *Administration and Society*, VII (May 1975), 5-26, on the distinction within liberalism.

[35] Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger 1957).

[36] Shils (fn. 6), 72-73.

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urban areas" which, according to some scholars, is part of the particular pattern and rate of urbanization in postwar Yugoslavia.[37] A comparison between public behavior in Ljubljana and Belgrade, for instance, or, I would venture, of current urban behavior with that between the wars, would deflate the author's conclusion that contemporary public interaction is simply an unreformed remnant of traditional culture.

Zukin's discussion of political generations is an intriguing entrée into the political socialization of the children of a revolutionary generation, rather than evidence of apathy and disillusionment. Young people, raised on stories of a romantic age, are reminded that they played no part, but must make the revolution real by achieving as much as this open society will allow; when they try to please their parents (for instance, by joining a youth brigade), the experience does not match the parents' idealism; when they confront their parents with what they see (illustrated by a mother-daughter exchange on petty corruption, p. 119), the parents deny the very reality that has led to their own withdrawal; and when they accept their parents as models and turn to school, work, and the struggle for the *dinar*, they are unfavorably compared to the youth of the past. The author does not remind us, however, that the major crises of 1968 and 1971 centered on student unrest.

Finally, many of Zukin's examples raise profound questions about adaptation rather than about the failure of socialist practice. There is the awkward attempt by a university student to fulfill his self-managing responsibility of *vratar* (doorman) among his peers which infuriates Zukin (p. 211); there is the young student who says, "I wondered and worried a lot over that, what is self-management?" (p. 95); and there are the tactics of informal groups, particularly of those Zukin calls "establishment activists," to control the course of decisions at local voters' meetings (pp. 158-192), the adaption of a traditional instrument —gossip—for expressing and organizing opposition in modern organizations (pp. 233-34), and the petty corruption in enterprises and offices.

"If the relatively short experience of Yugoslavia can teach us anything," writes a Yugoslav sage, "it is that the problems are far more complicated than they appear to be when seen from the viewpoint of modern social philosophies."[38] The danger in the approach followed by Zukin and Nord is that a perception that something is wrong—of

[37] See George W. Hoffman, "Migration and Social Change," *Problems of Communism*, XXII (November-December 1973), 16-31; Jack Fisher, *Yugoslavia—A Multinational State* (San Francisco: Chandler 1966); and Andrei Simić, *The Peasant Urbanites: A Study of Rural-Urban Mobility in Serbia* (New York and London: Seminar Press 1973).

[38] Županov, "Yugoslavia . . ." (fn. 20), 320.

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anomaly—will not become prelude to discovery. What is at stake, in the end, is the impact on curiosity of a scholar's disillusionment, not the apparent failure of Yugoslav practice. By the end of Nord's study we are persuaded that Yugoslav nonalignment is not worth exploring; by the end of Zukin's book we feel drained of any hope for or interest in the ideal of self-management. Yet students of Yugoslavia will find Zukin's material a rich source of ideas about self-management. Is social ownership, as Adizes contests, necessary for the social relations of self-management? In what way does industrialization contradict socialist goals? What are the popular rather than political bases of nationalism? Is nationalist feeling on the decline, as Denitch argues?[39] Is the bourgeois personality really a product of capitalism and exclusive to its social system? What patterns of social consciousness do we find in Yugoslavia? Finally, the books under review rarely ask what politics has to do with the answer to these questions and why. As Garson argues in his review of the literature, *On Democratic Administration and Socialist Self-Management*,[40] the "problems associated with Yugoslav practice are not intrinsic to the self-management model, yet there is a danger that misplaced judgments by academics and workers alike will lead to rejection of the model" (p. 43).

III

In the two preceding sections I have tried to argue several points about the treatment of ideology in studies of Yugoslav politics: that one cannot ignore it nor treat it solely as a shimmering vision toward which people strive; that one's own ideology influences the selection of data and interpretations and must therefore be openly recognized; that the role of ideology in Yugoslav society is not stable over time; that it helps shape the behavior under study; and that judgments about its realization must be based on an investigation of conditions which is entirely separate from that question itself.

The poignantly human dimension of this thesis touches us in Milovan Djilas's *Parts of a Lifetime*, which for the editors, Michael and Deborah

[39] Denitch (fn. 4), pp. 105-148.

[40] Garson's monograph places Yugoslav self-management in the framework of contemporary efforts to democratize society, as in Western Europe and Israel. The review is so tightly packed that its subtleties may be lost on first reading, while a second and even third reading suggest that readers already conversant with the literature he discusses will find it most useful; further, the comparison with Israel and Europe is implied, but neither justified nor developed.

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Milenkovitch, was clearly a labor of love.[41] This single volume gathers selections from Djilas's writings ranging from 1928 to 1973, from the literary to the polemical, and from the personal to the political. One-third of the material has never before been published, and another third only in Serbo-Croatian. Reading it reminds us how many current interpretations originated with Djilas in the early 1950's, and how little we have improved on those ideas or subjected them to systematic tests. One also experiences ideology directly—in the changes Djilas's thought has undergone over time, in the clear distinction between his literary and political writings, in the accounts of pragmatic decisions (such as the organization of the federal state), and in the exchange between accusers and accused at Djilas's 1954 trial. At the same time, the volume illustrates how useful similar studies of the present Yugoslav leaders, such as Tito and Kardelj, would be.

Above all, *Parts of a Lifetime* is valuable as a collection of *pensées* on Yugoslavia. For example, Djilas's *Diary of Thoughts* from 1953–1954 already contained musings that are appropriate to the issues raised in this review:

> It seems essential to me that the *period of transition* from capitalism to socialism not establish any *definitive* philosophy nor even less any *definitive* social system.
>
> The "application of Marxism" to . . . reality leads to dogmatism. For since it is reality that is new and the theory that is old, the theory should be adjusted to the new reality, and not reality to the new theory. The old theory can only be a starting point for both the new theory and the new practice. . . .
>
> An interesting psychological observation: whenever we Communists come upon hard times, we always recall some universal values, but as soon as we win—the class within us bursts out ever stronger. Why is this so? (p. 191; emphases in original).

Have we taken advantage of Djilas's perspicacity in our understanding of Yugoslav politics after the revolution? I think not. The conclusion to be drawn from the works reviewed here is that we continue to take Djilas for granted: we accept his analysis without penetrating his terms or perspective; we treat his thesis of the new class as the assumption for further work rather than as one hypothesis; and we thus relegate a study of Yugoslavia simply to reaffirming broad general-

[41] Michael Milenkovitch has also compiled a useful bibliography on Djilas, *Milovan Djilas: An Annotated Bibliography, 1928–1975* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International 1976).

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izations about authoritarian regimes. Djilas's notion of the new class and the role of organized authority in revolution (especially historical cases of Communist revolutions), once depersonalized and grafted onto the prevailing notion of ideology in American social science, set the terms of inquiry for the study of Yugoslav politics. While the Milenkovitches' book allows us to repersonalize Djilas's terms and thus to apply his arguments appropriately, we are still left with a literature written behind ideological blinders.

Thus, the concept of the new class has for a generation of scholars been a description of the political structure of Yugoslavia, whereas for Djilas it was recognition of a *class structure* and its particular political properties. Although the character of the ruling class was new as the result of the revolution, its politics were necessarily old and familiar to him precisely because there were still classes.

Nevertheless, it came to be accepted that nothing in the politics of Yugoslavia was novel after the revolution and thus, that there was nothing there to study;[42] in this view, the state remained an authoritarian polity in the formal-legal sense, in which authority was being wielded for the same reasons and in the same way as in all other authoritarian, essentially one-party states. The main question for research was to determine who was in control in any particular instance (so as to reaffirm the party's role), rather than to look for how control was exercised, what constraints there were on its use within the society, what impact this form of authority had on outcomes, or even whether the formal-legal structure of authoritarianism best described what was actually there. The sole sign of change in this political structure could be administrative—namely, decentralization—even if the nature of power remained the same at a lower level.[43] It seemed, further, that the reasons Djilas gave for the nature of authority in Communist regimes—the revolution and the need to industrialize to catch up with the West—were replaced by a vague consensus about the nature of Communist parties, so that only a change in the role of the party (rather than, for example, industrialization or distance from the revolution) could pro-

[42] Djilas writes, "The political structure in many ways remains just as it emerged from the revolution" (p. 401). Denitch, writing from a similar perspective as Djilas was originally, observes that "Self-management has launched processes in the base of the society which have not yet produced an appropriate political superstructure. This is, if for no other reason, because the *political structure* has a history and tradition while the *social system* is new." "Notes on the Relevance of Yugoslav Self-management," *Politics and Society*, III (Summer 1973), 489; emphasis in original. The statement, however, could easily be misleading in the sense I am discussing.

[43] Šuvar (fn. 23), asserts that decentralization to the republican level has only transferred the monolithic concept of power to a different sphere, but has not changed the nature of power exercised in Yugoslavia.

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duce a change in the authoritarian rule of the new class. Again, Djilas's thesis itself was never subjected to a definitive test.[44]

The liberal foundations of American social science seem to have reinforced these preconceptions. The formal-legal view of government looked to a country's constitution for its political structure; significant changes in politics produced by economic and social developments were disregarded as long as they could not be measured by changes in the laws. At the same time, scholars were often blind to the significant lag in Yugoslavia between passage of a law and its implementation. When the Yugoslavs insisted on replacing or amending their constitution so often, Western social scientists assumed that they had little respect for the rule of law. Yugoslavs, however, engineer constitutions to make basic, ideologically directed changes in the structure of the economy. If necessary, they can handle the control of ideas (the intelligentsia and the mass media), of the means of coercion (the police and the army), and of popular participation (the party and its associated organizations) by purge, since these three bases of rule are personalistic. Control of capital, on the other hand, depends on role and structure, not on persons, so that here purge does not work; only a change in the structure itself can lead to changes in the economy. In the Yugoslav view, the polity is not shaped by laws as much as by the conditions of the economy and of social relations: the structure of power changes continually with conditions and is rarely described by constitutional (formal-legal) symbols.

Liberal precepts about the individual as the basic social unit have also led social scientists to misunderstand the concept of self-management, the influence of ethnohistorical cleavages on the structure of society, the foundations and consequent role of the single party in a corporatist rather than individualist state,[45] and the nature of political participation. The idea that democracy means individual political participation in the state has only reinforced the social scientists' misuse of Djilas's argument: it seemed to reaffirm that Yugoslavia was indeed

[44] An attempt to confront one part of Djilas's thesis with hard data does occur in Frank Parkin, "Yugoslavia," in Margaret Scotford Archer and Salvador Giner, eds., *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1971), pp. 312-15.

[45] One of the best analyses of Yugoslav society at the moment (though it does not intend to be and is limited to certain aspects), is the discussion of corporatism by Ronald Rogowski and Lois Wasserspring, *Does Political Development Exist? Corporatism in Old and New Societies*, Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics, II: 01-024 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications 1971). Rogowski takes the argument further in *Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).

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an authoritarian state and an alienated political culture,[46] in spite of Yugoslav assumptions about, for instance, the primacy of the economy over the polity, and of workplace democracy over governmental democracy. Rather, Yugoslav citizens were considered to be alienated because they did not act as if governmental politics were primary and economic and social issues secondary. Zukin is right that data analysis dependent solely on aggregation of individual attitudes and behavior is inappropriate to the Yugoslav polity—not, as she would have it, because it "exploits" the subjects, but because its use can so easily lead to a misunderstanding of the system.

Finally, many students of post-revolutionary Yugoslavia have kept ideology antiseptically separate from the grime of authoritarian politics. Assuming that the role of ideology is to establish goals for the new society, scholars have proceeded to view Yugoslav goals as set, and politics solely as administration and social control. Not surprisingly, descriptions and analyses of Yugoslav politics look very much like those of administrative systems in the West, such as Britain's and France's (before Suleiman's attempt to reintegrate politics into the study of administration in France).[47] The pragmatism of the administrator and engineer has been emphasized. For Johnson, Yugoslavia is "muddling through" (p. 59); for Adizes, its policy is "crisis-oriented,"[48] and for Singleton it is "ad-hoc" (p. 288);[49] for both Zukin and Singleton, there is continuing compromise with principle and short-term decisions.[50] Descriptions of Yugoslav politics have attended only to outcomes, in particular at the federal (system-wide) level, and not to inputs or the process of decision making. Constraints on leaders have not been studied, and raw politics, particularly grass-roots attempts to change

[46] This conclusion is not limited to non-Yugoslav social scientists. In Yugoslavia it is associated with Pavle Novosel, who maintains that Yugoslav political culture, especially among the young, should be labelled "alienated"; see his "Politička Kultura u S.R. Hrvatskoj [Political Culture in the S.R. of Croatia]," *Politička Misao*, 1970, for example. Novosel is trying to explain the decline in political interest among young people, however; his argument should not be taken as a reason for not asking what leads an ordinary individual to forego his political alienation, or for not expecting grass-roots participation at all.

[47] Ezra N. Suleiman, *Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).

[48] Adizes (fn. 21), 8; for France, see the argument of Michel Crozier in *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964).

[49] Although Singleton does give this impression, his book contains much material that would permit a different perspective.

[50] See also Milenkovitch (fn. 20), who cites George W. Hoffman and Fred W. Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1962), 90n, to emphasize the "pragmatic quality" of theoretical speculation in Yugoslavia.

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the order of social preferences, have largely been ignored.[51] Since it has been assumed that administrative politics are necessarily bureaucratic, the remarkable responsiveness of the Yugoslav leadership in some circumstances is little known.

Viewing ideology solely as a guide to intended change of a system, scholars have concentrated on the pace of change set by leaders, on the extent of their success in accomplishing such changes (the gap between theory and practice), and on the "traditionalism" of citizens which slows the pace. Yet, is not a system undergoing rapid change, or at least attempting it, a far better subject for studying conservatism—in particular, the conservative mentality, renewed particularism, and protective mechanisms of individuals trying to find balance and stability under conditions of uncertainty—than an openly conservative society? Moreover, having forgotten the importance of "illusion" to revolutionary and ideologized societies, we have tended to treat "disillusionment" among the citizenry as an extreme form of dissatisfaction leading to withdrawal, rather than as a novel element of the political culture created by that ideology. Finally, just as the Aristotelian classification has plagued comparative politics, so the scholarship on Yugoslavia has been beset by a classification keyed to the two stages of its revolution (1941–1945 and 1949–1953) and its ideology, without regard to postrevolutionary changes in that ideology or to the role of changing conditions: although clearly the Yugoslav system fits none of these categories, it has been assumed to bounce regularly between capitalist, statist, and self-managing politics.[52]

Our knowledge of the details of Yugoslav politics is increasing, but it is not clear whether we know their context, or the relationship between power and goals, economy and polity, leaders and masses. We do know that the expression of popular discontent has followed increases in disagreement within the party; that organizational approaches to stability have dominated thus far; that the less the federal government and the party attempt to direct changes, the less political consensus is necessary.[53] We know that individual participation in

[51] George Klein does suggest that the nationalist crisis of 1971 must be understood as a growth of grass-roots politics and the appearance of a generation of leadership with strong ties to active constituencies within the republics. "The Role of Ethnic Politics in the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 and the Yugoslav Crisis of 1971," paper presented to the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[52] See Dušan Bilandžić, *Ideje i Praksa Društvenog Razvoja Jugoslavije, 1945–1973* [Ideas and Praxis in the Social Development of Yugoslavia, 1945–1973] (Belgrade: Komunist 1973), 294.

[53] On this point, see writings by Milenkovitch (e.g., fn. 20) and Rusinow (fn. 7).

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politics seems to aim at upward social mobility, while collective political action is directed at a share of the pie (distributional questions rather than systemic goals); that popular disillusionment, if Zukin's respondents are representative, suggests little challenge to the legitimacy of the system itself since it is clearly within the terms set by the prevailing ideology; that the central leadership currently believes increased Marxist education of the young will increase support for the system rather than undermine it; and that recent constitutional changes, in Polanyi's terms,[54] are designed to move the Yugoslav system back to a redistributional system from one based on market exchange. We do *not* know whether this apparently corporatist state can also be Marxist; whether there are avenues within the current political structure for channeling increasing social differentiation; what the differences are between one-party and multi-party political mechanisms; whether identities are shifting from ethnicity and territory toward communities of work (presumably necessary for self-management); and how our ignorance of the private sector, whether urban or rural, distorts our overall perception.

That we do not understand the actual structure of politics in current Yugoslavia is not only important in itself but also limits our ability to respond to the questions that so many people want answered. To get beyond description and assess Yugoslavia's potential as a socialist state, the extent of its corporatist character, the actual role of ideology in postrevolutionary circumstances, the extent to which social environment is shaping consciousness or the converse, what conflicts exist between the demands of economic growth and efficiency and the achievement of social justice as prescribed by self-managing socialism, to what extent studies of attitudes can inform us about the structure of this system,[55] and ultimately its possibilities for stability after Tito, we need to know more than we do now and be freer from the intellectual prejudices of the past.

[54] See Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry Pearson, eds., *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1957).

[55] Ivan Šiber finds, in a survey of political attitudes and socialization among rural youths, that while they respond appropriately (i.e., positively) to statements containing the self-management ideals, they also respond positively to statements containing attitudes Šiber identifies with bourgeois society—even though these two sets of attitudes should be mutually exclusive or at least contradictory. "Politička socijalizacija seoske omladine" [Political Socialization of Rural Youth], *Sociologija Sela* XIII (November-December 1975).

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Revista Trimestral Publicada Por el Colegio de México

Fundador: DANIEL COSIO VILLEGAS
Director: RAFAEL SEGOVIA
Director Adjunto: BLANCA TORRES RAMIREZ

VOL. XVII **ABRIL-JUNIO, 1977** **NUM. 4**

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Suscripción anual (4 números) **120.00 pesos, U.S. Dls. 7.20**

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO

Departamento de Publicaciones
Camino al Ajusco 20
México 20, D.F.

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